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Aporetic Thinking and the Production of ‘Race’ focuses on the early 
critical writings of W.E.B. Du Bois and the central theoretical texts of 
Frantz Fanon. Usually viewed as articulating the conflict between a 
biological and a socio-historical notion of race Du Bois’s early texts are 
generally considered a failed attempt to disentangle himself from the 
constraints of nineteenth century racial discourse. Moving away from 
the limitations of this interpretation, I claim that Du Bois’s conception 
of race emerges from his methodological engagement with the defining 
question of his early work, “What is a Negro?” My dissertation 
contends that the methodological imperative guiding his early analysis 
of this question places him alongside Max Weber, Heinrich Rickert and 
the German neo-Kantians, and his mentor Gustav Schmoller in his 
attempt to establish the epistemological basis of social scientific 
practice. I link the epistemological concern that guides Du Bois early 
analysis of the ‘Negro problem’ to the emergence of his distinct notion 
of race. His increased focus on the epistemological substrate 
constitutive of the phenomena he calls the ‘Negro’ and his inability to 
determine it in a manner he considers satisfactory coincides with his 
accelerated shift to the biographical as the modality through which the 
 paradox of the ‘Negro’ is thought. I suggest that race, as formulated by 
Du Bois in texts as diverse as The Negro, Dusk of Dawn, “The 
Conservation of Races,” “Sociology Hesitant,” Darkwater, and Black 
Reconstruction, is reducible to neither biology nor culture. Rather than 
this often rehearsed dichotomy I propose that Du Bois’s notion of race 
gestures towards what contemporary theory identifies as the space of 
the ‘political’. It is on this point that the problematic Du Bois confronts 
insinuates itself within the work of Frantz Fanon. In “Aporetic 
Thinking” I argue that the proliferation of theoretical languages within 
Fanon bears witness not to a seeming theoretical confusion on his part 
but rather speaks to the inadequacy of available theoretical languages 
to define or register the being of the Negro. Rather than championing 
one specific theoretical ‘Fanon’ (e.g. psychoanalytic, Marxist, 
phenomenological, etc.) my analysis, read within the context of 
Heidegger’s “Age of the World Picture,” contends that Fanon’s work is 
best viewed as a challenge to the dominance of ‘theoretical 
understanding’ itself and of the subject it produces. The slippage 
within Fanon between ‘theory’ as discursive modality and ‘theory’ as a 
form of understanding is the site, I argue, from which Fanon’s 
conception of what constitutes the space of colonial politics must be 
thought. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The pairing of the two authors at the center of this study might, 
on first appearance, seem somewhat unusual. W.E.B. Du Bois and 
Frantz Fanon although representative members of what might be 
considered a discourse of the margins have until recently shared very 
little common disciplinary space within the University. In fact not long 
ago Du Bois and his texts were generally relegated to the darker 
corners of English departments while Fanon, perhaps finding greater 
favor, was more often to be found in political science departments than 
anywhere else. Of course times change. Today, Du Bois, although still 
principally taught in English departments, has acquired a much 
higher profile. Due in part to the institutionalization of African 
American studies within the academy and his central place in the 
canon of an African American literary tradition, Du Bois now 
commands far greater attention within academic circles than was 
imaginable even a generation ago. Fanon, likewise, has seen an 
expansion of his horizons. Postcolonial studies and the increasing 
attention to transnationalism within cultural studies have made of 
Fanon’s work a necessary reference point for any serious scholarship 
in these areas.  
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Despite the repositioning of their work within the academy both 
authors seem nonetheless bedeviled and unable to escape the 
parameters governing the initial reception of their writing. Du Bois is 
still the inherited symbol of an ongoing racial politics that defines his 
texts in terms of their role in that politics. In other words, the Du Bois 
who offers an alternative conception of method within the social 
sciences, who engages in a critique of the emerging positivism of 
sociology, and who attempts to redefine the parameter through which 
we apprehend the social scientific object is elided in favor of the 
progressive, reformist, that is, the ‘political’ Du Bois.1 Fanon in certain 
ways seems to fare no better. His reception is still marked by the 
dichotomy that prevailed when I first encountered him in college 
(which is quite some time ago now). There is the early Fanon, attentive 
to the formation of racialized identities and the fracture of their 
interiority but who seemingly cannot recognize the terms of the politics 
in which these agents live. And the later Fanon, cognizant of the 
political reality of the colonial world and the revolutionary political 
action that it requires, yet who seems somehow incapable of truly 
thinking the possibility of identity other than as political/national 
                                                
1 The importance of Anthony Appiah’s essay on Du Bois’s “The Conservation of 
Races” and the attention it generated stems in part from its challenge to this 
‘political’ Du Bois. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, "The Uncompleted Argument: Du 
Bois and the Illusion of Race," Critical Inquiry 12 (1985), Appiah, "Uncompleted.", 
Appiah, "Uncompleted.", Appiah, "Uncompleted.", Appiah, "Uncompleted." 
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identity.2 Work on Fanon has tended to reproduce this dichotomous 
reading, positioning him on either one side or another of the 
postmodern/political, psychoanalysis/phenomenology, etc., divide.3 
The respective terms of their reception also sheds some light onto the 
reason why there has been little attempt among scholars to bring 
these two thinkers into conversation. Scholars of Du Bois and Fanon 
have traditionally been separated by linguistic and disciplinary 
differences with Du Bois and Fanon each believed to be addressing 
                                                
2 The principal line of demarcation here is of course between Peau noire, masques 
blancs and Les damnés de la terre. See Frantz Fanon, Peau Noire, Masques Blancs 
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1952), Fanon, Peau Noire, Masques Blancs, Fanon, Peau 
Noire, Masques Blancs, Fanon, Peau Noire, Masques Blancs, Fanon, Peau Noire, 
Masques Blancs, Frantz Fanon, Les Damnés De La Terrre (Paris: François Maspero, 
1961), Fanon, Les Damnés De La Terrre, Fanon, Les Damnés De La Terrre, Fanon, 
Les Damnés De La Terrre, Fanon, Les Damnés De La Terrre. 
3 Recent examples of collections organized along such lines are Anthony C. 
Alessandrini’s Frantz Fanon: Perspectives and Lewis R. Gordon’s Fanon: A Critical 
Reader. Two noted attempts to resist this trend can be found in the Spring 2002 
special issue of Parallax that collected a range of contemporary essays on Fanon and 
in the recent work of Hortense J. Spillers. See Anthony C. Alessandrini, ed., Frantz 
Fanon: Critical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1999), Alessandrini, ed., Frantz 
Fanon: Critical Perspectives, Alessandrini, ed., Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives, 
Alessandrini, ed., Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives, Alessandrini, ed., Frantz 
Fanon: Critical Perspectives, Lewis R. Gordon, Dean T. Sharpley-Whiting and Renée 
T. White, eds., Fanon: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996), 
Gordon, Sharpley-Whiting and White, eds., Fanon: A Critical Reader, Gordon, 
Sharpley-Whiting and White, eds., Fanon: A Critical Reader, Gordon, Sharpley-
Whiting and White, eds., Fanon: A Critical Reader, Gordon, Sharpley-Whiting and 
White, eds., Fanon: A Critical Reader, Hortense J. Spillers, "'All the Things You 
Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your Mother'," Boundary 2: An 
International Journal of Literature and Culture 23.3 (1996), Spillers, "'All the Things 
You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your Mother'.", Spillers, "'All the 
Things You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your Mother'.", Spillers, 
"'All the Things You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your Mother'.", 
Spillers, "'All the Things You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud's Wife Was Your 
Mother'.", Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, "Introduction: Fanon's Counterculture of 
Modernity," Parallax: A Journal of Metadiscursive Theory and Cultural Practices 8.2 
(2002), Ziarek, "Introduction: Fanon's Counterculture of Modernity.", Ziarek, 
"Introduction: Fanon's Counterculture of Modernity.", Ziarek, "Introduction: Fanon's 
Counterculture of Modernity.", Ziarek, "Introduction: Fanon's Counterculture of 
Modernity." 
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quite different questions. While Du Bois’s work has been principally 
viewed as raising questions of concern to African Americans, of their 
role in the production of an American national imaginary and the 
politico-racial economy that subtends it, Fanon’s purview has been the 
terrain of violent anticolonial struggle and the complex 
psychodynamics (whether individual or collective) inscribed within it.  
A recent and still emerging body of scholarship is attempting to 
move beyond the parameters that up to now have governed the 
reception of Du Bois and Fanon’s work. In “Race, Marxism, and 
Colonial Experience: Du Bois and Fanon,” Michael Stone-Richards 
offers a provocative reading of the link that unify Du Bois and Fanon 
in a common project.4 Du Bois and Fanon, Stone-Richards argues, are 
inheritors of the early Marx and the left Hegelianism out of which his 
early work was produced. By focusing on the terms governing black 
experience Du Bois and Fanon each conclude, according to Stone-
Richards, that under capitalism the socius is characterized by a 
“doubleness,”–termed ‘manichaeanism’ in the case of Fanon and 
‘double-consciousness’ in the case of Du Bois. With enviable 
attentiveness to the nuance of each writer’s text Michelle Wright’s 
recent study, Becoming Black: Creating Identity in the African Diaspora, 
links Du Bois and Fanon through a common lineage arguing that their 
                                                
4 Michael Stone-Richards, "Race, Marxism, and Colonial Experience: Du Bois and Fanon," The 
Cambridge Companion to W.E.B. Du Bois, ed. Shamoon Zamir (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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respective work (alongside that of Senghor and Césaire) constitutes a 
pioneering if problematic counter-discourse of race.5 Du Bois and 
Fanon, Wright contends, produce within their respective registers a 
critical response to the idealist fallacy that grounds the dialectical 
conception of the “Black Other.” Vilashini Cooppan, in her rewarding 
Worlds Within: National Narratives & Global Connections in Postcolonial 
Writing, understands Du Bois and Fanon to be articulating the 
complex relation between the national and the global, identity and the 
nation within their texts.6 In each case, Cooppan argues, the 
heterogeneric and polyvocal character of their best known texts arise 
from the logic of spectrality (in its Derridean sense) that animates their 
respective relation to territory and nation.  Both Thomas Holt and 
Ross Posnock each use the occasion of analyses of Du Bois and Fanon 
to make quite pointed interventions in disciplinary debates occurring 
in their respective fields. For Holt, Du Bois and Fanon illustrate how 
“race” is structured within and reproduced through the sinews of the 
everyday. Experience (in its subjective and objective dimensions) 
demarcates, in both a phenomenological and analytical sense, the 
locus where “race” acquires its force by simultaneously structuring 
                                                
5 Michelle M. Wright, Becoming Black: Creating Identity in the African Diaspora (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004). 
6 Vilashini Cooppan, Worlds Within: National Narratives & Global Connections in 
Postcolonial Writing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
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that experience and being structured by it.7 The traditional tools of the 
historical profession are unable, Holt concludes, to register the range 
of issues such a conception of race and racism present. Posnock’s 
essay engages with various currents within the academy that are 
unified, he suggests, by their adherence to a notion of postmodernism 
and the identitarian politics that arise from it.8 His reading of Du Bois 
and Fanon positions them as inheritors of a cosmopolitan sensibility 
at odds, he argues, with the conception of politics and particularity 
that circulates within the academy today. As suggestive and 
productive as these studies have been they are still primarily 
concerned with either situating Du Bois and Fanon within the secure 
confines of (new) disciplinary borders or construing them as a 
legitimating voice for one side or another in our institutional polemics. 
To approach the relation between Du Bois and Fanon from a different 
perspective we need to return to the constraints that have worked to 
confine them to different institutional spaces within the academy. 
As their respective places within the academy have become 
increasingly secure, the questions Du Bois and Fanon are believed to 
be asking have progressively overlapped (i.e., identity, subject-
formation, race, etc.) and the issue of who is best suited to speak to 
                                                
7 Thomas C. Holt, "Marking: Race, Race-Making, and the Writing of History," The American 
Historical Review 100.1 (1995). 
8 Ross Posnock, "How It Feels to Be a Problem: Du Bois, Fanon, and the 'Impossible Life' of the 
Black Intellectual," Critical Inquiry 23 (1997). 
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these particular configurations has itself arisen as a point of debate.9 
These debates have a great deal to do with the allocation of resources, 
the corporatization of higher education, the marginalization of the 
humanities on the university campus and the transformation of the 
modern research university into a constellation of knowledge 
increasingly defined by what Bill Readings terms the “idea of 
excellence.” Yet they also speak to the challenge minority discourses 
pose for the self-conception of the university. At issue here I would 
suggest is the particular question raised by presence of these 
discourses/disciplines on the University campus, namely whether they 
can be subsumed under the logic by which the University constitutes 
disciplinary knowledge.  
Attending to the question of knowledge formation raised by 
Reading’s analysis requires asking a different type of question: what 
object occupies the center of our disciplinary inquiry. Not what 
objective do we pursue in our inquiries but rather what object sits at 
the center of these inquiries and how does the construction of that 
object (i.e., how we constitute its ‘objectness’) determine the 
disciplinary boundaries/logic we inhabit. This is the fundamental 
question that guides my encounter with Du Bois and Fanon. What I 
                                                
9 See Mae G. Henderson, "'Where, by the Way, Is This Train Going?': A Case for Black 
(Cultural) Studies," Callaloo 19.1 (Winter, 1996), Wahneema Lubiano, "Mapping the Interstices 
between Afro-American Cultural Discourse and Cultural Studies: A Prolegomenon," Callaloo 
19.1 (Winter, 1996). 
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mean to suggest here is that any attempt to assess the work of Du 
Bois and Fanon must also address the tenuous and conflicted relation 
their texts propose to sites of knowledge formation, that is to the logic 
of exclusion and regulation by which a field of inquiry comes to ground 
itself as a site of knowledge. Without due attentiveness to this dynamic 
the challenge Du Bois’s and Fanon’s texts put to us risks being lost in 
the unsaid of our everyday intellectual practice. Although they now 
occupy relatively secure places within the Parthenon of ‘our’ canonical 
texts this should not blind us to the disruptive capacity these texts 
embodied – a capacity initially thought particularly ill suited to a 
disciplinary order. In an attempt to identify the source of Du Bois and 
Fanon’s ‘disciplinary’ unease this study focuses on the following 
questions their texts raise: What does it mean to think the Negro? 
What does it mean to think the ‘nègre’? In taking Du Bois and Fanon 
to be proposing the above questions, I understand them to be both 
placing pressure on the terms through which a disciplinary logic 
produces its object and inquiring whether such a logic can 
circumscribe the figures they identify as the ‘Negro’ and the ‘nègre’.   
For both Du Bois and Fanon ‘thinking’ the Negro and the ‘nègre’ 
takes place alongside a (re)consideration of the sites from which such 
thinking occurs. In other words the strictures that define the 
institutional space, discursive regime, or theoretical vocabulary that 
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purports to register/produce the Negro necessarily come under 
review.10 At the center of this (re)consideration is the figure of the 
Negro as both the locus and articulation of the limit. My reference here 
is less to the status that the Negro (or in an earlier epistemic 
configuration the African) assumes as the limit of western modernity’s 
conception of the human than to the consequences that accrue from 
the attempt to account for the Negro within recognizable discursive or 
disciplinary terms. Du Bois and Fanon in attempting to define (in the 
case of the former) and critique (in the case of the latter) the fiction one 
calls the Negro reveal, within their respective registers, the limits of the 
discursive regimes that purport to speak to and through it. Homi 
Bhabha helps us understand the mechanics by which the 
reinscription Du Bois and Fanon articulate produce their critical 
valence. Fanon’s thought according to Bhabha––who is here outlining 
the contours of Fanon’s critical gesture––moves beyond a simple 
contradiction of the West’s epistemological formula. In repeating the 
West’s “metaphysical ideas of progress or racism or rationality” Fanon 
does not simply counter these ideas but “distantiates them … makes 
them uncanny by displacing them in a number of culturally 
                                                
10 I will use the term “Negro” for the balance of this introduction rather than the 
clumsier Negro/nègre. By this I do not mean to suggest that the terms operate 
identically in the work of each writer or that they draw from an identical historical 
and semantic field. But because these figures designate, in their respective fashion, a 
moment of instability and disturbance within the fields they occupy, they thus 
assume a similar position in relation to the discourses they address and that 
address them. 
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contradictory and discursively estranged locations.”11 For Bhabha, 
Fanon engages in a “catachrestic reversal” that results in both the 
displacement of conceptual vocabularies and the ‘unwarranted’ 
crossing of discursive boundaries. In other words, Fanon proceeds via 
the solicitation of an aporetic moment. The critical possibility Du Bois 
bequeaths to us requires that we understand how he also thinks the 
Negro through/as an aporetic disturbance. This avenue in Du Bois’s 
thought is opened by his continuing attempts to situate the African 
American ‘subject’ in relation to notions of exemplarity and 
exorbitance (and all that this structure of excess suggests).12 Mobilized 
through the various figures that appear throughout his early work 
(e.g., veil, double-consciousness, etc.), these terms and the particular 
theoretical resistance they inscribe shape the landscape on which Du 
                                                
11 Homi Bhabha, "Conclusion: 'Race,' Time and the Revision of Modernity," The 
Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994) 339-40, Bhabha, "Conclusion: 
'Race,' Time and the Revision of Modernity,"   339-40, Bhabha, "Conclusion: 'Race,' 
Time and the Revision of Modernity,"   339-40, Bhabha, "Conclusion: 'Race,' Time 
and the Revision of Modernity,"   339-40, Bhabha, "Conclusion: 'Race,' Time and the 
Revision of Modernity,"   339-40. 
12 Nahum Chandler in a series of provocative essays explores the centrality of 
notions of exorbitance and exemplarity in Du Bois’s work. Nahum D. Chandler, "The 
Figure of the X: An Elaboration of the Du Boisian Autobiographical Example," 
Displacement, Diaspora, and the Geographies of Identity, eds. Smadar Lavie and Ted 
Swendenburg (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), Chandler, "The Figure of the 
X: An Elaboration of the Du Boisian Autobiographical Example.", Chandler, "The 
Figure of the X: An Elaboration of the Du Boisian Autobiographical Example.", 
Chandler, "The Figure of the X: An Elaboration of the Du Boisian Autobiographical 
Example.", Chandler, "The Figure of the X: An Elaboration of the Du Boisian 
Autobiographical Example.", Nahum Dimitri Chandler, "Originary Displacement," 
Boundary 2: An International Journal of Literature and Culture 27.3 (2000), 
Chandler, "Originary Displacement.", Chandler, "Originary Displacement.", Chandler, 
"Originary Displacement.", Chandler, "Originary Displacement." 
 11  
Bois’s iconic formulation (“How does it feel to be a problem”) needs to 
be addressed.  
Jacques Derrida has traveled furthest in attempting to 
understand the relation of the limit to the aporia, an understanding 
perhaps best captured in a formulation drawn from Aporia, his 1993 
text that explicitly addresses this formative dimension of Derrida’s 
thought: “Il y va d’un certain pas. [It involves a certain step/not; he 
goes along at a certain pace.]”13 The limit, Derrida argues, always 
involves the contamination of that which determines it as limit and 
thereby necessarily raises the question of the beyond of the limit. 
Configured as an impossibility, this beyond marks the foundation of 
the limit itself, marks the limit’s very (im)possibility. It is this 
conceptual orientation that Derrida’s phrase captures and this 
conception of the “pas,” Derrida contends, i.e., its unfolding of the 
limit, leads to the entire economy of the aporia. In its definition of the 
term the Oxford English Dictionary offers a telling etymology that 
seemingly suggests Derrida’s proffered conceptualization. According to 
the OED aporia names both an impassable passage and the 
                                                
13 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, 
eds. Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993) 6, Derrida, Aporias  6, Derrida, Aporias  6, Derrida, Aporias  6, Derrida, 
Aporias  6. This question of the aporia has in a certain way been the most persistent 
and belatedly recognizable dimension of Derrida’s work. See Paola Marrati, Genesis 
and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005), Marrati, Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger, 
Marrati, Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger, Marrati, 
Genesis and Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger, Marrati, Genesis and 
Trace: Derrida Reading Husserl and Heidegger. 
 12  
skepticism that arises from the failure of discursive resources.14 The 
skepticism that registers in the OED definition differs qualitatively 
from its foundational Cartesian variety, i.e., Descartes’ radical 
proposition that grounds the subject’s discursive power in the 
certainty of radical doubt. Locating the ‘conceptual’ resources of the 
aporia on quite different terrain, Derrida defines it less as a moment of 
discursive power than as an instance of productive insufficiency: “the 
difficult or impracticable, here the impossible passage, the refused, 
denied or prohibited passage, indeed the nonpassage, which can in 
fact be something else, the event of a coming or of a future advent  
[événement de venue ou d’avenir] which no longer has the form of the 
movement that consists in passing, traversing, or transiting.”15 
Derrida articulates the notion of a futurity outside the determination 
of the limit, the “‘coming to pass’ of an event that would no longer have 
the form or the appearance of a pas,” in other words, the possibility of 
an arrival produced otherwise.  
In tracing the various configurations in which a reflection on the 
aporia has been a constitutive feature of this work, Derrida analyzes 
the particular contours in which the aporia operates. Recollecting how 
his thought has consistently been guided by reflections on the aporia, 
                                                
14 “[a. Fr. aporetique (Cotgr.), ad. Gr. ἀ!ορητικ-ός, f. ἀ!ορέ-ειν to be at a loss, f. ἄ!ορ-ος 
impassable, f. ἀ priv. + !όρος passage.] Inclined to doubt, or to raise objections.”                                      
15 Derrida, Aporias  8, Derrida, Aporias  8, Derrida, Aporias  8, Derrida, Aporias  8, 
Derrida, Aporias  8. 
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Derrida clarifies the conceptual economy in which the paradox of the 
aporia circulates: 
 
But, conversely, who would call a decision that is without 
rule, without norm, without determinable or determined 
law, a decision? Who will answer for it as if for a 
responsible decision, and before whom? Who will dare call 
duty a duty that owes nothing, or, better (or, worse), that 
must owe nothing? It is necessary, therefore, that the 
decision and responsibility for it be taken, interrupting the 
relation to any presentable determination but still 
maintaining a presentable relation to the interruption and 
to what it interrupts. Is that possible? Is it possible once 
the interruption always resembles the mark of a borderly 
edge, the mark of a threshold not to be trespassed?16  
 
 
Although Derrida recounts the manner in which a notion of the 
aporia arrived to play such a prominent role in his thinking, 
especially as regards notions of responsibility and duty, the 
specific economy of the aporia Derrida conceptualizes in this 
passage extends beyond the specific theoretical intervention he 
makes above: 
 
 
How to justify the choice of negative form (aporia) to 
designate a duty that, through the impossible or the 
impracticable, nonetheless announces itself in an 
affirmative fashion? … The affirmation that announced 
itself through a negative form was therefore the necessity 
of experience itself, the experience of the aporia (and these 
two words that tell of the passage and the nonpassage are 
                                                
16 Derrida, Aporias  17, Derrida, Aporias  17, Derrida, Aporias  17, Derrida, Aporias  
17, Derrida, Aporias  17. 
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thereby coupled in an aporetic fashion) as endurance or as 
passion, as interminable resistance or remainder.”17  
 
 
 
What registers here as a non-dialectical negation structures decision 
and responsibility by simultaneously positing and erasing the 
determinate relation that seemingly informs ethical action. In other 
words, Derrida conceives of the aporia as a resistance to the 
‘theoretical’ modality and the forms of regulative determination 
(whether as program, rule, etc.) that it may and can imply. That is not 
to say that he either abandons regulative determinations or an 
awareness of their necessity. Rather, aporia signifies a moment 
articulated as resistance or remainder that recognizes ethical 
responsibility (in the particular example to which Derrida refers) as 
“radically heterogeneous” to the sphere of the theoretical. The ‘radical 
heterogeneity’ Derrida references helps to account for the uneasy 
relationship Du Bois and Fanon have to the disciplinary and 
discursive regimes they engage. It is not that either thinker disengages 
from a recognizable theoretical or disciplinary account of African 
American or diasporic experience in their writings. Du Bois and Fanon 
each mobilize the dominant theoretical schemes of their day in their 
respective attempts to conceptually demarcate African American and 
‘diasporic’ experience. Yet their respective engagements reveal 
                                                
17 Derrida, Aporias  19, Derrida, Aporias  19, Derrida, Aporias  19, Derrida, Aporias  
19, Derrida, Aporias  19. 
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fractures within those discourses, fissures revealed by placing the 
Negro/nègre at the center, by making of it the ‘object’ of these 
discourses.  
Du Bois and Fanon are the focus of this study because they 
each articulate more clearly than other principle figures of what I 
earlier termed the ‘discourse of the margins’ the counterintuitive basis 
that founds minority discourse’s critical stance. Reading them 
alongside and against each other allows us to delineate the “arrival 
otherwise” characteristic of their thought and identify how each 
author, within the terms of their respective discursive constellation, 
enacts the “pas” of Derrida’s aporetic logic. In other words, how each is 
simultaneously arrested at and traverses ‘otherwise’ the limit of the 
discourses they engage. In addition, inasmuch they are each clearly 
identified with two different and at times competing spaces on the 
disciplinary landscape it allows me to keep the question of 
disciplinarity, in however inadequate a fashion, in the background. In 
the final analysis the compulsion both Du Bois and Fanon articulate–
in their quite different fashions–to appropriately circumscribe their 
respective (disciplinary) objects and the critical resources that are 
produced by their common failure to do so is the larger question that 
hovers over this study. Returning to this dimension of their thought is 
particularly necessary at a time when many scholars are refocusing on 
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the disciplinary and conceptual foundations of what was until recently 
termed “Black Studies.”18  
 To think Du Bois and Fanon together requires bracketing the 
received categorization of their work, a categorization that owes more 
to the convenience of disciplinary boundaries and the conception of 
influence that oftentimes still defines the relationship between texts 
than to the texts themselves. Yet although what Du Bois means by 
‘Negro’ and Fanon by ‘Nègre’ share at most a tenuous denotative link 
they nonetheless partake in the articulation of a singular movement, 
itself constitutive of the attempt to think difference through these 
respective figures (i.e., the ‘Negro,’ le ‘Nègre’). To think their relation 
either through notions such as ‘influence’ or to conceive their possible 
conversation as derived from a common history of the margin is 
insufficient. The former presupposes, in essence, the identity of figures 
(i.e., of Negro and Nègre) and in such a manner as to not only erase 
the specificity of Du Bois and Fanon’s respective concerns but also 
anchors them in conceptual vocabularies that their respective projects 
                                                
18 I’m using the term “Black studies” with the specific inflection given the term by Ronald 
Judy. See Ronald Judy, "Untimely Intellectuals and the University," Boundary 2 27.1 (2000). 
Whether explicitly in the recent work of Hortense Spillers, Alex Weheliye, and Ronald Judy or 
implicitly in the work of Fred Moten, and Brent Hayes Edwards, amongst others, the study of 
African American expressive culture and Afro-diasporic culture is conceived as undergoing a 
moment of crisis and has compelled a return, within multiple registers, to questions of 
foundation. See Brent Hayes Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and 
the Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), Fred 
Moten, In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), Hortense J. Spillers, "The Idea of Black Culture," CR: The New 
Centennial Review 6.3 (Winter, 2006), Alexander G. Weheliye, "After Man," American Literary 
History 20.1-2 (Spring/Summer 2008). 
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challenge. The latter, on the other hand, construes their relation as 
produced by a shared experience and history of marginality when their 
respective work brings accepted notions of experience or history under 
review. Both Du Bois and Fanon suggest that neither ‘history’ nor 
‘experience’ remain immune from the effects of the aporetic logic 
identified in their texts thus problematizing either term’s capacity to 
ground a common identity or an ‘identity-in-common.’ This is not to 
say there is no relation or shared sensibilities that derive from a 
common habitation of the margin but rather that this commonality (if 
that’s the proper term) must be thought differently. In this instance 
what links our two authors is a common problematic that arises 
because of the site they each occupy in relation to the discourses they 
address and (equally important) that address them. 
Unlike most studies of Du Bois I situate his early writings 
against the backdrop of the central intellectual concerns arising in his 
field at the turn of the twentieth century. If we are to determine what 
compels Du Bois’s transition from the early sociological texts such as 
The Philadelphia Negro to the great bio-critical works it requires that 
we understand the intellectual legacy with which Du Bois grappled. 
The overriding concern of Du Bois’s early texts was the attempt to 
specify the parameters of what the period termed the ‘Negro problem.’ 
Alongside his contemporaries Du Bois was attempting to forge a 
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methodological paradigm that would not altogether cede the terrain of 
the social sciences to those who considered the natural sciences an 
ideal model for social scientific practice. The early twentieth century 
attempt to locate what might constitute the methodological renewal of 
the social sciences finds Du Bois and his more illustrious 
contemporaries, i.e., Weber, Schmoller, Rickert, et al., all searching for 
a response to their respective disciplinary crises. For Du Bois the 
question that presses most insistently is precisely the articulation of a 
conceptual language that can speak to the ‘Negro problem.’  
 Du Bois’s early work finds in the newly emerging field of 
empirical sociology the ideal setting from which the question of Negro 
may be asked. In Du Bois’s hands the ‘Negro problem’ becomes the 
material from which he fashions the research agenda of the Atlanta 
conferences. As proposed by Du Bois the Atlanta conferences were a 
100-year research program whose objective was “the collection of a 
basic body of fact concerning the social condition of American Negroes, 
endeavoring to reduce that condition to exact measurement whenever 
or wherever occasion permitted.”19 The study, divided into ten ten-year 
cycles, aimed to provide a complete map of the very contour and 
                                                
19 W.E.B. Du Bois, "My Evolving Program for Negro Freedom," Writings by W.E.B. Du 
Bois in Non-Periodical Literature Edited by Others, ed. Herbert Aptheker (Millwood, 
NY.: Kraus-Thomson, 1982) 226, Du Bois, "My Evolving Program for Negro Freedom,"   
226, Du Bois, "My Evolving Program for Negro Freedom,"   226, Du Bois, "My 
Evolving Program for Negro Freedom,"   226, Du Bois, "My Evolving Program for 
Negro Freedom,"   226. 
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content of African American experience. This complete exhaustion of 
experience, the submission of every aspect of it to the epistemological 
glance and the belief that such a reduction was possible is what 
connected Du Bois to the governing social scientific impulse of his 
period. Yet unlike the other founders of the discipline, for whom the 
task was to harmonize the methodological approaches specific to 
nature and spirit and thereby establish the methodological foundation 
for the study of society, Du Bois’s challenge pushed the very limit of 
this logic of method.20 His attempt to articulate this entity called the 
“Negro” as both the site of scientific inquiry and subjective interiority 
and to redefine its points of convergence with the discourses that 
purported to define it, placed into question the disciplinary logic that 
subtended the ‘objecteness’ of his (disciplinary) ‘object.’ The same 
ambivalence that threatened the stability of his mentor Gustav 
                                                
20 For a historical reconstruction of the various early attempts to ground social 
science methodology and delimit the specificity of its object see Jürgen Habermas, 
On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry A. 
Stark (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1988) 1-42, Habermas, On the Logic of the Social 
Sciences  1-42, Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences  1-42, Habermas, On 
the Logic of the Social Sciences  1-42, Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences  
1-42, Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology, trans. 
R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Lepenies, Between 
Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology, Lepenies, Between Literature and 
Science: The Rise of Sociology, Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: The Rise of 
Sociology, Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology. Charles 
Bambach provides an illuminating analysis of the importance methodological 
reflection in the debates occurring in German Neo-Kantian circles at the turn of the 
twentieth-century. These debates were central to Du Bois’s formation and provided 
part of the intellectual backdrop during his doctoral years in Berlin. See Charles R. 
Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995) 57-176, Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of 
Historicism  57-176, Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism  57-
176, Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism  57-176, Bambach, 
Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism  57-176. 
 20  
Schmoller’s object of inquiry come to infect Du Bois’s own attempt to 
define the methodological site appropriate to the Negro.21 Sociology 
now no longer seems adequate and the subtle empirical positivism 
that at first appeared so intellectually seductive is left behind. 
 Fanon’s texts (and their reception) present a slightly different 
problem of analysis for the critic. Unlike the insistence on univocal 
politico-historical meaning that has until recently dominated even the 
most productive readings of Du Bois, the multitude of theoretical 
languages within Fanon has often led to an appropriation of his work 
in which a problematic conceptual consistency is imposed or his 
consonance with a specific theoretical vocabulary invoked. Facilitating 
                                                
21 Gustav Schmoller, principal voice in the methodenstreit that erupted in German 
social sciences during the 1880s and Du Bois’s mentor at the University of Berlin, 
was never able to produce a methodology that satisfied the competing demands at 
the heart of his conception of economics. On the one hand he conceived of economics 
as a discipline whose object was reducible to statistical quantification while on the 
other he viewed it as an extension of the “moral sciences.” In other words, the 
appropriate method for an object conditioned by both a natural and moral order in 
which neither category is reducible to the other eluded him. See Jacob Jan Krabbe, 
Historicism and Organicism in Economics: The Evolution of Thought (Dodrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) 17-60, Krabbe, Historicism and 
Organicism in Economics: The Evolution of Thought  17-60, Heino Heinrich Nau, 
"Gustav Schmoller's Historico-Ethical Politicial Economy: Ethics, Politics and 
Economics in the Younger German Historical School, 1860-1917," The European 
Journal of the History of Economic Thought 7.4 (2000), Nau, "Gustav Schmoller's 
Historico-Ethical Politicial Economy: Ethics, Politics and Economics in the Younger 
German Historical School, 1860-1917.", Nau, "Gustav Schmoller's Historico-Ethical 
Politicial Economy: Ethics, Politics and Economics in the Younger German Historical 
School, 1860-1917.", Nau, "Gustav Schmoller's Historico-Ethical Politicial Economy: 
Ethics, Politics and Economics in the Younger German Historical School, 1860-
1917.", Nau, "Gustav Schmoller's Historico-Ethical Politicial Economy: Ethics, Politics 
and Economics in the Younger German Historical School, 1860-1917.", Gustav 
Schmoller, "The Idea of Justice in Political Economy," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science  (March, 1894), Schmoller, "The Idea of 
Justice in Political Economy.", Schmoller, "The Idea of Justice in Political Economy.", 
Schmoller, "The Idea of Justice in Political Economy.", Schmoller, "The Idea of 
Justice in Political Economy." 
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this dynamic is the seeming division within Fanon’s own trajectory in 
which the early psychoanalytically inflected work of Peau noire, 
masques blancs, gives way to the politically grounded analyses of Les 
damnés de la terre. But reducing Fanon’s text to this trajectory 
requires that we construe them as relatively consistent examples of 
whichever theoretical vocabulary we believe they belong. Not only does 
this developmental schema require us to assign to the later Fanon a 
badge of political and philosophical maturity; to privilege the early 
work does not escape the problem. This latter inversion fails to 
displace the teleological structure that guides our interpretation 
inasmuch as teleological fulfillment arrives nonetheless, only at a 
different point.  Apart from the questionable process by which an 
‘early’ and ‘late’ Fanon are accommodated within the figure of the 
singular author, the intelligibility of Fanon’s texts is itself determined 
in problematic terms. Whether referencing Marxist, phenomenological, 
or psychoanalytic vocabularies their ‘coherence’ is determined by 
fidelity to whichever conceptual vocabulary is believed to inform them. 
Both of these interpretive schemas require that we adhere to a binary 
modality (i.e., early/late, psychoanalytical/political, etc.) that the 
entirety of Fanon’s corpus brings into question. If there is a consistent 
line that runs from Peau noire, masques blancs through to Les damnés 
de la terre it is Fanon’s continued interrogation of the binary modality–
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–whether at the level of the psyche or the socius––that structures 
colonial subjectivity. When approaching Fanon therefore we are 
compelled to situate his writing in such a way as to countenance his 
difference, i.e., the dissonance produced in his (re)presentation of 
philosophical and psychoanalytic problematics. This study attempts to 
reveal that dissonance by focusing on Fanon’s reimagining of the 
relation between self and other and the notion of colonial alterity that 
results. 
 This present study constitutes four chapters each addressing a 
different dimension of the questions broached above. The first chapter 
focuses on Du Bois’s early sociological work and argues that with “The 
Conservation of Races” and The Philadelphia Negro we witness the 
impasse on which Du Bois’s initial consideration of race founders. I 
contend that Du Bois’s methodological focus reveals a problematic 
that he will never truly resolve but that will structure his later 
biographical and critical work, namely the tension between knowledge 
and (Negro) experience. I contend that to fully understand the notion 
of race that emerges from Du Bois’s early work, one must attend to the 
methodological concerns that are at the center of these texts. I suggest 
that this methodological preoccupation is conditioned by two factors, 
both of which provide the context through which the specific 
conception of race resident within Du Bois’s early texts assumes 
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coherence, the debate over polygenesis and the emergence of sociology 
as a distinct discipline. The first factor introduces an ambiguous 
scientific conception of the Negro, itself the result of the attempt to 
distinguish between ‘Negroes’ and ‘Caucasians’ by defining them as 
members of different species. With the latter, the requirement 
underpinning the emergence of a new discipline, i.e., that it define the 
nature of the phenomena that it investigates and the status of the 
knowledge it produces, highlights the aporia that attends the 
theorization of ‘Negro’ experience witnessed in Du Bois’s early work. 
These two factors condition Du Bois’s turn towards issues of 
methodology and his attempt to establish the methodological protocol 
appropriate to the study of the American Negro.  
 Chapter two takes up Du Bois’s conception of race more 
explicitly. That Du Bois’s notion of race accumulates more 
contradictions than it perhaps resolves should come as no surprise. 
From the moment of its first modern usage race has been the 
repository of various and at times conflicting ideological currents. Even 
its initial role in natural history as a classificatory marker was 
inflected by the difficulty of defining precisely what was denoted by the 
idea of ‘race.’ And, of course, most important for an understanding of 
Du Bois own relationship to the intellectual legacy of the term is the 
central place of the Negro within the emerging discourse of race. The 
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significance of the ‘Negro problem’ cannot be fully grasped unless one 
recognizes its position as the point of intersection in which political, 
philosophical, and scientific discourses meet. Du Bois’s ‘redefinition’ of 
race functions, in part, as a response to the conception of the Negro 
that these discourses suggest. This chapter details the historical 
emergence of the notion of ‘race,’ its gradual migration from the 
discourse of natural history to its subsequent transformation within 
the nineteenth century scientific discourse of race.  I argue that Du 
Bois attempts to realign the very foundation of the notion of race 
through an implicit critique of the particular brand of American 
scientific racialism represented by the influential work Samuel Morton, 
Louis Agassiz and Josiah Nott, the founders of the first school of 
American ethnology.  Du Bois’s early work not only highlights the 
epistemological fault lines along which nineteenth century scientific 
American racialist discourse is structured, but it also, and more 
importantly, attempts to retranscribe the terms of that discourse 
within an entirely different theoretical register, that of the political. 
“The Conservation of Races,” Du Bois’s seminal 1897 text, is his first 
and I argue most sustained attempt at such a retranscription. 
 Chapter three attempts to demarcate the operative contours of 
Du Bois’s great bio-critical texts and situate them in relation to the 
challenge constituted by Hegel’s philosophy of history. What sort of 
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historiography does Du Bois’s Souls of Black Folk or Darkwater 
represent? What is the nature of the ‘knowledge these texts purport to 
present? Of the three modes of historiography referenced in Hegel’s 
Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy History, each corresponds 
to a different stage in the development of Spirit, of its self-
consciousness. They purport to raise experience out of the realm of 
“mere existence,” to use Hegel’s phrase, and thereby redeem 
experience for the operations of spirit. In other words, experience must 
lend itself to an activity that allows for its transformation from “mere 
existence” into a “representation of the internal and external faculties 
of mind” as Hegel puts it. But what if, and this is the Du Boisian 
question, experience does not lend itself to such an exhaustion of its 
capacities? What if there is, to borrow a phrase from Du Bois’s 
“Sociology Hesitant,” “something incalculable” to action and 
experience? To what sort of history and historiography would this give 
rise? Du Bois’s biographical-critical texts, I contend, are precisely an 
example of such historiography. I argue that the realm of “mere 
existence” to which Hegel relegates the ‘Negro’ is precisely the space 
from which Souls of Black Folk, Darkwater, and Dusk of Dawn are 
written. I link the generic indistinctiveness that characterizes these 
texts to the problematic that both Philippe Lejeune and Paul de Man 
identify (one more readily than the other) with the autobiographical 
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and its resistance to the dominance of the epistemological gesture. In 
this sense Souls, Darkwater, and Dusk, resists the logic of Spirit’s 
epistemophilic desire and articulate a moment of remainder within 
Spirit’s enterprise. 
The dominance of the epistemological in the apprehension of the 
being of the other is also the central preoccupation of my fourth 
chapter. I argue that Frantz Fanon’s critique, especially as it’s 
presented in Peau noire, masques blancs, addresses the grounds upon 
which the operation of the subject rests. This critique, I contend, 
proceeds by questioning the reduction of the relationship between self 
and other to the theoretical articulation of this relationship, that 
between self and Other. What this logic structures, according to 
Fanon’s text, is the production of the subject through the reduction of 
the other to the Other. The subject is installed via the reduction of the 
ontological to the epistemological, from the articulation of being as 
that which is to that which is known. The terms of this logic are most 
clearly expressed, and its inadequacy most profoundly evident, within 
the colonial context.  
Although these questions posed by Du Bois and Fanon appear 
derived from two different realms of inquiry, two different disciplinary 
modalities and are therefore connected in perhaps only the most 
superficial of manners, they are in fact unified through their 
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articulation of a singular problematic. In both their respective analyses 
Du Bois and Fanon grapple with the disruptive relation of their 
subjects to the operative discourses at hand. Du Bois’s failure to 
fashion a sociological method adequate to a study of the “Negro” and 
Fanon’s inability to philosophical circumscribe the possibility of the 
“Black” leads them to an identical recognition, that an altogether 
different gesture towards the phenomena under investigation is 
required. For Du Bois this recognition culminates with the production 
of the great bio-critical texts of the early twentieth century (i.e., Souls 
of Black Folk, Darkwater, Dusk of Dawn, John Brown). Fanon, on the 
other hand, attempts to broker the birth of a historicity without 
history (L’an V de la revolution algérienne) and a politics without 
ground (Les damnés de la terre). This study traces the trajectory from 
which these new possibilities emerge, identifying the key terms that 
are passed along the way –– the political, race, experience, knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Methods, Knowledges, and Negroes: W.E.B. Du Bois and the 
Problem(s) of Race (I) 
  
Du Bois begins The Souls of Black Folk by recounting his 
response to a question that –– in one form or another –– he will never 
cease asking: “How does it feel to be a problem?”22 Although the 
significance of this question has of late garnered some critical 
attention, its full impact on Du Bois’s work, and the critical 
reorientation it prompts have yet to be fully appreciated.23 Not only 
does this question problematize the status of the African American 
subject (how does one articulate the subject as the site of a 
problematic?), its relation to history (what kind of historicality can a 
‘problem’ have?) and its relation to itself (is a ‘problem’ still a subject?), 
but it is Du Bois’s response that provides what may well be the most 
perplexing challenge of the set of questions raised: 
 
To the real question, how does it feel to be a problem? I 
answer seldom a word. 
 And yet, being a problem is a strange experience…24 
 
 
                                                
22 W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Souls of Black Folk," Du Bois: Writings, ed. Nathan Huggins 
(New York: Library of America, 1986) 363. 
23 In this regard the recent work of Ronald Judy, Nahum Chandler, and Kevin Miles 
are notable exceptions. 
24 Du Bois, "Souls,"   363. 
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Embedded within this passage is the paradox that structures Du 
Bois’s texts and produces the set of concerns Du Bois and his critics 
will, in various ways, attempt to address; namely, the relation between 
‘problem’ (here meaning the distinctive epistemological and discursive 
parameters that condition the articulation of African American 
subjectivity) and experience (as both the site in which the ‘problem’ as 
such registers and through which it is rendered intelligible). This 
tension between ‘problem’ and experience is precisely what makes the 
theoretical specificity of African American subjectivity so intractable. 
Apprehending the terms of this ‘experience’ theoretically requires that 
we somehow give equal weight to two perhaps incompatible frames of 
reference. Both ‘problem’ and ‘experience,’ in their Du Boisian 
articulation, each signify in a twofold manner. In his usage, ‘problem’ 
references the obstacles associated with the racialized context of 
African American life and specifies –– in a quite different discursive 
register –– the structure of African American subjectivity.(Du Bois The 
Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study) ‘Experience’ denotes the contour 
through which this racialized context is represented subjectively and 
demarcates an insufficiency that renders the possible methodological 
coherence required for an analysis of (African American) ‘experience’ 
problematic. Each term references the other through a complex 
interchange in which the relation between the empirical and the 
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methodological is placed consistently at issue. In other words this 
‘problem’–– that is the Negro problem and everything that it comes to 
denote –– registers not solely as the experience of a problem but as a 
problem of experience. And to understand it as such is to acknowledge 
the nature of the challenge the ‘Negro question’ posed for Du Bois in 
his time; and the continued persistence of this challenge, the 
inheritance Du Bois’s question poses for us in ours. 
 Part of the difficulty Du Bois encounters in outlining the proper 
conceptual parameters of African American subjectivity involves the 
very notion of problem itself. For the semantic instability underlying 
the notion that he introduces to both describe and analyze the Negro, 
makes its functional and conceptual delimitation hard to establish. In 
his use of the concept Du Bois clearly has it do double-duty. On the 
one hand, Du Bois’s ‘problem’ appears to have as its reference the 
series of socio-cultural pathologies –– “poverty, ignorance, crime and 
labor,” in Du Bois’s words –– of which the Negro was taken to be the 
incarnation.25 On the other, he seems to identify the notion of 
‘problem’ as the specific contour that distinguishes African American 
interiority. The first instance arises from the Negro’s participation in 
the social world and his/her relation to others –– Du Bois is asked 
how does “it feel to be a problem” –– and therefore references the 
                                                
25 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1899) 5. 
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‘world’ in which whites situate, and the matrix from which they 
understand, the Negro. The latter, conversely, stems from a 
questioning in which the Negro’s own(ed) experience is central (“[a]nd 
yet being a problem is a strange experience…”). How one takes up the 
question and finds its proper limits, is the issue that guides Du Bois’s 
project and delimits what he comes to term the ‘Negro problem.’ 
 The citation also provides one additional clue that illustrates 
precisely the complexity Du Bois will have to confront in theorizing the 
‘Negro question.’ By asking, “how does it feel to be a problem,” Du 
Bois’s interlocutors presume that the experience to which their 
question refers, i.e., Negro experience, is self-evidently available, that it 
can be easily represented within terms they will find recognizable. And 
yet, Du Bois’s response suggests that the ‘concreteness’ the question 
implicitly ascribes to (Negro) experience leaves something essential, 
perhaps its ‘strangeness,’ aside. Of course Du Bois himself is no 
stranger to this particular lapse either. By invoking the ‘problematic’ 
nature of African American experience and defining its parameters, at 
least initially, within the academic terms with which he was familiar, 
Du Bois situates the ‘problem’ within an acceptable scholarly 
framework. In other words, by inserting it within a disciplinary 
economy and thereby establishing its appropriate discursive and 
sociological contours Du Bois renders the ‘problem’ intelligible to the  
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disciplinary protocols that define the terms by which phenomena are 
produced as knowledge by the modern research university.26 Placed 
securely within the confines of the new empirical sociology, the ‘Negro 
problem’ becomes the site from which Du Bois constructs an entire 
research agenda –– the ambitious program of the Atlanta Conferences 
–– whose objective is to render the problem legible in sociological 
terms.27 Du Bois’s early work evidences a clear debt to the new 
discipline, especially the methodological precepts that seem to guide 
his early analysis of the broad complex of issues. But the ‘problem,’ as 
Du Bois comes increasingly to formulate it, is not exhausted by the 
empirical parameters in which it becomes situated. As early a text as 
The Philadelphia Negro already bears witness to an understated 
uncertainty regarding the ability of the investigator to accurately 
portray the everyday of Negro experience.28 And this because the 
                                                
26 The centrality of the “methodological division of labor” as the constituent element 
of the modern research university is analysed in Ronald Judy, (Dis)Forming the 
American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the Vernacular (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 1-30.  
27 For a later overview by Du Bois of the work and objective of the Atlanta 
Conferences see Du Bois, "My Evolving Program for Negro Freedom,"   225-28. 
Ronald Judy offers an insightful analysis of these early studies in his Ronald Judy, 
"On W.E.B. Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking," Boundary 2 27.3 (2000): 1-35. 
28 The methodological introduction to The Philadelphia Negro, one of Du Bois most 
emphatically sociological texts, itself invokes the necessary limitations that 
accompany sociological inquiry: “The best available methods of sociological research 
are at present so liable to inaccuracies that the careful student discloses the results 
of individual research with diffidence; he knows that they are liable to error from the 
seemingly ineradicable faults of statistical method, to even greater error from the 
methods of general observation, and, above all, he must ever tremble lest some 
personal bias, some moral conviction or some unconscious trend of thought due to 
previous training, has to a degree distorted the picture in his view. Convictions on all 
great matters of human interest one must have to a greater or lesser degree, and 
they will enter to some extent into the most cold-blooded scientific research as a 
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categories used to define this experience might not only themselves be 
suspect, but in addition the possibility of error can never truly be 
eliminated –– in this instance, the error inscribed in the very relation 
of Negro experience to scientific observation. The question then, “How 
does it feel to be a problem?” might require a different sort of answer.  
 The tension between these two different ways of delimiting the 
Negro problem, i.e., between an empirical approach and one that 
exceeds the purely empirical, manifests itself clearly in Du Bois’s 
attempt to forge a protocol appropriate to the determination of Negro 
experience. As initially confirmed by Du Bois, the Negro problem 
required an analytic response that rendered it legible to the terms 
governing the accepted methods of sociological inquiry. Yet the further 
Du Bois progresses the more his texts evince a persistent ambivalence 
regarding the capacity of the new discipline to truly frame the 
complexity of the “problem” –– and this for several reasons. First, 
determining what constitutes the empirical framework of, in Du Bois’s 
words, the “real question” (i.e., “how does it feel to be a problem”) 
requires specifying the sociological categories through which it is 
articulated (crime, poverty, etc.) while simultaneously removing the 
structural bias against African Americans these categories, even in 
                                                
disturbing factor.” Failure is here structurally inscribed in the very process itself. 
These “ineradicable faults” make of scientific inquiry (understood in the broad sense) 
and its truth an ideal towards which the investigator strives but which nonetheless 
remains always just out of reach. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study  
3. 
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their scientific usage, display. Second, and more importantly for our 
purposes, it is further complicated by the requirement of situating this 
structure of the ‘problem’ in relation to a notion of experience meant to 
specify the Negro’s subjective relation to the world, but which is itself 
subtended by a category –– i.e., race –– that presupposes a conception 
of sociality at odds with the methodological precepts underwriting his 
analysis. That this is an odd way to construe what might itself be a 
tenuous proposition, i.e., the formative relationship between race and 
methodology, presents itself as a possible response to the perspective 
I’ve proposed. What has race –– as a concept –– to do with 
methodology and how does whatever conception of sociality have to do 
with either?29  
                                                
29 Another way of understanding this question is to recognize the impact of the 
notion of atomistic individualism, which underpinned the laissez-faire liberalism of 
Du Bois’s day, in framing the parameters by which social questions could be defined. 
The formation of a distinctly American social science begins with the crisis in the 
ideology of American exceptionalism that marks the Gilded Age. Two different 
developments characterize this crisis: the breakdown of orthodox religious authority 
and the decline of its influence on scientific discourse, and the appearance of 
pronounced labor unrest and the eclipse of the republican ideal that it was 
presumed to foreshadow. American social science emerges, in part, in response to 
and on the basis of these developments. The gentry class, as Dorothy Ross terms 
them, who had been supplanted in their national leadership by a new political and 
business elite, availed themselves of this opportunity to reassert a now altered 
authority. “They began to think of themselves,” Ross writes, “as professionals, whose 
authority and expertise had in part an older kind of social resource, in status and 
higher education, and in part a new source in their specialized, expert social 
function. The basis of their new authority was to be modern scientific knowledge.” 
Natural science defined the scientific ideal to which the gentry class continued to 
strive and positivism remained its principal methodological precept. Again Ross: 
“Realism reinforced the empirical thrust of the commitment to natural knowledge. 
Baconian empiricism had been the reigning methodology of American science, 
resting on a philosophy of commonsense realism and although new philosophical 
currents would shape the restructuring of Gilded Age social science, they would not 
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 The issue orienting Du Bois’s early work is precisely this tension 
between methodology and experience, the repeated attempts to fashion 
a protocol appropriate to the study of the “Negro problem.” This 
insistent dyadic tension marks the very structure of Du Bois’s texts 
and the series of terms he generates in his various attempts to arrive 
at a register of the issue. The proliferation of these ‘double’ concepts 
has not gone unnoticed, and in fact their analysis has become a staple 
of Du Bois criticism. ‘Double-consciousness,’ ‘second-sight,’ the ‘veil,’ 
terms marshaled by Du Bois to explain and describe Negro experience, 
and all inscribed with this both/neither quality, have become common 
reference points in discourse surrounding Du Bois’s work.30 Even the 
notion of the talented-tenth seems to presuppose an uneasy dual 
negotiation (viz., between a vanguard and the masses) at the heart of 
what Du Bois considers the African American experience. Yet the 
significance of this structural ‘unease,’ and the paradox it could well 
be said to elicit, have more often than not been addressed exclusively 
in terms of the contemporary political issues to which his texts are 
believed to have been a response. Or, in other instances, his discourse 
is placed in the service of current disciplinary concerns with little 
                                                
alter its underlying empirical thrust.” Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 62, 59. 
30 For a recent study that attempts to construct its own theoretical vocabulary from 
the dualisms that comprise Du Bois’s conceptual offering see Howard Winant, The 
World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War Ii (New York: Basic Books, 
2001) 8-9, 114-20. 
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regard for the precision of Du Bois’s own claims. Even our most astute 
literary and cultural critics, in attempting to engage fully with the 
various and perplexing nuances of Du Bois’s thought, often resort to 
precisely those categories of analysis that Du Bois’s work questions. 
An example of this particular interpretive blindness is evident in the 
influential rereading of Du Bois undertaken in the work of Ross 
Posnock.  
 
 
I. 
Posnock’s interest in Du Bois is framed by his concern with the 
current state of the academy. In particular by the different model of 
literary-cultural analysis proposed by adherents of cultural studies 
and the concurrent dismissal of the aesthetic he believes underpins 
this transformation. In offering an alternative trajectory for the 
practice of cultural analysis Posnock attempts to ‘rehabilitate’ Du Bois 
and resituate him as an avatar of the cosmopolitan intellectual:  
 
In short, Du Bois’s career encourages a rethinking of the 
currently alleged antagonism between the aesthetic and 
the political. This conflict is concomitant with the 
ascendancy in the academy, by the mid-1980s, of cultural 
studies, whose founding gesture repudiated the concept of 
aesthetic value as elitist and apolitical. I will explore how 
Du Bois’s encounter with pragmatism, imbibed directly at 
Harvard professor William James, encouraged elitist, 
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aesthetic, and activist impulses to overlap in his 
remarkably hybrid sensibility. Du Bois, in effect, shows 
how pragmatism can mediate between the aesthetic and 
the political and help moves us beyond the constricting 
dichotomy, which has at times polarized contemporary 
debate.31  
 
 
Yet, this twofold task –– one explicit, i.e., rehabilitating the aesthetic as 
a valid category of political emancipation, and one implicit, i.e., the 
rehabilitation of pragmatism –– requires that Posnock reframe the 
nature of Du Bois’s project. Not only is Du Bois’s precise relation to 
the pragmatist tradition far from settled, the nature of the elder 
James’s influence on Du Bois’s work remains itself a contested issue.32 
And, beyond these two points, the question of whether the notion of 
the aesthetic with which Posnock is operating conforms to that 
inscribed in Du Bois’s text is itself not unproblematic. In other words, 
Posnock’s rereading of Du Bois will undoubtedly require a redefining of 
Du Bois as well. 
 In his attempt to establish Du Bois’s pragmatist credentials 
Posnock argues that the purported elitism so familiarly associated 
                                                
31 Ross Posnock, "The Distinction of Du Bois: Aesthetics, Pragmatism, Politics," 
American Literary History.3 (1995): 502.  
32 For a positive assessment of the relationship between pragmatism, James, and Du 
Bois see Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Douglass and Du Bois's Der Schwarze Volkgeist," 
Race & Racism in Continental Philosophy, eds. Robert Bernasconi and Sybol Cook 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2003) 32-52. For a view that contests the 
significance of James’s influence on Du Bois see David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. Du 
Bois: Biography of a Race, 1868-1919 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993) 
96, Adolph Reed, Jr., "Du Bois's 'Double Consciousness': Race and Gender in 
Progressive Era Thought," Studies in American Political Development 6 (1992): 93-
139. 
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with Du Bois needs to be redefined. Elitism, as a description of the 
gesture that defines Du Bois cultural politics, misconstrues and 
inadequately designates the basis of Du Bois own cultural 
interventions.33 Rather than elitism Posnock introduces the notion of 
distinction as a term that in his view provides a more productive 
rendering of the parameters of Du Bois’s cultural analysis. Distinction 
represents far more accurately, if we follow Posnock, the creative, 
transformative, and multivalent character of Du Bois’s own 
formulations and interventions regarding culture. And, in Posnock’s 
view it is this transformative quality, that ascribed to this notion of 
‘distinction,’ that connects Du Bois to the pragmatist tradition: 
 
Du Bois played with both the social and diacritic 
meanings of distinction: possessing distinction as well as 
making and contesting distinctions were intimately related 
for him.34  
 
 
And, 
 
Du Bois’s predilection for the mobility of troping received 
philosophical coherence and direction from his favorite 
Harvard professor: “The turning was due to William 
James.”35  
                                                
33 For a very different assessment of Du Bois’s elitism see Ronald Judy, "The New 
Black Aesthetic and W.E.B. Du Bois, or Haphaestus Limping," Massachusetts 
Review: A Quarterly of Literature and Public Affairs 35.2 (1994): 249-82. 
34 Posnock, "Distinction," 503. 
35 Posnock, "Distinction," 503. 
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Distinction here becomes a term of critical reappropriation and 
renaming that places Du Bois within an unambiguously pragmatist 
lineage. In Posnock’s usage the term also attempts to replicate the 
doubled conceptual structure identified with Du Bois’s own key 
notions, a gesture Posnock believes evinces Du Bois’s pragmatist 
credentials.  
Following Richard Rorty, Posnock defines pragmatism as a 
project of conceptual redefinition.36 The significance he ascribes to the 
notion of distinction stems from his identification of the term with this 
defining gesture of the pragmatist tradition. Through his analysis of 
Du Bois’s work, Posnock finds an illustration of this ‘pragmatist logic’ 
articulated in Du Bois’s classic study The Philadelphia Negro. In 
Posnock’s reading of Du Bois’s pivotal 1899 study, ‘distinction’ 
                                                
36 Rorty provides a description of the defining gesture of pragmatism in the following 
passage: “Since ‘education’ sounds a bit too flat, and Bildung a bit too foreign, I shall 
use ‘edification’ to stand for this project of finding new, better, more interesting, 
more fruitful ways of speaking. The attempt to edify (ourselves and others) may 
consist in the hermeneutic activity of making connections between our own culture 
and some exotic culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and 
another discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an 
incommensurable vocabulary. But it may instead consist in the ‘poetic’ activity of 
thinking up such aims, new words, or new disciplines, followed by, so to speak, the 
inverse of hermeneutics: the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the 
unfamiliar terms of our new inventions.” Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) 360. Whether termed 
‘pragmatism,’ ‘edifying discourse,’ or ‘hermeneutics,’ Rorty’s critique of philosophical 
foundationalism offers an alternative philosophical trajectory in which the notion of 
‘redefinition’ is central. See also Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas 
McCarthy, eds., After Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 
1987) 21-25. 
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references not only the best class identified with a people, but it 
facilitates, on Posnock’s interpretation, a shift in the characterization 
of the Negro away from an association with destructive stereotypes 
towards a more accurate representation. Citing Du Bois, Posnock 
emphasizes this point: “[i]n many respects it is right and proper to 
judge a people by its best classes … the highest class of any group 
represents its possibilities rather than its exceptions, as is so often 
assumed in regard to the Negro.”37 Distinction therefore functions as a 
term that enacts a movement beyond, in Posnock’s words, the “givens 
of racism”.38 
 Operating along two different yet related avenues, distinction 
signifies both as a mark of separation, but also functions as a form of 
typicality inasmuch as the best class exemplifies the possibility 
resident within the race as a whole. Because this typicality extends 
(structurally) to all Negroes, and therefore all Negroes participate in 
that form of exemplarity associated with their ‘best class,’ Posnock 
argues that the dynamic that links distinction and exemplarity 
connects to democracy as well. It is through this relation of distinction 
to democracy, claims Posnock, that Du Bois’s proximity to both a 
Romantic conception of the aesthetic and the pragmatist tradition 
become clear. Comparing Du Bois to John Dewey, Posnock remarks 
                                                
37 Du Bois quoted in Posnock, "Distinction," 504. 
38 Posnock, "Distinction," 504. 
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that “Dewey finds possibility inscribed in the open-ended experimental 
thrust of pragmatism and democracy,” and that both Du Bois and 
Dewey, “partake of art’s liberating power ‘to insinuate possibilities of 
human relation not to be found in rule and precept.’”39. As the passage 
suggests, Posnock’s notion of the aesthetic adheres to a broadly 
Kantian definition, i.e., aesthetic judgment cannot be reduced to either 
rule or concept and yet remains, necessarily, universal. The tension 
between judgment and rule, so central to Kant’s conceptual focus in 
the Third Critique, informs Posnock’s idea of politics.40 His conception 
of Du Bois’s politics arises from the connection posited between the 
Kantian notion of the aesthetic and the pragmatist ideal of the 
political. The aesthetic, as Posnock construes it, not only conditions 
Du Bois’s conception of politics, but also defines its opposition to the 
instrumental rationalist view of political ends: “But such judgments 
[i.e., regarding Du Bois’s politics] ignore his pragmatist understanding 
of politics as a distinctive mode of experience and conduct rather than 
a determinate order of knowledge” (Italics added).41 Posnock highlights 
                                                
39 Posnock, "Distinction," 504. 
40 In part, Kant’s Third Critique is an attempt to outline the proper use and limit of 
our power of judgment and Kant’s conceptual difficulty revolves precisely around the 
relation of judgment to concepts. Writing in the preface to the Critique of Judgment 
Kant remarks: “So judgment itself must provide a concept, a concept through which 
we do not actually cognize anything but which only serves as a rule for the power of 
judgment itself –– but not as an objective rule, to which it could adapt its judgment, 
since then we would need another power of judgment in order to decide whether or 
not the judgment is a case of that rule.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 
trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987) 6. 
41 Posnock, "Distinction," 508. 
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the opposition mentioned at the outset of this chapter between 
experience and the terms by which one can claim knowledge of that 
experience. In other words, Posnock brings into focus the tension Du 
Bois articulates between the order of experience and the order of 
knowledge.  
Up to this point Posnock’s outline of the Du Boisian conception 
of experience has consistently recognized its unsettled relationship to 
a grounding epistemological gesture. As we noted earlier the question 
that prompts and conditions much of Du Bois’s work requires that he 
straddle, uneasily, the relation of knowledge and experience. And Du 
Bois goes much further, for he inscribes the tension between 
knowledge and experience at the very heart of (Negro) experience itself. 
All these elements of Du Bois’s discourse are present in one manner or 
another in Posnock’s analysis, and are united in Posnock’s conception 
of the Du Boisian political: 
 
But the controversy of Du Bois’s politics resulted not from 
his retreat but from his struggle to think in and through the 
paradox. Rather than imposing goals and values grounded 
in reason’s antecedently formulated truths –– the 
foundationalist effort of rationalism –– Du Bois’s conduct 
was shaped by the contingencies of the historical 
experience within which he was embedded. And in 1923 
that experience was riven by the clash of competing 
priorities and sympathies: black progress in this century 
has been largely separatist, so black schools must 
continue; integration is a risk, yet without it race pride 
congeals into hatred and a promise of democracy –– the 
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opportunity for interracial contact –– withers. Much to the 
dismay of his audience, Du Bois’s speech staged the clash 
rather than defusing or muffling it. His double message 
enacts his root conviction in the “unreconciled strivings” 
of the black soul, a tension Du Bois internalizes as the 
structure of his vision.42 (Italics added) 
 
 
For Posnock, the conflict emphasized above remains solely within the 
confines of experience. Du Bois is presented with two equally valid yet 
contradictory propositions (i.e., integration or separation) that resist 
adjudication by reference to a rule; and yet, it is this structure that 
ideally represents the contours of African American experience and the 
notion of the political that it founds. In other words, the Du Boisian 
political illustrates the tenuous relationship between epistemology and 
experience. Yet the conflict, as Posnock presents it, never challenges 
the conception of political action supposedly at issue. Although the 
conflict Posnock articulates may well withstand easy resolution, it is 
not conditioned by the antinomial relation between knowledge and 
experience presented within the Du Boisian text. Under Posnock, Du 
Bois’s hesitation and uncertainty, his refusal to define an 
epistemologically anchored path of action is recuperated as itself a 
species of knowledge.43 
                                                
42 Posnock, "Distinction," 509. 
43 Relating Du Bois’s formulation to Deweyan notions of inquiry, Posnock contends 
that: “Refusing to dispense solutions, Du Bois’s political conduct seems most 
concerned to register the ‘turns and twists’ of the ‘curious path’ on which black 
Americans find themselves. … Committed to turning and groping, Du Bois 
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 Although Posnock recognizes the conflict Du Bois ascribes to the 
very structure of African American experience, his redefinition of the 
terms of Du Bois’s analysis comes at a significant cost. He subsumes 
the conflict under a philosophical thematic that evacuates any concern 
in Du Bois’s formulation with the methodological problematic that it 
inflects. The clearest illustration of the consequence of this reading is 
that Posnock fails to ask the question that much of his analysis, not to 
mention that of Du Bois’s, broach. By defining politics as a “distinctive 
mode of experience” rather than a “determinate order of knowledge” 
Du Bois implicitly questions the conceptual substrate of the political 
itself. In other words, what conception of the political emerges when it 
is defined as a “distinctive mode of experience” rather than grounded 
in the certainty of epistemological transparency? 
 Posnock’s analysis transforms Du Bois’s valuation of the 
aesthetic into the basis and condition of Du Bois’s politics. “To Du 
Bois,” writes Posnock “aesthetic bliss and the erasure of the color line 
would forever be fused.”44 Finding echoes of Schiller in Du Bois’s own 
programmatic lectures on European art and culture, Posnock claims 
for Du Bois the notion that “pleasure in appearances not only prove 
one’s external freedom from necessity but also one’s internal 
                                                
exemplifies what Dewey calls a ‘disciplined mind’ –– one whose ‘delight in the 
problematic’ is a sign of the ‘scientific attitude,’ an attitude that makes ‘productive use 
of doubt by converting it into operations of definite inquiry’” (Italics added). Posnock, 
"Distinction," 510. 
44 Posnock, "Distinction," 512. 
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freedom.”45 The implicit reference to the possibility of a democratic 
politics erected on the foundation of a revitalized notion of the 
aesthetic is rendered explicit when Posnock writes that: 
 
Despite his celebration of the gifts of black folk, for Du 
Bois the “higher individualism” of aesthetic experience is 
beyond “race identity,” neither black not white but his, or 
anyone’s, by virtue of “looking at the world as a man and 
not simply from the narrow racial and provincial point of 
view.” Indeed, The Souls of Black Folk describes the 
“freedom for expansion and self-development” in and 
through European culture as redemptive, a “boon and 
guerdon for what they [black Americans] lose on earth by 
being black.” While Du Bois’s “kingdom of culture” stands 
against American philistinism, it is finally defined less by 
racial or national identity than by practices. Deriving a 
“higher individualism” from the practice of aesthetic 
contemplation, Du Bois’s kingdom of culture avoids the 
segregation of essentialism (which makes identity prior to 
practice) and embraces democratic openness.46  
 
 
Apart from the question of whether one can construe aesthetic 
contemplation (in its Kantian sense) as a practice, Posnock’s reading of 
Du Bois requires that he dispense with one of the central features of 
his own interpretation of Du Bois’s politics. By defining Du Bois’s idea 
of politics as a practice –– and by relegating the notion of identity that 
emerges from it within the same terms –– Posnock transforms the 
paradox he initially claims grounded experience into a species of 
reconciliation. Deriving identity from politics or action necessitates 
                                                
45 Posnock, "Distinction," 514. 
46 Posnock, "Distinction," 514-15. 
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that one posits a relation of reciprocal transparency between subject 
and action. And, therefore, it requires a stable, relatively 
unproblematic, notion of intentionality.47 Without this notion of 
intentionality, the transparency between subject and action required 
to link politics and the aesthetic –– within the terms Posnock outlines –– 
is untenable. In other words, given Posnock’s terms, what notion of 
identity can we derive from a subject who does not know, or 
misconstrues, his or her actions? That is, from a subject whose 
intentions are not secure or, for that matter, their own? 
 Undoubtedly Posnock would contest this particular 
understanding of his work. Rather than a continuation of what one 
might term –– for lack of a better phrase –– the ‘discourse of the 
subject,’ Posnock clearly enlists his version of cosmopolitanism, and 
the particular interpretation of Du Bois it ascribes, as a critique of the 
philosophical underpinnings of this notion of transparency. More 
specifically, as a critique of what he considers its Cartesian 
provenance: “In moving beyond authenticity, they both [i.e., Du Bois 
and Fanon] displace the original Cartesian subject by deriving identity 
from action”.48 But the claim, proposed by Posnock, i.e., that deriving 
                                                
47 Seen from this perspective, Posnock’s argument is similar to that forwarded by 
Walter Benn Michaels. Both authors are engaged –– although in slightly different 
ways –– in an attempt to rethink the proximity of the notions of race and 
essentialism. See Walter Benn Michaels, "From Race into Culture: A Critical 
Genealogy of Cultural Identity," Critical Inquiry 18.4 (1992): 655-85. 
48 Posnock, "How It Feels to Be a Problem: Du Bois, Fanon, and the 'Impossible Life' 
of the Black Intellectual," 325. 
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identity from action permits an escape from the Cartesian economy of 
the subject, not only misconstrues Descartes but also the structure of 
transparency necessary for Posnock’s own argument.  
 Although Descartes situates the knowing subject at the center of 
philosophical discourse, Posnock’s claim, and its purported critique of 
Descartes, points to a misconception of the philosophical 
consequences of the Cartesian position. Descartes’s philosophical 
reconceptualization produces the knowing subject as its result, but it 
anchors that subject in the certainty of its own representations. 
Inasmuch as such certainty is required for the subject’s 
epistemological claims to have any validity, it is the proper grounding 
of this certainty –– its clarity –– that legitimizes the epistemological 
foundationalism Posnock desires to critique.49 From the very beginning 
of the Meditations Descartes proposes that nothing that cannot be 
ascertained with certainty can be construed as true. The victims here 
are not simply outright falsehoods but even those principles that never 
                                                
49 Charles Taylor describes, in the following passage, the truly novel proposition 
Descartes’s innovation establishes: “The confidence that underlies this whole 
operation is that certainty is something the thinker can generate for himself, by 
ordering his thoughts correctly –– according to clear and distinct connections. This 
confidence is in a sense independent of the positive outcome of Descartes’s argument 
to the existence of a veracious God, the guarantor of our science. … [.] … Descartes 
is thus the originator of the modern notion that certainty is the child of reflexive 
clarity, or the examination of our own ideas in abstraction from what they 
‘represent’…” Charles Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," Philosophy: End of 
Transformation?, eds. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy 
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1987) 468-69. 
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raise themselves beyond the level of credible probability.50 Such 
certainty requires as its correlate –– in the Cartesian schema –– a self-
grounding subject that produces itself through the proper ownership 
of itself. This particular Cartesian conceptual necessity could be 
illustrated in various ways, whether through a focus on Descartes’s 
distinction of the imagination from the understanding or his 
propositions regarding the relationship between reason and desire –– 
to name simply two. But perhaps nothing makes the parameters 
through which Descartes subject operates clearer than the importance 
he assigns to the unified, indivisible, will. 
 The singular unity of the individual will, one of the central 
presumptions underlying Descartes conception of the res cogitans, 
assumes its significance in Descartes thought because it imposes the 
order required for the production of clear and distinct truths. In the 
second discourse, Descartes arrives at a conclusion that he appears to 
broach as if it were itself a truism, namely, “that there is less 
perfection in works composed of separate pieces and made of different 
                                                
50 “Now it will not be necessary, in order to accomplish this aim, to prove that they 
are false [i.e., his opinions], a point which perhaps I would never reach; but 
inasmuch as reason persuades me already that I must avoid believing things which 
are not entirely certain and undubitable, no less carefully than those things which 
seem manifestly false, the slightest ground for doubt I find in any, will suffice for me 
to reject all of them.” René Descartes, "Meditations on the First Philosophy in Which 
the Existence of God and the Real Distinction between the Soul and the Body of Man 
Are Demonstrated," trans. F.E. Sutcliffe, The Discourse on Method and the 
Meditations (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968) 95. 
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masters, than in those at which only one person worked.”51 As 
Descartes proceeds to elaborate this reflection, the exact nature of the 
claim at issue becomes clearer: 
 
So it is that one sees that buildings undertaken and 
completed by a single architect are usually more beautiful 
and better ordered than those that several architects have 
tried to put into shape, making use of old walls which 
were built for other purposes. So it is that these old cities 
which, originally only villages, have become, through the 
passage of time, great towns, are usually so badly 
proportioned in comparison with those orderly towns 
which an engineer designs at will on some plain that, 
although the buildings, taken separately, often display as 
much art as those of the planned towns or even more, 
nevertheless, seeing how they are placed, with a big one 
here, a small one there, and how they cause the streets to 
bend and to be at different levels, one has the impression 
that they are more the product of chance than that of a 
human will operating according to reason.52  
 
 
Of course, at one level, this passage articulates the central role 
Descartes ascribes to method, to the proper regulation of one’s 
thoughts. But equally present, and not at all disconnected from the 
significance Descartes attaches to method –– or any less clearly stated 
–– is the characterization of order as the product of the indivisible will. 
At issue here is not the beauty of individual buildings, but rather, the 
                                                
51 René Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting One's Reason 
and of Seeking the Truth in the Sciences," trans. F.E. Sutcliffe, Discourse on Method 
and the Meditations (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968) 35.  
52 Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting One's Reason and of 
Seeking the Truth in the Sciences,"   35. 
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order(ing) of the overall design.53 The singular unity of the will garners 
importance in Descartes conceptualization precisely because the 
order(ing) it produces defines the operation of reason. As this is the 
case, the contrary–– an adherence to multiplicity or the many –– 
proves to be a reliable sign of error. It is no surprise then that in 
writing of the principles his reflections bring under review, Descartes 
concludes that, “as for their imperfections, if they have any, and the 
mere diversity among them suffices to assure us that many of them have 
imperfections, usage had doubtless softened many of them 
considerably…”54 (Italics added). Multiplicity, it seems, implies 
imperfection, confusion, and signifies –– of necessity –– an absence of 
clarity, a lack of uniformity. The self-contained nature of the cogito, its 
self-enclosed structure that partakes of no necessary relation with 
anything outside itself, is constructed on the foundation of the 
indivisible will. 
 Posnock’s implicit characterization of Descartes, the position 
that leads him to assert that deriving identity from action “displaces 
                                                
53 In writing of the relationship between Descartes’s ontology and his epistemology, 
Taylor highlights the etymological connection between cogitare and ‘ordering’ I 
introduce in this passage: “The order of representations must thus meet standards 
which derive from the thinking activity of the knower. It is an order collected and 
brought together to meet, inter alia, certain subjective demands. Thinking which is 
such a construction or gathering is rightly designated by ‘cogitare’, with its 
etymological links to notions like gathering and ordering.” Charles Taylor, Sources of 
the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989) 145. 
54 Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting One's Reason and of 
Seeking the Truth in the Sciences,"   37. 
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the original Cartesian subject,” fails to recognize how his own 
argument inhabits, quite comfortably, the terms of Descartes position. 
A product of the cogito itself, the certainty associated with the 
Cartesian subject requires that it be self-generating and its operations 
self-grounding.55 By proposing his specific relation between subject 
and action, Posnock also comes to require that his ‘subject’ assume 
legitimacy only through a constitutive relation to itself. Although he 
claims for Du Bois an alternative pragmatist locus of action, one 
distinct from the constraints of the epistemological order, he 
nonetheless situates Du Bois within an economy governed by this very 
order. Despite his attempt to unsettle the relation of knowledge and 
experience, to speculate on the possibility of a disjunctive relationship 
between the two categories, Posnock, in the end, returns the paradox 
that would have initiated this movement back to its ‘proper’ place. 
Whereas Du Bois extends the terms of the paradox to the conceptual 
substrate of the political itself, thereby offering a –– not unproblematic 
–– rearticulation of the basis of political action; Posnock, by 
comparison, retrieves a conception of the political whose structure 
owes its consistency to the safety of the Cartesian position. The 
                                                
55 “What I get in the cogito,” writes Taylor, “is just this kind of certainty, which I can 
generate for myself by following the right method … [.] … The thesis is not that I gain 
knowledge when turned towards God in faith. Rather the certainty of clear and 
distinct perception is unconditional and self-generated. What has happened is rather 
that God’s existence has become a stage in my progress towards science through the 
methodical ordering of evident insight. God’s existence is a theorem in my system of 
perfect science. The centre of gravity has decisively shifted.” Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: The Making of the Modern Identity  156-57. 
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relational transparency of subject and action –– so essential to 
Posnock’s argument –– depends on the regularity of the social field and 
the self-generating certainty of intentional relations for its coherence.56 
In other words, precisely those features on which Descartes’ cogito is 
both predicated and that it produces. Whether one derives identity 
from action or from knowledge, the closed loop of the Cartesian 
subject governs both. After all, for Posnock, one derives identity from 
one’s own action, not from the actions of another. 
 That Posnock falters on the issue of the Du Boisian political, 
despite recognizing the terms through which Du Bois specifies the 
contours of African American politics, is not surprising. As we have 
seen, Posnock reintroduces the structure of the Cartesian subject –– a 
conception he believed to have left well behind –– and offers an idea of 
the political that is conditioned by its proximal relationship to this 
inheritance.57 But Du Bois raises a question that resists formulation 
within these terms, and, that perhaps, cannot be addressed within the 
framework to which Posnock subscribes. What Du Bois raises, the 
                                                
56 Regarding this regularity of the social field, Anthony Cascardi puts it quite well 
when he writes that “[b]oth perspective and the cogito,” here comparing the formal 
innovations that comprise the hallmark of Quattrocento painting with Descartes’s 
new epistemological standpoint, “assure a uniformity and regularity of proportion, 
and provide a vision that could in principle be held by anyone”. Anthony J. Cascardi, 
The Subject of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 34. 
57 Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," trans. William Lovitt, The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishing, 1977) 127-28. For a view that contest the degree and scope of influence 
ascribed to Descartes by Heidegger see Andrew Bowie, "Rethinking the History of the 
Subject:  Jacobi, Schelling, and Heidegger," Deconstructive Subjectivities, eds. 
Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) 
105-26. 
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question he isolates, is that of the ‘politics of race.’ By this I do not 
mean a politics informed by issues of race, nor one subtended by the 
operation of the ‘racial’ subject. Du Bois appears to propose something 
quite different than anything either of these two categories 
traditionally defines. In this sense, the relationship between ‘politics’ 
and ‘race’ inaugurates a semantic field that situates us on quite 
different theoretical terrain. The ‘politics of race’ signals –– at least 
from the standpoint of Du Bois’s circumscription of the issue –– the 
attempt to think a different relation between ‘politics’ and ‘race.’58  
If Posnock provides an ideal point from which to preface the 
difficulties associated with the Du Boisian notion of politics, then 
Anthony Appiah’s influential writings on Du Bois offers an equally 
ideal introduction to the complexity of Du Bois’s conception of race.59 
                                                
58 Following from the powerful work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy, the conception of the political suggested here is not defined as a question of 
strategy or political calculus, but is rather meant to indicate what Lacoue-Labarthe 
has in his Heidegger, Art and Politics termed “the essence of things political.” 
Articulated through various terms, each constituting different determinations 
through which the political is thought (i.e., authority, legitimacy, the state, the 
people, citizenship, sovereignty, etc.) –– and represented to thought –– they 
nonetheless fail to broach what may be called “the central question” of the political, 
i.e., the question of relation. The proper delimitation of the political as understood in 
terms of the question of relation is an ongoing question that cannot be answered 
here, but I do take it as my tentative point of departure. The political, although this 
brings into question the very possibility of its delimitation, can with due caution be 
understood therefore as the space of relation. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, 
Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990) 17. See also, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "La 
Panique Politique," trans. Céline Surprenant, Retreating the Political, ed. Simon 
Sparks (New York: Routledge, 1997) 1-31, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, "Opening 
Address to the Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political,"   107-21, Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy, "The 'Retreat' of the Political,"   122-37. 
59 Appiah, "Uncompleted," 21-37, Kwame Anthony Appiah, "The Conservation of 
'Race'," Black American Literature Forum 23.1 (1989): 37-60, Kwame Anthony 
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Appiah’s work on Du Bois has, in many respects, set the terms for 
much of the contemporary debate regarding Du Bois’s notion of race.60 
And, although they are at this point in some instances close to twenty 
years old, these essays continue to impose themselves on any serious 
reading of Du Bois’s work. Appiah’s writing provides an additional 
benefit for our purposes. They not only constitute perhaps the most 
provocative –– and definitely the most unyielding –– engagement with 
Du Bois’s notion of race, they also articulate the stakes involved in any 
such rereading of Du Bois with admirable clarity.  
 Appiah’s critique focuses on Du Bois’s adherence, despite the 
latter’s claim to the contrary, to a biological conception of race. In 
summarizing Du Bois’s argument in “Conservation” Appiah notes that  
 
On the face of it, Du Bois’s argument in “The Conservation 
of Races” is that “race” is not “scientific” –– that is, 
biological –– but a sociohistorical concept. Sociohistorical 
                                                
Appiah, In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) 28-46. 
60 For recent work that engages –– in varying degrees –– Appiah’s interpretation of 
Du Bois see, Robert Gooding-Williams, "Outlaw, Appiah, and Du Bois's 'the 
Conservation of Races'," W.E.B. Du Bois on Race and Culture: Philosophy, Politics, 
and Poetics, eds. Bernard W. Bell, Emily Grosholz and James B. Stewart (New York: 
Routledge, 1996) 39-56, Tommy Lott, "Du Bois on the Invention of Race," The 
Philosophical Forum XXIV.1-3 (1992-93 Fall-Spring): 166-87, Tommy Lott, "Du 
Bois's Anthropological Notion of Race," Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 59-83, Kevin Thomas Miles, "'One Far Off Divine 
Event': 'Race' and a Future History in Du Bois," Race and Racism in Continental 
Philosophy, eds. Robert Bernasconi and Sybol Cook, Studies in Continental Thought 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) 19-31, Lucius Outlaw, "'Conserve' 
Races? In Defense of W.E.B. Du Bois," W.E.B. Du Bois on Race and Culture, eds. 
Bernard W. Bell, Emily Grosholz and James B. Stewart (New York: Routledge, 1996) 
15-37, Paul C. Taylor, "Appiah's Uncompleted Argument: W.E.B. Du Bois and the 
Reality of Race," Social Theory and Practice 26.1 (2000): 103-28. 
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races each have a “message” for humanity, a message that 
derives, in some way, from God’s purpose in creating 
races. The Negro race has still to deliver its full message, 
and it is the duty of Negroes to work together –– through 
race organizations –– so that this message can be 
delivered.61  
 
 
Although Du Bois appears to posit a sociohistorical conception of race 
(or at least something that seems akin to it), Appiah finds that the 
argument proposed in “Conservation” suggests a different 
understanding of race. Writing of Du Bois’s use of terms such as 
“family,” “blood,” and “common history” to describe the bonds that 
unite a race, Appiah argues that “[a]t the center of Du Bois’s 
conception, then, is the claim that a race is ‘a vast family of human 
beings, always of common history and traditions,” and therefore “if we 
want to understand Du Bois, our question must be: What is a ‘family 
… of common history’?”62 At issue for Appiah is the question of 
whether notions of “common history” or “family” can do the conceptual 
work Du Bois requires. In other words, can they truly supplant the 
biological, become the unifying ground for a non-biological conception 
of race, and therefore function as the basis of group racial 
differentiation? Du Bois’s terms fail in this respect, Appiah contends, 
by reintroducing the biological conception of race in a different form. 
                                                
61 Appiah, Father's House  30. 
62 Appiah, Father's House  31. 
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Appiah turns to Du Bois’s notion of “common history” to illustrate the 
logic he believes organizes Du Bois’s argument: 
 
Does adding a notion of common history allow us to make 
the distinction between Slav and Teuton, or between 
English and Negro? The answer is no. 
 Consider, for example, Du Bois himself. As the 
descendant of Dutch ancestors, why does not the history 
of Holland in the fourteenth century (which he shares with 
all people of Dutch descent) make him a member of the 
Teutonic race? The answer is straightforward: the Dutch 
were not Negroes, Du Bois is. But it follows from this that 
the history of Africa is part of the common history of 
African-Americans not simply because African-Americans 
are descended from various peoples who played a part in 
African history but because African history is the history 
of the people of the same race.63  
 
 
“Common history” then, the notion Du Bois invokes as a feature that 
distinguishes one race from another, is insufficient, according to 
Appiah, for the task at hand. It relies on a circularity of argument, in 
Appiah’s estimation, that presumes what it purports to explain: 
 
… sharing a common group history cannot be a criterion 
for being members of the same group, for we would have 
to be able to identify the group in order to identify its 
history. Someone in the fourteenth century could share a 
common history with me through our membership in a 
historically extended race only if something accounts for 
their membership in the race in the fourteenth century 
and mine in the twentieth. That something cannot, on the 
pain of circularity, be the history of the race.64  
                                                
63 Appiah, Father's House  31-32. 
64 Appiah, Father's House  32. 
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Appiah unfolds what he understands as the conditions of Du Bois’s 
argument in the above passages. And, although his analysis will 
extend its focus beyond the idea of “common history” to include Du 
Bois’s notion of “blood” and “family,” the terms of his critique are 
repeated in each instance. Namely, that Du Bois requires a conceptual 
variable that can function to delimit the field under discussion, i.e., 
distinguish one race from another. Further, in Appiah’s view, the 
variables Du Bois solicits, such as “common history,” “family,” “blood,” 
etc. –– namely, the entire architecture of the notion of sociohistorical 
races –– as markers of difference fail to achieve their stated end. The 
source of Du Bois’s failure, Appiah maintains, is nothing less than his 
unreconstructed adherence to the scientific conception of race. “Once 
we have stripped away the sociohistorical elements from Du Bois’s 
definition of race, we are left with his true criterion,” Appiah 
concludes, “the scientific conception.”65 For Appiah, Du Bois’s inability 
to escape the constraints of nineteenth century racialism configures 
the terms of Du Bois’s notion of race. 66 The entire trajectory of Du 
                                                
65 Appiah, Father's House  32-33. 
66 Appiah defines ‘racialism’ as the doctrine that contends that: “there are heritable 
characteristics, possessed by members of our species, which allow us to divide them 
into a small set of races, in such a way that all members of these races share certain 
traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any 
other race. These traits and tendencies characteristic of a race constitute, on the 
racialist view, a sort of racial essence; it is part of the content of racialism that the 
essential heritable characteristics of the ‘Races of Man’ account for more than the 
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Bois’s argument, Appiah implies, is guided by a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the basis on which it is constructed. Du Bois’s 
notion of race therefore, whether that of the early “Conservation of 
Races” or the later Dusk of Dawn, is incoherent outside of the 
nineteenth century biological parameters of the idea.  
 Appiah’s critique of Du Bois has as its target something other 
than simply the latter’s racialism, or even the scientific theories of race 
that underpin it. For Appiah, Du Bois’s racial essentialism is the point 
of contention. Race –– as an operative term –– makes sense, Appiah 
seems to argue, only to the degree that it functions as an a priori 
determining property. His dismissal of both Du Bois’s notion of 
“common ‘impulses’” and “voluntary and involuntary ‘strivings’” occurs 
precisely because they can only be construed as a posteriori 
properties.67 From this perspective it matters little how one chooses to 
qualify the term (i.e., sociohistorical races, etc.), invoking ‘race’ as a 
distinguishing characteristic is already to fall prey to the logic of racial 
essentialism. Du Bois’s notion of race, in Appiah’s view, conforms 
                                                
visible morphological characteristics –– skin color, hair type, facial features –– on the 
basis of which we make our informal classifications. Racialism is at the heart of 
nineteenth-century attempts to develop a science of difference, but it appears to have 
been believed by others –– like Hegel, before then, and Crummell and many other 
Africans since –– who had no interest in developing scientific theories.” Appiah, 
Father's House  13. 
67 “And if we ask which common impulses that history has detected allow us to 
recognize the Negro, we shall see that Du Bois’s claim to have found in these 
impulses a criterion of identity is mere bravado. If, without evidence about his or her 
impulses, we can say who is a Negro, then it cannot be part of what it is to be a 
Negro that he or she has them; rather it must be an a posteriori claim that people of 
a common race, defined by descent and biology, have impulses, for whatever reason, 
in common.” Appiah, Father's House  33. 
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clearly to the above definition –– regardless of Du Bois’s claims to the 
contrary.  
As one might expect, given the stakes involved in any such 
reading of Du Bois, there has been no shortage of respondents 
contesting the strength, credibility, or even in certain instances the 
generosity of Appiah’s interpretation. Robert Gooding-Williams for 
example, although in broad agreement with the specifics of Appiah’s 
reading, believes that its reluctance to acknowledge the political 
context shadowing Du Bois’s intervention in the debate regarding race, 
indicates an important shortcoming of Appiah’s analysis.68 Likewise, 
Tommy Lott has contested Appiah’s interpretation of the role 
“sociohistorical criteria” assume in Du Bois’s understanding of race. 
Contra Appiah, Lott argues that Du Bois “spoke of race in this 
sociohistorical sense as an ‘invention’ that various European nations 
had used to realize their group ideal. An important lesson to be drawn 
from history, according to Du Bois, is that racial identity has played 
                                                
68 Gooding-Williams situates Du Bois’s use of race in the broader context of Du 
Bois’s politico-strategic calculus: “For Du Bois, the political mobilization of African 
Americans (in part, through the formation of the American Negro Academy) required 
the rhetorical mobilization of such signifiers as ‘Negro’ and ‘race’ because these 
signifiers were the signifiers in terms of which African Americans comprehended 
themselves as a subordinate group. So while Du Bois could have produced a 
nonbiological explanation of group spiritual differences, absent any talk of race, he 
continues that talk for political purposes, and, in order to rationalize it, states a 
definition of ‘race’ consistent with a nonbiological explanation of group spiritual 
differences. Still, to the extent that Du Bois seems not to use this definition (to do the 
work of individuation), and appears to rely instead on one congenial to the 
nineteenth-century racial sciences, he demonstrates his inability fully to reconcile 
the rhetorical requirements of his politics and the theoretical implications of a 
nonbiological explanation of group spiritual differences.” Gooding-Williams, "Outlaw, 
Appiah, and Du Bois's 'the Conservation of Races',"   51. 
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an important role in guiding the collective actions that led to the 
modernization of European nations.”69 Du Bois’s belief, namely, that 
through the “embrace of their African-American identity” a similar 
benefit could accrue to the American Negro, is the prism through 
which we should view Du Bois’s claims regarding the ‘invention’ of 
race, Lott contends. In this sense, Du Bois’s sociohistorical criteria, 
inasmuch as they participate in this ‘invention’ of race, constitute an 
entirely different conceptual framework than that which subtends the 
biological notion.  
Appiah has encountered criticism from another quarter as well. 
It is not only the content of Appiah’s argument that has invited 
objections; several of his more astute readers have also questioned the 
protocol that guides his reading. Lucius Outlaw, in his influential 
response to Appiah’s critique, argues convincingly that Appiah, in 
treating each component of Du Bois’s argument as a discrete claim, 
misreads Du Bois’s text. More specifically, by ignoring the relationship 
between the various terms of Du Bois’s argument Appiah 
misconstrues the precise nature of Du Bois’s claims.70 And, following 
in the wake of Outlaw’s criticism, Paul C. Taylor, in his “Appiah’s 
Uncompleted Argument,” contests Appiah’s ‘eliminativism’ and the 
                                                
69 Lott, "Du Bois's Anthropological Notion of Race,"   66. 
70 Outlaw, "Conserve Races?,"   23. 
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philosophical nominalism that underpins it.71 But, it is Kevin Thomas 
Miles, in his impressive “‘One Far Off Divine Event,’” that perhaps goes 
furthest down this avenue of criticism. By underlining the absence of 
generosity he detects in Appiah’s reading Miles proffers an entirely 
different Du Bois, a figure Appiah may well not recognize.72 Although 
these are all important reevaluations of Appiah’s pivotal essays, I want 
to focus attention on another aspect of Appiah’s reading, one that 
illuminates the contour of Du Bois’s idea of race.  
Towards the latter part of his essay, in an extended analysis of 
the ‘science’ of race, Appiah proceeds to give an account of the relation 
                                                
71 For Taylor, Appiah’s ‘eliminativism’ remains deeply indebted to the philosophical 
nominalism to which Appiah subscribes: “Eliminativism exhausts the field only if 
certain assumptions are built in, assumptions that are rarely made explicit. If one 
thinks, for example, that social facts in general are facts only in some honorific sense 
of the term, and that only the entities postulated by, say, physics are real, then of 
course races do not exist. But this kind of physicalism is profoundly 
counterintuitive, and seems to function more as a way of inflating the notion of 
reality than as a tool for guiding our interactions with the world.” Taylor, "Appiah's 
Uncompleted Argument: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race," 114. 
72 That Appiah’s generosity is the issue at hand for Miles is clear from the following 
passage: “Appiah does well to point out the ways in which Du Bois has erred so long 
as the remarks in ‘The Conservation of Races’ and in Dusk of Dawn remain 
inextricably bound to an attempt to connect the present to some point empirically 
fixed in the past. Appiah is also correct in identifying the elements in Du Bois’s 
language that appear to depend upon the biological as such. Appiah’s criticisms do, 
however, fail in at least one important respect: they fail to take seriously Du Bois’s 
effort to think beyond the boundaries of the biological as it operates within the limits 
of an ordinary conception of history. The point at which Du Bois begins to express 
himself in terms of what he can feel better than he can explain more readily suggests 
an excess in his thought that outstrips his ability to give a master name to that 
about which he is speaking. … What remains for readers of Du Bois today is not 
simply to discover flaws in his thinking, but perhaps to read him with the kind of 
generosity that Kant brings to his reading of Plato when he remarks in his Critique of 
Pure Reason that ‘it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an 
author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in 
writing, to find that we understand him better than he understood himself. As he 
has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even 
thought, in opposition to his own intention.’” Miles, "'One Far Off Divine Event': 
'Race' and a Future History in Du Bois,"   25-26. 
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of race –– as a classificatory category –– to the unfolding history of 
scientific thought. “The appeal of race as a classificatory notion,” he 
remarks, 
 
provides us with an instance of a familiar pattern in the 
history of science. In the early phase of theory, scientists 
begin, inevitably, with the categories of their folk theories 
of the world, and often the criteria of membership of these 
categories can be detected with the unaided senses. … 
Gradually, as the science develops, however, concepts are 
developed whose application requires more than the 
unaided senses; instead of the phenomenal properties of 
things, we look for deeper, more theoretical properties. … 
Few candidates for laws of nature can be stated by 
reference to the colors, tastes, smells, or touches of 
objects. It is hard for us to accept that the color of objects, 
which play so important a role in our visual experience 
and our recognition of everyday objects, turn out neither 
to play an important part in the behavior of matter nor to 
be correlated with properties that do. Brown, for example, 
a color whose absence would make a radical difference to 
the look of the natural world, is hard to correlate in any 
clear way with the physical properties of reflecting 
surfaces.73  
 
 
Race, Appiah contends, constitutes an eclipsed category, part and 
parcel of an earlier, less developed, scientific modality. The history of 
scientific knowledge is understood here as the gradual evolution of 
ever more complex conceptual tools that increasingly place the results 
of science at odds with the ‘reality’ of everyday life. As science 
progresses we arrive at the recognition that the bases of our various 
                                                
73 Appiah, Father's House  38-39. 
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classificatory schemes often do not coincide with the ‘truth’ of the 
natural world. Race is one such scheme. But there are others. Color, 
Appiah suggests, provides an example of a feature of the natural world 
that we inflate with significance but whose importance is in actuality 
quite minimal. Of course, in a sense, Appiah is correct. The ‘scientific’ 
value of an object rarely aligns with the phenomenal properties our 
senses detect. Nor does race, if understood within the parameters 
Appiah proposes, escape from these consequences of scientific 
progress. Yet the issue remains, does Appiah’s definition of race, and 
Du Bois’s own understanding of it, coincide?74 
 We can begin to broach an answer to this question by turning to 
a passage in Du Bois’s Dusk of Dawn that has assumed representative 
status as one of his signal pronouncements regarding the question of 
race: 
 
“But what is this group; and how do you 
differentiate it; and how can you call it ‘black’ when you 
admit it is not black?” 
I recognize it quite easily and with full legal 
sanction; the black man is a person who must ride “Jim 
Crow” in Georgia.75  
 
 
                                                
74 I do not mean to suggest that Appiah himself subscribes to a particular definition 
of race –– he doesn’t. Rather, a consequence of his position is that the biological 
conception, although false, remains the only logically consistent notion of race. 
75 Du Bois, "Dusk,"   666.  
  64 
Often read as a citation of the inseparable relation of politics and 
power to race, this passage is frequently used to confine––in whole or 
in part–– Du Bois’s understanding of race to juridico-political (as 
opposed to biological) terms.76 And, this reading does have its merits 
inasmuch as it recognizes the centrality Du Bois assigns to the 
phenomenology of race, to the unrelenting everyday of racial 
experience. Yet, although it is difficult to ignore the importance Du 
Bois ascribes to the juridico-political strictures through which ‘race’ 
assumes its particular American form, I want to draw attention to 
something else. 77   
 The above passage constitutes the concluding section of a 
dialogue between Du Bois and his fictional interlocutor Roger Van 
Dieman. Their discussion revolves around the issue of racial 
difference; specifically, of the criteria that establish it, the value one 
may assign to it and the history it proposes. Van Dieman, although 
sympathetic to the African American’s predicament, nonetheless 
remains a devout adherent to the racialist perspective that defines the 
                                                
76 For two recent studies that interpret this passage along these lines see Kenneth 
Mostern, Autobiography and Black Identity Politics: Racialization in Twentieth-
Century America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 71-72, Taylor, 
"Appiah's Uncompleted Argument: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race," 109. 
77 I do not mean to imply that it is solely in the American context that race manifests 
itself in juridico-political terms. Rather, that the origin, function, and variability of 
the juridico-political determinants that comprise the American racial economy differs 
from others, such as, for instance, that of South Africa. See Eric Foner, Nothing but 
Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1983), George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in 
American & South African History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
  65 
relative status of different racial groups in a very particular order. 
“[T]he white race,” he contends, “excels in beauty, goodness, and 
adaptability, and is well abreast even in goodness.”78 Du Bois, on the 
other hand sees no reason –– and in fact finds many that point to the 
opposite conclusion –– to concede Van Dieman’s claim of white 
superiority. Apart from the various cultural objects Du Bois ascribes to 
‘historically’ black peoples, he enumerates other contributions, both 
ethical and spiritual, that are indicative of the ‘equality’ of the races. 
And, although Van Dieman’s becomes increasingly exasperated by Du 
Bois’s consistent dismissal of his arguments regarding the superiority 
of the white race, nothing distresses him more than Du Bois’s 
apparent conclusion: that the continuous intermixing of racial groups 
makes the idea of race a quite tenuous proposition. “What becomes of 
all your argument,” Van Dieman’s demands of Du Bois, “if there are no 
races and we are all so horribly mixed as you maliciously charge?”79 It 
is from this position that Van Dieman’s question, the one he broaches 
in the above passage, acquires its significance: “how can you call it 
‘black’ when you admit it is not black?”  
The question, and Du Bois’s response to it (“I recognize it quite easily and 
with full legal sanction; the black man is a person who must ride ‘Jim Crow’ in 
Georgia.”), forces Van Dieman’s into an uncomfortable recognition of the juridico-
                                                
78 Du Bois, "Dusk,"   657. 
79 Du Bois, "Dusk,"   665. 
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political context of African American life. But this is only one –– and not the most 
consequential –– of the issues that the question itself raises. To, as Van Dieman’s puts 
it, “call it ‘black’ when you admit it is not black,” is to countenance the notion that 
‘blackness,’ and by extension race, cannot be circumscribed by, or even principally 
defined in terms of, an epistemological gesture. In other words, Du Bois’s notion of 
blackness is not founded on an epistemological claim. Appiah’s critique therefore 
loses much of its force. His interpretation of Du Bois presupposes, and in fact argues, 
that Du Bois understands race as an object in the world in much the same way as a 
flower or a color. That is as something that one may submit to clear epistemological 
criteria. But Du Bois defines race, or more accurately the possibility of race, in very 
different terms than those Appiah proposes. And it is precisely these very different 
terms that give rise to the tension witnessed in Du Bois texts between the order of 
knowledge and the order of experience.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Methods, Knowledges, and Negroes: W.E.B. Du Bois and the 
Problem(s) of Race (II)  
 
That Du Bois’s notion of race accumulates more contradictions 
than it perhaps resolves should come as no surprise. From the 
moment of its first modern usage race has been the repository of 
various and at times conflicting ideological currents. Even its initial 
role in natural history as a classificatory marker was inflected by the 
difficulty of defining precisely what was denoted by the idea of ‘race.’ 
And, of course, most important for an understanding of Du Bois own 
relationship to the intellectual legacy of the term is the central place of 
the Negro within the emerging discourse of race. The significance of 
the ‘Negro problem’ cannot be fully grasped unless one recognizes its 
position as the point of intersection in which political, philosophical, 
and scientific discourses meet. Du Bois’s ‘redefinition’ of race 
functions, in part, as a response to the conception of the Negro that 
these discourses suggest.  
 According to Michael Banton ‘race’ enters the lexicon of “the 
English language in 1508 in the poem The Dance of the Seven Deidly 
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Sins by the Scotsman, William Dunbar.”80 Although there is no clear 
agreement as to whether the word originally migrates from the Italian 
or the French, there is consensus regarding its Latinate origins. With 
the arrival of the eighteenth century ‘race’ begins to function as one of 
the various synonyms that translate the Latin words gens and 
genus.81 In this usage it comes to occupy the same semantic orbit as 
words such as ‘stock,’ ‘tribe,’ ‘family,’ and ‘nation.’ Yet, Enlightenment 
use of the word still resides at some distance from the modern 
meaning of the term, i.e., from the “cultural, genealogical and political 
connotations” that subtend the idea of race in the nineteenth 
century.82 H.F. Augstein, in his rewarding Race: The Origins of an Idea, 
1760-1850, claims that the Enlightenment’s own self-understanding 
did not require the transformation of ‘race’ into the foundation of 
‘racial theory’ in part because it did not view race as a signifier of 
essential distinctions. Whether one believes –– as Augstein argues –– 
that the existential anxieties accompanying the transformations within 
European cultures of the period contributed to the semantic expansion 
of the term, by the end of the eighteenth century ‘race’ comes to mean 
significantly more than it did at the beginning of the century. 
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 During the eighteenth century natural history –– the avenue 
through which ‘race’ is principally introduced to Enlightenment 
culture at large –– was primarily concerned with the classification of 
natural objects, and “[i]t’s criteria was derived less from anatomical 
and physiological insights than from external observations.”83 
Linnaeus, the famed Swedish naturalist whose binomial classificatory 
scheme organized the basis for much later work in the field, in his 
distinction between species and varieties provides an illustration of the 
problem he and his contemporaries encountered. Linnaeus considered 
species as “primordial forms” whose character had remained 
unchanged since creation. Varieties differed in that they were elements 
within species that had undergone an alteration in appearance due to 
external pressures or factors. Linnaeus’s conception of species 
emerges from his application of the first four propositions articulated 
in his “Observationes” in the Systema Naturae. Firstly, like can only 
produce like, and therefore no species other than those existing at the 
moment of creation are possible. Secondly, the continual propagation 
of the various species means that there are presently more individual 
members of each species than at any previous time. Thirdly, each 
species can be traced back to an original pair or hermaphroditic 
beginning; in other words, each species constitutes an unbroken 
unity. And finally, these propositions confirm God as the single creator 
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of these different species.84 Even this brief outline of the Linnaean 
classificatory model testifies to an already expressed tension between 
variability and fixity, between change and stasis, at its heart. As 
Michael Banton writes, “[t]he Linnaean classificatory enterprise 
depended upon the assumption that the various sets of individuals to 
be classified were stable, for how could they be classified if they were 
changing?”85 But the existence of varieties within species, that is, 
within these otherwise “primordial forms,” presupposes that change is 
a factor of species development. As such the line of demarcation 
between species, and between varieties within species, arises as an 
issue. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century there remained 
significant reservations regarding the actual line separating humans 
from apes, and, as Banton informs us, “on which side of that line 
Pygmies, Hottentots and Orang Utans belonged.”86 The question 
therefore of “What is the Negro?” begins to acquire a quite different 
tenor. 
 Although Linnaeus’s classification of the human species situated 
it on a line of continuity that included apes, he nonetheless regarded 
humans –– all humans –– as a separate species, and did so because 
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Homo sapiens exhibited the demonstrable reproductive isolation 
proper to a distinct species. Still, Linnaeus’s biological order, defined 
as it was by morphologically based classificatory relationships, 
seemingly introduced cultural judgments that appear to foreshadow 
the tenets ascribed to nineteenth century racial theory: 
 
Americanus: reddish, choleric, and exact; hair –– black, 
straight, thick; wide nostrils, scanty beard; obstinate, 
merry, free; paints himself with fine red lines; regulated by 
customs. 
Asiaticus: sallow, melancholy, stiff; black hair, dark eyes; 
severe, haughty, avaricious; covered with loose garments; 
ruled by opinions. 
Africanus: black, phlegmatic, relaxed; hair –– frizzled; skin 
–– silky; nose –– flat; lips –– tumid; women without shame, 
they lactate profusely; crafty, indolent, negligent; anoints 
himself with grease; governed by caprice. 
Europeans: white, sanguine, muscular; hair –– long, 
flowing; eyes –– blue; gentle, acute, inventive; covers 
himself with close vestments, governed by laws.87 
 
 
Intermingling in Linnaeus’s description of the four human groups are 
implicit claims that conjoin phenotype and evaluative judgments in a 
manner reminiscent of that found in nineteenth century racial 
discourse.88 The classification Linnaeus provides situates the 
European at the most advanced level of development. Yet Linnaeus’s 
principal reference point remains the unity of the species and its origin 
                                                
87 Linnaeus cited in Smedley, Race  161. 
88 Linnaeus actually distinguishes six different diurnal varieties of Homo sapiens: 
ferus, americanus, europaeus, asiaticus, afer, monstrous. I do not list the first or last 
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in the single act of divine creation. Therefore later hypotheses 
regarding the possibility of multiple acts of creation and with it 
multiple ‘species of men,’ or other formulations that divide different 
human beings into different –– hierarchically related –– species, 
remain alien (although not necessarily incompatible) to Linnaeus’s 
understanding of the biological order. 
 To Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, we owe the first 
successful attempt to disentangle the notion of species from the 
rigidity of Linnaeus’s classificatory grid. That Buffon had very little 
sympathy for Linnaeus or his classificatory system was no secret. 
When he critiques the system that wishes “to judge of the whole by a 
single instance, to reduce nature to the status of petty systems which 
are foreign to her,” Buffon undoubtedly had Linnaeus’s “artificial 
taxonomy” in mind.89 That he championed a substantially different 
methodological approach than Linnaeus, stems from the very different 
assumptions that guide his understanding of nature: 
 
For in order to make a system, an arrangement –– in a 
word, a general method –– it is necessary that everything 
be taken in by it. It is necessary to divide the whole under 
consideration into different classes, apportion these 
classes into genera, subdivide these genera into species, 
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and to do all this following a principle of arrangement in 
which there is of necessity an element of arbitrariness. 
But nature proceeds by unknown gradation, and, 
consequently, it is impossible to describe her with full 
accuracy by such divisions, since she passes from one 
species to another, and often from one genus to another, 
by imperceptible nuances. As a result, one finds a great 
number of intermediate species and mixed objects which it 
is impossible to categorize and which necessarily upset 
the project of a general system.90 
 
 
For Buffon the classificatory distinctions of Linnaeus’s system cannot 
be other than artificial. Nature does not lend itself to the type of 
categorization that Linnaeus classification presumes. If the differences 
between the two naturalists could be summarized simply (which it 
can’t), it would probably be reduced to the following: for Buffon nature 
is a productive not a static entity.91 The proliferation of ‘varieties’ and 
the intermixing of natural objects suggest, for Buffon, that change is a 
central value of the natural world. Thus unlike Linnaeus, Buffon 
recognized that mutability, evidenced by the constant modification of 
varieties, was inscribed in the very notion of species and therefore that 
any effective definition had to accommodate that fact.  
 Buffon’s definition of species moves away from the morphologic 
basis underlying previous conceptions of the category and introduces 
different parameters for the understanding of the notion: 
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l’espèce est donc un mot abstrait & général, dont la chose 
n’existe qu’en considérant la Nature dans la succession 
des temps, & dans la destruction constante & le 
renouvellement tout aussi constant des être: c’est en 
comparant la Nature d’aujourd’hui à celle des autres 
temps, & les individus actuels aux individus passés, que 
nous avons pris une idée nette de ce que l’on appelle 
espèce, & la comparaison du nombre ou de la 
ressemblance des individus n’est qu’une idée accessoire & 
souvent indépendante de la première: car l’âne ressemble 
au cheval plus que le barbet au levrier, & cependant le 
barbet & le levrier ne sont qu’une même espèce, puisqu’il 
produisent ensemble des individus qui peuvent eux-même 
en produire d’autres, au lieu que le cheval & l’âne sont 
certainment de different espèces, puisqu’ils ne produisent 
ensemble que d’individus viciés & inféconds.92  
 
 
Despite his initial skepticism as to the actual existence in nature of 
something one could call ‘species,’ Buffon nonetheless acknowledged 
that nature provided the basis for (tentatively) circumscribing one 
species from another. Buffon’s new definition limits membership 
within a species to entities who can mate and produce fertile offspring. 
No longer construed primarily in relation to morphology, Buffon 
integrates the possibility of change into his definition of species and 
resituates the organizing force of the category in its historicity. In other 
words, different individuals aren’t unified under the same species 
because of their shared morphological traits, but rather because they 
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participate in the “succession of similar forms.”93 His example 
illustrates precisely this point. The morphologic similarity between the 
donkey and the horse mistakenly suggests that they are members of 
the same species, while the differences between the greyhound and the 
spaniel obscures the fact that they belong to one species. What the 
greyhound and the spaniel share, that the donkey and the horse do 
not, is a line of succession (i.e., a compatible reproductive physiology). 
As Paul L. Farber specifies, writing of Buffon’s definition, “[p]artly by 
morphology, but most dramatically by the constant succession of like 
forms, species were recognizable.”94  
This new conception of species extended to Homo sapiens, and 
specifically opposed claims that located any particular human variety 
outside the enclosure of a single human species: 
 
Les hommes diffèrent du blanc au noir par la couleur, du 
double au simple par la hauteur de la taille, la grosseur, la 
légèreté, la force, &c., & du tout au rien pour l’esprit; mais 
cette dernière qualité, n’appartenant point à la matière, ne 
doit point être ici considérées; les autres sont les 
variations ordinaires de la Nature qui vienne de l’influence 
du climat & de la nourriture; mais ces différences de 
couleur et de dimension dans la taille n’empêche pas que 
le Nègre & le blanc, le Lappon & le Patagon, le géant et le 
nain, ne produisent ensemble des individus qui peuvent 
eux-même se reproduire, & que par conséquent ces 
hommes, se différens en apparence, ne soient tout d’une 
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Biology 5.2 (1972): 266. 
94 Farber, "Buffon and the Concept of Species," 263. 
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seule & même espèce, puisque cette reproduction 
constante est ce qui constitue l’espèce.95  
 
 
Given Buffon’s new definition, differences between varieties of human 
beings did not imply that they inhabited differing species. In fact the 
very possibility of overlapping interrelations, of a unity drawn from 
difference, substantiated the claim that different varieties of human 
beings held membership in the same species. After all, it is the 
reproductive fertility that ensues from the union of “le Négre & le 
blanc” that warrants their shared membership in the species. But this 
flexibility, Buffon’s recognition of nature’s continuing modifications, 
also makes ‘race’ an apt designation for the different groups of human 
beings. Originally ‘race’ denoted a family lineage, whether of animals 
or humans, that “formed a veritable ‘history’ of traits passed down 
through generations in innumerable forms.”96 For Buffon the 
variability of the human species was best articulated through this 
specific conception, i.e., ‘race,’ rather than Linnaeus’s far more rigid 
notion of ‘variety.’ These ‘races’ “represented particular stocks whose 
members, like those great families showed a considerable degree of 
resemblance, yet were in a state of constant variation.”97 This use of 
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race emerging from Buffon’s definition of species, is not yet the 
dominating idea that proceeds to govern the nineteenth century; in 
Buffon’s, and for that matter Linnaeus’s usage, ‘race’ remains a 
descriptive as opposed to an analytic category. Both Buffon and 
Linnaeus in their use of ‘race’ maintain a tenuous relationship to its 
original meaning (i.e., ‘lineage’), but they maintain one nonetheless. In 
other words, they have not traveled as far down the road in their usage 
as a Johann Friedrich Blumenbach for example, for whom race 
“specifically denoted visible differences of physiology rather than 
common stock.”98 This becomes particularly evident once one 
compares Blumenbach’s descriptions with that of Linnaeus. The 
American variety of humankind, according to Blumenbach, is: 
 
Copper-coloured…; hair black, stiff, straight and scanty…; 
forehead short; eyes set very deep; nose somewhat apish, 
but prominent; the face invariably broad, with cheeks 
prominent, but not flat or depressed; its parts, if seen in 
profile, very distinct, and as it were deeply chiselled…; the 
shape of the forehead and head in many artificially 
distorted. This variety comprehends the inhabitants of 
America except the Esquimaux.99  
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Blumenbach’s description focuses exclusively on the morphological 
characteristics of his subjects and therefore seems to return us to an 
earlier idea of species. However the basis of Blumenbach’s descriptions 
are predicated on a rigorous quantification of this morphology. What 
we witness in the above passage is the result of a diligently applied 
quantitative method, one that seems to leave little room for the ‘racial’ 
definitions offered by Linnaeus –– of the ‘indolent’ African, for example. 
Yet it’s precisely the introduction of such methods that marks the 
transition from a regime of observation to that of measurement, from a 
discourse of natural history to the science of biology, from a language 
of varieties to a modern conception of race. Without this shift away 
from a discourse of ‘lineage’ and ‘family,’ to speak scientifically of 
different human groups as different in kind would have encountered a 
conceptual obstacle. Completely divorced from its semantic 
relationship to ‘lineage’ or ‘family,’ Blumenbach begins to construe 
‘race’ in markedly different terms. 
 None of these three authors escape from the constraints of their 
racial bias or prejudice. A brief perusal of any of their texts provides a 
clear enough indication of that. They each subscribe to a hierarchy 
that situates ‘whiteness’ at the point of privilege and organizes the 
balance of human “varieties” in relation to it.100 But neither do any of 
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the three question the fundamental unity of the species or the 
proposition that all individuals are members of a single human family. 
Yet by the end of the eighteenth century this proposition would come 
under increasing attack. Linnaeus’s classificatory scheme was an 
attempt to answer a question that had acquired increasing importance 
during the age of colonial expansion, i.e., that of human diversity. In 
other words, if human beings were the products of a single divine 
creation and could therefore trace their lineage back to a common 
origin, how could one account for the differences in appearance and 
levels of ‘civilization’? Linnaeus’s answer –– and in this he was joined 
by Buffon, Blumenbach, and many others –– was that environment 
produced the modifications evident in different varieties of human 
beings. Yet the age of colonial expansion appeared to invalidate this 
hypothesis. With the increasing transfer of populations to different 
climatic regions –– for example, the establishment of Europeans in 
North America and the forced removal of Africans to Europe and the 
colonial territories –– the predicted physiognomic and cultural changes 
simply did not occur. Environment, apparently, could not account for 
diversity. 
 With the weakening of the ‘environmentalist’ position, 
polygenesis reemerged –– it had been formulated as an explanation of 
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human diversity as early as the sixteenth century in the writings of 
Giordano Bruno and Paracelsus –– as a legitimate narrative of human 
difference.101 David Hume’s evaluation of the precise mental and 
cultural capacity of the Negro (or the lack thereof) is representative in 
this respect: 
 
I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the 
other species of men (for there are four or five different 
kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never 
was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, 
nor even any individual eminent in action or speculation. 
No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no 
sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and 
barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GEMANS, 
the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about 
them, in their valour, form of government, or some other 
particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could 
not happen in so many countries and ages, if nature had 
not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of 
men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE 
slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever 
discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; tho’ low people, 
without education, will start up amongst us, and 
distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA 
indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and 
learning; but ‘tis likely he is admired for very slender 
accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words 
plainly.102  
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Differences that had previously been ascribed to theories of degeneracy 
or the wisdom of a divine plan were now increasingly explained as 
characteristics proper to differing species. The Negro’s failure to 
achieve a passing grade in Hume’s comparative evaluation signifies 
less the underdevelopment of Negro capacity than it does the Negro’s 
status as a permanently inferior species of human being. In dismissing 
all indications that might signify the possibility of Negro 
‘advancement,’ whether witnessed by educational or artistic 
achievement, Hume condemns the African to what he considers its 
proper place outside the purview of the human family.103 Although 
Hume’s understanding of race still partakes of an older discourse, 
evident by his emphasis on the African’s cultural rather than biological 
shortcomings, the significant issue here is his willingness to supplant 
the biblical narrative of creation and the unity of the species that it 
presumes. Assumptions informing the idea Negro inferiority undergo a 
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gradual transformation beginning in the middle of the eighteenth 
century. The well formed opinion of the Negro’s subordinate status, a 
staple of eighteenth century scientific discourse and a truism beyond 
argument, no longer rests on the secure foundation of biblical truth –– 
at least as it had been understood up to that point. Polygenesis, the 
position Hume advances in the above passage, not only posits multiple 
species of human beings, but conflicts with the tenets of biblical 
teaching; and yet, it acquired an increasing influence, in both Europe 
and the colonies, as an explanation of human difference. Its influence 
was most pronounced in the United States and provided the unifying 
thread for the coterie of scholars who would form the first school of 
American ethnology.104 The ensuing debate between monogenesists 
and polygenesists that occurs in the first half of the nineteenth 
century provides the terms through which the basic configuration of 
nineteenth century racial theory assumes form in the United States. 
Ultimately this transition, from a language of classification to a 
discourse of biology, from questions lineage to those of race, ushers in 
the basis of nineteenth century racial ideology; and, as such, informs 
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the immediate ‘scientific’ and cultural backdrop of W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
own reflections on race. 
 
 
III. 
 Pre-Civil War America witnessed a movement towards a new 
understanding of the reasons for racial inferiority. No longer 
exclusively construed as the result of ‘degeneracy’ or the consequences 
of the Negro’s allotted fate (i.e., his/her position in the Great Chain of 
Being) –– arguments dependent on a notion of monogenesis for their 
coherence ––, Negro inferiority now began to be conceived in reference 
to polygenesis. This revival of polygenesis served other than solely 
scientific purposes. Its arguments were marshaled in response to 
those forwarded by the growing abolitionist movement and the threat 
it constituted to the slave power. As we have seen Enlightenment 
natural historians presumed that human diversity was conditioned by 
environmental and geographical factors. By producing fertile offspring, 
the sexual union of Negroes and Caucasians clearly conformed to the 
criteria by which different ‘varieties’ were unified under the umbrella of 
a single species. The issue of species unity therefore remained a minor 
though not insignificant question. Explanations for the Negro’s 
difference from her European counterpart made reference principally 
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to the climatic and geographical variants necessarily effecting the 
African’s development. In other words, regardless of the undeniable 
hierarchical order in which natural historians such as a Linnaeus or a 
Buffon placed the African–– situating her, depending on the author, 
either on the lowest or sometimes the penultimate rung of human 
development –– they nonetheless considered both the European and 
the Negro as members of the same species. With the advent of the 
nineteenth century this basic assumption began to change. In this 
context Edward Long’s History of Jamaica published in 1744 (and 
reprinted in the United States in The Columbian Magazine in 1788) 
was to be of particular importance. Long, an English jurist and planter 
who had lived in the West Indies for over twelve years, published his 
History as a justification of black slavery. It gained significant 
popularity, and more importantly, proved highly influential among 
Southern plantation owners. Of Long’s many arguments supporting 
slavery he staked his principal claim to the belief that the Negro 
constituted a distinct species, that their physical traits placed them 
closer to beasts than human beings, and that the African occupied an 
intermediate level between lower apes and Homo sapiens. Negroes, in 
his view of the matter, were “devoid of genius, and seem almost 
incapable of making any progress in civility or science. They have no 
plan or system of morality among them. … It being a common proverb, 
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that all people of the globe have some good as well as ill qualities 
except the African.”105 (Smedley) What distinguishes Long’s text from 
other proto-anthropological treatises written in the colonies –– apart 
from its influence on the issue of the Atlantic slave trade –– is its 
unabashed advocacy of polygenesis. Long is not writing from the 
center of politics and culture, or from the sophisticated comfort of a 
European capital, his published adherence to polygenesis therefore 
constitutes an even more telling indication of its increasing influence. 
 Despite the historical importance of Long’s text, his influence in 
scientific circles of the period paled besides that of Samuel Stanhope 
Smith. Smith’s Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and 
Figure in the Human Species, published in 1787 and updated in 1810, 
was considered the authoritative American text concerning the origins 
of human diversity and remained deeply influential well into the 
1840s. Smith, a defender of monogenesis, argued that racial 
differences were the result of differing social and climatic 
environments. He claimed that if such external environmental factors 
were erased then the differences witnessed between races would 
eventually be eliminated. Smith’s argument foundered on the same 
shoals other adherents of monogenesis had encountered, i.e., no one 
had ever witnessed the transformation Smith postulated.106 Although 
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Charles Caldwell presented the first important American critique of 
Smith’s arguments, in his Thoughts on the Original Unity of the Human 
Race, it was not until the emergence of the ‘American School of 
Ethnology’ that the combination of science and polygenesis exhibited 
its profound influence on American racial thinking.  
 Up until the publication of Dr. Samuel George Morton’s Crania 
Americana in 1839, considered by many as the inaugural text of the 
first school of American ethnology, the account of human difference 
still followed –– at least in its basic outlines –– the narrative proposed 
by Samuel Stanhope Smith. Morton’s study, alongside the increasing 
scientific prestige associated with the American school of ethnology, 
initiated the eclipse of Smith’s influence in scientific circles. What 
distinguished Morton’s text was both the centrality he assigned to 
polygenesis and the purported scientific value of his analysis.107 
Polygenesis became more than simply the explanatory framework 
subtending Morton’s argument; it identified Morton’s study as 
specifically American in its provenance, and granted polygenesis a 
cultural legitimacy far outstripping its status anywhere else.108 As 
                                                
107 Morton’s data on the internal cranial capacity of different races is reproduced, for 
example, in the work of Carl Gustav Carus, and from Carus makes its way into the 
writings of Joseph Arthur de Gobineau. See Banton, Racial Theories  50-51. 
108 Gould, remarking on the transformation that engendered the establishment of a 
distinctly American variant of ethnology writes: “A collection of eclectic amateurs, 
bowing before the prestige of European theorists became a group of professionals 
with indigenous ideas and an internal dynamic that did not require constant fueling 
from Europe. The doctrine of polygeny acted as an important agent in this 
transformation; for its was one of the first theories of largely American origin that 
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such, it established the profile, both scientifically and institutionally, 
of the first school of American ethnology. 
Morton underwrote his argument with ‘scientific’ data drawn 
from his vast skull collection. His comparative analysis of Native 
American and, later, Egyptian skulls led him to conclude that opinions 
which stated, “that the differences now observable in mankind are 
owing solely to vicissitudes of climate, locality, habits of life, and 
various collateral circumstances” were ill-formed.109 In opposition 
therefore to the then governing consensus, Morton surmised that 
different races were particularly suited to different environments, and 
that this racial adaptability occurred independently of climatic or 
environmental factors. Citing Caldwell’s argument in Thoughts on the 
Unity of the Human Species –– who himself was relying on Archbishop 
James Ussher’s accepted Biblical timeline110 ––, Morton asserted that 
the Negro had not changed since the moment of its creation. If one 
accepted the biblical chronology regarding Noah’s descent from the ark 
(i.e., 4179 years ago), Morton argued, then the possibility of Negroes 
having actually derived their origins from the patriarch of the flood is 
                                                
won attention and respect of European scientists –– so much so that European 
referred to polygeny as the ‘American School’ of anthropology. Polygeny had 
European antecedents … but Americans developed the data cited in its support and 
based a large body of research on its tenets.” Gould, The Mismeasure of Man  74. 
109 Samuel George Morton, Crania Americana; or, a Comparative View of the Skulls 
of Various Aboriginal Nations of North and South America (1839), American Theories 
of Polygenesis, ed. Robert Bernasconi, vol. 1, 7 vols. (Bristol, England: Thoemmes 
Press, 2002) 2. 
110 Fredrickson, Black Image  73. 
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unlikely. Presuming Noah’s family to have been Caucasian –– a fact of 
which there is no reason to doubt according to Morton –– and recalling 
that the presence of Negroes can be dated to at least 3445 years ago, 
the resulting interval of 734 years would simply have been insufficient 
for the emergence of a new race. And further, Morton contends, 
“recent discoveries in Egypt give additional force to the preceding 
statement, inasmuch as they show beyond all question, that the 
Caucasian and Negro races were as perfectly distinct in that country 
upwards of three thousand years ago as they are now”.111 All evidence, 
in Morton’s view, points to the inevitable conclusion that races, and in 
particular the Negro and the Caucasian races, derive from different 
origins. 
 Of course, if Morton’s arguments rested primarily on his 
knowledge of biblical interpretation and chronology, then the scientific 
value of his texts would have been negligible. Rather than his biblical 
exegesis, it was through his measurement and classification of 
differences between white, Native American, and Negro skulls that 
Morton acquired his fame. From his examination of skull 
measurements Morton argued that the cognitive capacity and physical 
attributes of the various races had remained relatively unchanged. His 
1844 study, Crania Ægyptiaca, undertaken in collaboration with 
                                                
111 Morton, Crania Americana; or, a Comparative View of the Skulls of Various 
Aboriginal Nations of North and South America (1839)  88. 
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George R. Gliddon, reinforced the conclusions he had drawn from his 
earlier work. When measuring the cranial capacity of his Egyptian 
skulls, after having first dispersed them into their respective 
ethnographic divisions, Morton’s results reflected the conclusions he 
had asserted in 1839.112 Of the seventy-two skulls that comprised his 
study, the largest cranial capacity of any individual skull was 97 cubic 
inches belonging to a skull of the Pelasgic form (i.e., Caucasian), and 
the skulls of the Pelasgic form also supplied the highest mean average 
of cranial capacity. Negroid skulls, by contrast, had the lowest mean 
average of cranial capacity.113 Because cranial capacity was 
supposedly correlated with brain size and ‘civilizational capability,’ the 
conclusions that would be drawn from such a study are evident. Not 
only did it reinforce the hierarchical order of racial difference, it also 
substantiated the Southern perception of the Negro as inherently 
inferior and biologically destined for slavery. Morton’s studies 
reinforced the growing contention that Negroes and Caucasians 
constituted different ‘types of men’ and provided the basis for further 
                                                
112 Most of these skulls were collected by George Gliddon in his time as United States 
consul to the city of Cairo, and were thereafter forwarded to Morton. Through his 
travels in the region Gliddon originally obtained 137 skulls of which 100 belonged to 
“the ancient inhabitants of Egypt.” Morton concedes that he cannot ascertain with 
even the remotest certainty precisely to what period these remains belong. 
Fortunately, their supposed ethnographic discrepancies allow him to classify them 
according to their racial type. Samuel George Morton, Crania Ægyptiaca; or, 
Obervations of Egyptian Ethnography, Derived from Anatomy, History and 
Monuments (1844), American Theories of Polygenesis, ed. Robert Bernasconi, vol. 1, 
7 vols. (Bristol, England: Theommes Press, 2002) 1-3. 
113 Morton, Crania Ægyptiaca; or, Obervations of Egyptian Ethnography, Derived 
from Anatomy, History and Monuments (1844)  21. 
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research along these lines by the other two founding members of the 
American School of Ethnology, Louis Agassiz and Josiah C Nott. 
Louis Agassiz and Dr. Josiah C. Nott came from very different 
social and scientific backgrounds. Agassiz, before arriving in the 
United States in 1846, had already established an enviable scientific 
reputation in his native Switzerland and throughout Europe. His 
scientific credentials were further enhanced by his position at Harvard 
both as a professor as well as founder and director of the Museum of 
Comparative Zoology –– with which he was affiliated until his death in 
1873. The irony of his impact on Southern opinion makers regarding 
slavery and the Negro is that Agassiz had never encountered a Negro 
until his arrival in America.114 This cannot be said of Josiah Nott. Nott 
was a Southerner, an apologist for African slavery, a co-editor of the 
abridged American edition of Gobineau’s Essai sur l’inégalité des races 
humaines, and after the death of Samuel Morton the principal 
propagator of the tenets associated with the American School of 
Ethnology. As George Fredrickson has remarked, “that Nott was 
                                                
114 The impact of this first encounter, and the revulsion that he felt, is recollected in 
a December 1846 letter he wrote to his mother: “It was in Philadelphia that I first 
found myself in prolonged contact with negroes; all the domestics in my hotel were 
men of color. I can scarcely express to you the painful impression that I received, 
especially since the feeling that they inspired in me is contrary to all our ideas about 
the confraternity of the human type and the unique origin of our species. … 
Nonetheless, it is impossible for me to reprocess the feeling that they are not of the 
same blood as us. In seeing their black faces with their thick lips and grimacing 
teeth, the wool on their head, their bent knees, their elongated hands, and their large 
curved nails, and especially the livid color of the palm of their hands, I could not 
take my eyes off their face in order to tell them to stay far away.” Agassiz quoted in 
Gould, The Mismeasure of Man  75-77. 
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recognized as a leading scientist was perhaps more indicative of the 
racial preconceptions of his audience than of the quality of his 
research and theoretical formulations.”115 Yet despite their respective 
agendas, Agassiz and Nott were each admirers of Samuel Morton, and 
in 1854 collaborated with George R. Gliddon in the publication of 
Types of Mankind, a text published in honor of Morton.  
 The arguments proposed in Types of Mankind were principally 
indebted to the conclusions drawn from research undertaken by 
Morton in both his Crania Americana and the later Crania Ægyptiaca. 
But Types of Mankind extended the argument by attempting to provide 
a clearer theoretical foundation for Morton’s assessments. The 
conclusion of Morton’s research, namely, “that each Race was adapted 
from the beginning to its peculiar local destination,” and further, “that 
the physical characteristics which distinguish the different Races, are 
independent of external causes” was not, even in the science of the 
day, the easiest position to defend.116 Morton’s claim led logically to a 
conclusion that posited several types of human groups, each 
particularly suited for their specific environment and each originating 
in their respective geographical area. Proceeding along this line of 
inquiry in his “Sketch of the Natural Provinces of the Animal World 
and their Relation to Different Types of Man,” –– his own contribution 
                                                
115 Fredrickson, Black Image  79. 
116 Morton, Crania Americana; or, a Comparative View of the Skulls of Various 
Aboriginal Nations of North and South America (1839)  3. 
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to Types of Mankind –– Agassiz extended the scope of Morton’s 
argument. Focusing on the manner in which the “Asiatic zoological 
realm” is specifically delineated, Agassiz writes: 
 
But since it is not my object to describe separately all 
faunae, but chiefly to call attention to the coincidence 
existing between the natural limitation of the races of 
man, and the geographical range of the zoological 
provinces, I shall limit myself here to some general 
remarks respecting the Mongolian fauna, in order to show 
that the Asiatic zoological realm differs essentially from 
the European and the American. … [.] … If we now ask 
what are the nations of men inhabiting those regions, we 
find that they all belong to the so-called Mongolian race, 
the natural limits of which correspond exactly to the range 
of the Japanese, Chinese, Mongolian and Caspian faunae 
taken together, and that peculiar types, distinct nations of 
this race, cover respectively the different faunae of this 
realm.117  
 
The question of human diversity is answered for Agassiz by reference 
to the order he witnesses in the zoological realm. It is no coincidence, 
in his view, that one finds Mongolian flora and fauna within the same 
geographical parameters that one locates the Mongolian race. Or as he 
states it, one finds “the Japanese inhabiting the Japanese zoological 
province; the Chinese, the Chinese province, the Mongols, the 
                                                
117 Louis Agassiz, "Of the Natural Provinces of the Animal World and Their Relation 
to the Different Types of Man," Types of Mankind (1854), eds. Josiah Clark Nott and 
George Robins Gliddon, vol. 3, American Theories of Polygenesis (Bristol, England: 
Theommes Press, 2002) lxv-lxvi. 
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Mongolian province”.118 The zoological record appeared to reinforce the 
notion that the globe was peopled by “distinct types of man” whose 
differences were qualitative and inscribed in the biological order.119 In 
other words, human beings did not share a common origin.  
In holding this position, Agassiz and Nott, challenged not only 
the reigning orthodoxy regarding human diversity, but were also forced 
to confront what had become the secular and scientific basis of the 
idea of a common human origin: Buffon’s definition of species. By 
eliminating morphological similarity (or difference) as the determining 
criteria underlying the unity of a species, Buffon had also shifted the 
terms of discussion. Agassiz and Nott could no longer simply assert 
Negro inferiority or rely on the purported civilizational deficiency of the 
Negro as evidence of the good sense of their position. Therefore they 
challenged Buffon’s definition directly by charging that any theory that 
“makes specific difference or identity depend upon genetic succession,” 
remains mired in confusion, and is itself “begging the principle and 
                                                
118 Agassiz, "Of the Natural Provinces of the Animal World and Their Relation to the 
Different Types of Man,"   lxvi. 
119 The accuracy of Agassiz’s formulation is less important here than the significance 
his audience attached to his claims. Because humans are capable of migrating to 
most any geographical location, and are therefore considered an ideal example of a 
“cosmopolitan, variable species,” Agassiz’s particular classification is inapplicable. 
Although the zoological strictures Agassiz placed on fauna and flora did not apply to 
Homo sapiens, nor was it ever the dominant explanatory paradigm, it was still –– in 
the period –– a respectable scientific opinion. For a critique of Agassiz’s views see 
Gould, The Mismeasure of Man  74-78. 
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taking for granted what reality is under discussion.” 120 But, 
supplanting Buffon’s definition required locating another criteria –– 
one other than “genetic succession” –– that could form the basis of 
species differentiation. In his response, Agassiz proposed a refurbished 
notion of morphology, a concept allied to the idea of geographical 
dispersal outlined above, –– conceptions that Nott would adopt in his 
own writings on human diversity –– as the appropriate criteria by 
which species could be classified and distinguished. 
 Although morphology assumed a renewed importance for 
Agassiz –– and by extension for Nott –– and became the basis of their 
classification of different species-types, it did not prevent them from 
falling into the error Buffon’s definition had been intended to avoid. In 
perhaps the most noted example, Nott could claim that,  
 
inasmuch as there is no evidence that dogs did really all 
proceed from one stock, or that their different types, such 
as greyhounds, mastiffs, turnspits, &c., can be 
transformed into each other by physical causes; and 
again, considering that all these canine types did preserve, 
side by side in Egypt, their respective forms for thousands 
of years, these animals must be regarded, by every 
naturalist, as specifically distinct.121 (Italics mine) 
 
 
                                                
120 Agassiz, "Of the Natural Provinces of the Animal World and Their Relation to the 
Different Types of Man,"   lxxiv. 
121 Josiah Clark Nott, "Types of Mankind," Types of Mankind (1854), eds. Josiah 
Clark Nott and George Robins Gliddon, vol. 3, American Theories of Polygenesis 
(Bristol, England: Theommes Press, 2002) 386. 
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For Agassiz no less than for Nott, the slightest morphological 
difference between organisms presumed the discovery of another 
species. Thus the mastiff, the greyhound, and the turnspit can be 
defined as separate species, all on the basis of morphological 
distinction and geographical location. The taxonomic ‘irregularity’ of 
this classification applies to human beings as well. Negroes, 
Caucasians, Esquimaux, etc., all considered “distinct types of man” 
according to Agassiz, can be categorized as such because they 
subscribe to the same zoological rules that Agassiz sees at work in all 
flora and fauna. But Buffon’s emphasis on “genetic succession” –– and 
the scientific consensus surrounding his definition of species –– 
constitutes a serious challenge to Agassiz and Nott’s proposed 
argument. In other words, their Typological Theory of racial difference 
requires that “genetic succession” be marginalized as the criterion that 
determines species distinction. By rehabilitating morphological 
difference and unifying it with geographical dispersal in order to 
construct a determinate criterion of species distinction, Agassiz chose 
to confront Buffon on somewhat different terrain than his collaborator. 
Although Nott adopted most, if not all, of Agassiz’s formulations, he 
also chose to emphasize an aspect of the question to which Agassiz 
had only devoted slight attention. While Agassiz opted for a return to 
morphology and geographical location as an antidote to the perceived 
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error of Buffon’s definition, Josiah Nott addressed himself explicitly to 
the issue of hybridity and the question of fertility and species survival 
that it implied. 
 In his challenge to Buffon’s definition, Nott approached the issue 
from a different angle. Although, like Agassiz, he claimed that “genetic 
succession” was an inadequate criterion for distinguishing species, his 
argument proceeded in a different direction. He asserted that the 
existence of hybridity in nature confirmed Morton’s insight that 
“different degrees of affinity exist in nature” and that this must be 
“taken into account in all inquiries into the prolificacy of diverse 
‘species.’”122 Borrowing the language of Morton’s discourse, in which 
he had distinguished between remote, allied, and proximate species, 
Nott contended that this classification explained how –– contra Buffon 
–– different species could produce fertile offspring.123 Negroes, 
Caucasians, etc., although derived from the same genus constituted, 
in Nott’s assessment, proximate species and therefore the fertility of 
their offspring was to be expected. In other words, different human 
groups might share the same genus but they are still separated by 
their inclusion into different species or types.  
                                                
122 Nott, "Types of Mankind,"   394. 
123 Citing on an earlier paper published by Morton, Nott defined the terms as follows:  
“REMOTE SPECIES, of the same genus, are those among which 
hybrids are never produced.  
“ALLIED SPECIES produce, inter se, an infertile offspring. 
“PROXIMATE SPECIES produce, with each other, a fertile offspring.”  
Nott, "Types of Mankind,"   81. 
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 By formulating the issue of species difference along these lines, 
Nott situated the question species survival at the forefront of any 
discussion of human diversity. Returning to his canine example, Nott 
remarks that “[w]here opposite types of dogs are bred together, and 
their hybrid progeny becomes again intermingled, all sorts of mongrel, 
degenerate, or deformed varieties arise,” and moreover, products of 
such unions generally “‘possess a short and fleeting existence.’”124 
Humans, conforming to the same natural laws that apply to all 
creatures, are necessarily exposed to similar threats. “The species of 
men are all proximate,” yet, Nott cautions, “some are perfectly prolific; 
while others are imperfectly so –– possessing a tendency to become 
extinct when their hybrids are bred together.”125 Miscegenation 
constitutes a threat, and to the Josiah Nott of Types of Mankind, it is a 
threat directed principally at the white race.126 (Nott) Yet within a very 
short time it will be the Negro’s survival that will be the subject of 
speculation.  
By introducing the issue of hybridity, the constitutional 
adaptability of different “types of man” arises as a question. Therefore, 
                                                
124 Nott, "Types of Mankind,"   394. 
125 Nott, "Types of Mankind,"   397. 
126 “It seems to me certain, however, in human physical history, that the superior 
race must inevitably become deteriorated by any intermixture with the inferior; and I 
have suggested elsewhere, that, through the operation of the laws of hybridity alone, 
the human family might possibly become exterminated by a thorough amalgamation 
of all the various types of mankind now existing upon earth.” Nott, "Types of 
Mankind,"   407. 
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although all “species of men” are proximate, some are clearly more 
proximate than others: 
 
When two proximate species of mankind, two races 
bearing a general resemblance to each other in type, are 
bred together –– e.g., Teutons, Celts, Pelasgians, Iberians, 
or Jews –– they produce offspring perfectly prolific … 
When, on the other hand, species the most widely 
separated, such as the Anglo-Saxon with the Negro, are 
crossed, a different result has course. Their mulatto 
offspring, if still prolific, are but partially so; and acquire 
an inherent tendency to run out and become eventually 
extinct when kept apart from parent stocks.127 
 
 
Nott’s evaluation of the biological deficiency of mulattos testifies to 
what will become an increasing refrain in the latter third of the 
nineteenth century: the biological unsuitability of the Negro for 
survival. By the end of the Civil War the importance of Darwin’s 
theories began to impose themselves on American racialist thinking. 
Even Josiah Nott, once a devoted advocate of polygenesis, converted to 
positions he considered congruent with Darwinian hypotheses. 
Monogenesis and polygenesis were rapidly relegated to the margins as 
the new discourse of Darwinian evolutionary biology acquired a 
foothold. Debates that had defined the landscape of American 
conceptions of race slowly receded into the background as a new 
terrain of debate emerged. With the advent of Darwin’s revolution and 
                                                
127 Nott, "Types of Mankind,"   397-98. 
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the adoption of his theories by the principal exponents of American 
ethnology, the terms of racial debate underwent a shift.  
 
 
 
IV. 
The value of Du Bois’s early writings stems from his willingness to 
inhabit the contradictions that emerge from the discourses that speak 
to the ‘Negro problem.’(Banton; Voegelin; Augstein; Agassiz; Comte de 
Buffon "L'asne (1749-1767)"; Hume; Jefferson; Popkin; Gould; Baker) 
Du Bois does not extract himself easily, if at all, from these 
contradictions. And as such, particular vigilance when approaching 
these early texts is required. Often enmeshed within the discursive 
modalities of nineteenth century racial logic Du Bois’s early texts 
seemingly betray an allegiance to the conceptual vocabulary they claim 
to contest. But one must also recognize that Du Bois’s texts do not 
yield simply, or necessarily, to this logic. The resources marshaled in 
opposition to the governing racial logic are also drawn from it and it is 
through this intersection of a prior and insistent discursive modality 
with a new and incipient critical rearticulation –– one left almost 
always unresolved –– that Du Bois’s texts impose themselves. It is the 
absence of this awareness on the part of critics that can make the 
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renewed focus on Du Bois’s work at times perplexing. Criticism of Du 
Bois’s early work, while much of it well-warranted, often demand a 
conceptual or theoretical consistency that the discourses out of which 
Du Bois writes, themselves, when addressing race, simply do not have. 
But the issue goes much further. Although Du Bois, an undeniable 
intellectual product of his age, accepts the basis on which most of 
these discourses are constructed, the questions he implicitly puts to 
them challenges their basic configuration. How do we come to ask the 
‘Negro question’? What is the trajectory by which the Negro results as 
a ‘problem’? In other words what are the discursive modalities by 
which the ‘Negro’ is articulated and what is the historicity that attends 
the being of the ‘Negro.’ These questions, asked in one form or another 
throughout Du Bois entire corpus, assume particular importance in 
the early work because his various initial attempts to navigate them 
foregrounds the epistemological question at their core: what is the 
Negro? What does it mean to ask this question? For Du Bois, it means 
first to engage with the range of discourses (natural history, 
evolutionary biology, phrenology, history, etc.) across which the body 
and the being of the Negro lies available for inspection. Second, it 
means to compare the manner in which this question is asked of 
others –– and in what register –– and evaluate the way in which these 
answers are then parsed. Yet primarily for Du Bois it means bringing 
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into proximity discursive regimes whose affiliation within his texts 
produce unusual answers to what were thought to be well-rehearsed 
questions. 
 
“The question, then, which we must seriously consider is this: what is 
the real meaning of Race; what has, in the past, been the law of race 
development, and what lessons has the past history of race 
development to teach the rising Negro people?”128 This is the question 
that begins Du Bois’s “The Conservation of Races,” his 1897 address 
to the American Negro Academy. Delivered less than a year after Plessy 
vs. Ferguson, the supreme court decision that constitutionally 
sanctioned legal segregation, and written within the ever receding 
shadow of what was the promise of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendments, Du Bois’s essay appears at an undeniably burdened 
historical moment for African Americans.129 The 1890s were also to 
become the decade of the highest number of reported lynchings in 
American history.130 The over 2000 lynchings during the decade, most 
of which visited upon black people, punctuated the reversal of what 
had seemingly begun so well with the Emancipation Proclamation and 
                                                
128 Du Bois, "Conservation,"   815. 
129 The decision in Plessy was given on May 18th, 1896 and Du Bois delivered 
“Conservation,” on March 5th, 1897. 
130 Shipp Trial Project, Lynching in America: Statistics, Information, Images, 
Internet, Archive at Tuskegee Institute, Available: 
www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingyear.html. 
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the hopes of the newly freed slaves. Alongside these developments, the 
1890 U.S. census unleashed a new debate, couched in Darwinian 
terms, regarding the Negro’s fitness for survival. The census reported 
declining Negro birthrates and populations and this was construed as 
betokening the death knell of the Negro race.131 By the 1890s 
discussions of the inevitable disappearance of the American Negro, 
spurred primarily by interpretations of the 1890 census, acquired 
increasing currency. The prevailing question was no longer, as it had 
been, whether the Negro constituted a different species, but whether 
the Negro was fit for survival.132 Written alongside the tumult of late 
nineteenth century American racial politics “The Conservation of 
Races” presents itself in part as Du Bois’s attempt to situate the Negro 
within the period’s “race talk” in a somewhat different way.133 What is 
worked through in Du Bois’s address––at a subterranean level as it 
were––is the attempt to broker the beginnings of a rapprochement 
between an understanding of the Negro and a conception of race.  
That the conception of race on offer in Du Bois’s “Conservation” 
finds itself at odds with either the biological or cultural variant of the 
                                                
131 The rate of population increase among Negroes (as African Americans were 
designated in the 1890 census) had dropped by almost half in the 1890 census. 
Whereas the Negro population increased by approximately 1.7 million between 1870 
and 1880, the 1890 census indicated that their numbers increased by less than one 
million between 1880 and 1890. United States Census Bureau, Census Data for the 
Year 1890, Internet, United States Historical Census Data, Available: 
www.fisher.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/censusbin/census/cen.pl?year=890. 
132 Fredrickson, Black Image  246-47. 
133 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Publishers, 1973) 174. 
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notion might at first seem to be a slightly specious argument. After all 
Du Bois’s entire terminology seems borrowed from the governing 
discursive schemes of the day. Race appears to be a question of 
“language,” “blood,” even of specific “genius;” Du Bois marshals the 
entire rhetoric of late nineteenth century racial discourse in service of 
a conception of race that seemingly leaves us no further than when we 
began. But in following this either/or choice we quickly find that Du 
Bois’s text can in fact offer us either option ––a biological or a cultural 
determination of race –– and sometimes in remarkably close proximity 
to each other.134 That tensions and slippages arise in Du Bois’s text 
between a conception of race anchored in the biological and one firmly 
situated on the semantic field of the socio-historical is altogether clear. 
Yet the question remains: is this all there is to the position Du Bois 
elaborates, namely, an overly confused notion of racial difference that 
fails to rigorously propose a consistent definition. Does the conception 
of race Du Bois outlines falter on the unresolved tensions that his 
texts appear unable to surmount? Whatever answer one chooses to 
pursue, proceeding without due attentiveness to the complexity of the 
claims registered in a text such as “The Conservation of Races,” 
ignores what may be construed as Du Bois’s initial cautionary note 
regarding race: 
 
                                                
134 Du Bois, "Conservation,"   818. 
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Although the wonderful developments of human history 
teach that the grosser physical differences of color, hair 
and bone go but a short way toward explaining the 
different roles which groups of men have played in Human 
Progress, yet there are differences –– subtle, delicate and 
elusive, though they may be –– which have silently but 
definitely separated men into groups. While these subtle 
forces have generally followed the natural cleavages of 
common blood, descent and physical peculiarities, they 
have at other times swept across and ignored these. At all 
times, however, they have divided human beings into 
races, which, while they perhaps transcend scientific 
definition, nevertheless, are clearly defined to the eye of 
the Historian and Sociologist.135 
 
 
Students of Du Bois are undoubtedly familiar with this passage. 
Outside of the well-known opening section of The Souls of Black Folk, 
there might not be a more recognizably Du Boisian paragraph than 
this one. It appears to articulate the two competing conceptions of race 
seemingly at the center of Du Bois’s essay. The first, a definition that 
ensconces race in the framework of scientific discourse thereby 
relegating race to a species of biological determinism and making of 
the Negro an epiphenomenon of biological destiny. The second 
conception seemingly operative in Du Bois text locates race within the 
parameter of a socio-historical determination of racial difference. Both 
of these ideas of race present themselves in this paragraph and 
provide the terms through which a critical reading of Du Bois’s notion 
of race must navigate. Most critics, whether sympathetic or otherwise, 
                                                
135 Du Bois, "Conservation,"   816-17. 
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have generally construed the distinction between these two 
conceptions of race as an opposition.136 Either one of the definitions 
must be dismissed as unrepresentative of the true scope of Du Bois 
idea of race, or the apparent contradiction implied by their dual 
presence minimized by emphasizing the presence of one at the expense 
of the other. That within these pages the number of races vary 
depending on whether Du Bois is relying on the scientific (2) or socio-
historical (8) account would seem to reinforce the interpretive strategy 
that attempts to resolve this problem by adjudicating between these 
two seemingly ‘rival’ accounts of race.137 But Du Bois’s text appears to 
offer a third formulation, one that may provide another way of 
negotiating the specifically Du Boisian paradox of race: 
 
                                                
136 See amongst others, Peter Coviello, "Intimacy and Affliction: Du Bois, Race, and 
Psychoanalysis," Modern Language Quarterly 64.1 (2003): 1-32, Gooding-Williams, 
"Outlaw, Appiah, and Du Bois's 'the Conservation of Races',"   39-56, Tommy Lott, 
"Du Bois and Locke on the Scientific Study of the Negro," Boundary 2: An 
International Journal of Literature and Culture 27.3 (2000): 135-52, Lott, "Du Bois's 
Anthropological Notion of Race,"   59-83, Miles, "'One Far Off Divine Event': 'Race' 
and a Future History in Du Bois,"   19-31, Outlaw, "Conserve Races?,"   15-37, 
Cynthia D. Schrager, "Both Sides of the Veil: Race, Science, and Mysticism in W.E.B. 
Du Bois," American Quarterly 48.4 (1996): 551-86. 
137 Referencing the scientific definition Du Bois maintains that “[t]he final word of 
science, so far, is that we have at least two, perhaps three, great families of human 
beings –– the whites and Negroes, possibly the yellow race.” A page later, once he 
turns to history, the number is augmented by five: “We find upon the world’s stage 
today eight distinctly different races, in the sense in which History tells us the word 
must be used. They are, the Slavs of eastern Europe, the Teutons of middle Europe, 
the English of Great Britain and America, the Romance nations of Southern and 
Western Europe, the Negroes of Africa and America, the Semitic people of Western 
Asia and Northern Africa, the Hindoos of Central Asia and the Mongolian of Eastern 
Asia.” Du Bois, "Conservation,"   816, 17-18. 
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If this be true, then the history of the world is the history, 
not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but of 
races…138 
 
 
Found at the beginning of the paragraph that succeeds the previous 
citation, Du Bois here introduces an equivalence in which a peculiar 
notion of race seems operative: individuals are to nations as groups are 
to races.  
The peculiarity of the citation stems less from the seeming 
identification of nations and races. This commonplace already fueled 
much of the political rhetoric of European and American imperial 
expansionism during the nineties and through the turn of the 
century.139 Du Bois’s formulation would appear then to rehearse the 
accepted truisms of contemporary political rhetoric and race thinking 
albeit in service of a slightly different objective, namely, the 
rehabilitation of the American Negro. But reading Du Bois’s claim in 
such a narrowly circumscribed a manner denies the actual idea of race 
at the heart of his formulation. The specificity of Du Bois’s proposition 
is clarified if compared to another late nineteenth century theorist of 
the dialectic of race and nation Ernest Renan. Renan’s classic 
statement on the matter “What is a Nation?” delivered some fifteen 
years before Du Bois’s own effort to reinscribe the relationship 
                                                
138 Du Bois, "Conservation,"   817. 
139 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism  185-221. 
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between race and nation, 140 argues for the distinctiveness of the 
nation and of its centrality as the site for the actualization of the 
‘properly’ modern political relation: 
 
At the time of the French Revolution, it was commonly 
believed that the institutions proper to small, independent 
cities, such as Sparta and Rome, might be applied to our 
large nations, which number some thirty or forty million 
souls. Nowadays, a far graver mistake is made: race is 
confused with nation and a sovereignty analogous to that 
of really existing peoples is attributed to ethnographic or, 
rather linguistic groups.141  
 
 
The nation that Renan defines above as the locus of an authentic, 
“really existing peoples,” is also the site from which one recognizes the 
operation of true sovereignty; in other words sovereignty derived from 
the facticity of this people. Following a clear and well worn path, Renan 
offers a recognizable trajectory by which sovereignty derives from a 
source –– in this case the “people” –– from which authority, the 
authority of the political, is itself authorized. Why then, if the heart of 
the argument seems in such proper order, is it that the misapplication 
of institutional-political models (i.e., Sparta, Rome) constitutes a far 
less serious matter than the apparently egregious confusion of race 
with nation? What sort of dissimulation does race initiate and on 
                                                
140 Renan delivered his famous speech at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882 and Du 
Bois delivered his in May 1897, a little over fifteen years later. 
141 Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?," trans. Martin Thom, Nation and Narration, ed. 
Homi Bhabha (New York: Routledge, 1990) 8. 
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whose behalf (viz., who are its false “people”?) And what is the exact 
nature of its threat to sovereignty? In other words, what distinguishes 
race from nation and how is that distinction operative? 
The question is not simply one of definition. As conceived by 
Renan, the emergence of the nation requires that its constituent 
peoples engage in an active forgetting through which the national bond 
is thereby formed. 142 The “principle of nationality” initiated by, 
according to Renan, the invading Germanic tribes, enacts both this 
erasing of peoples and the concomitant forming of people(s)-as-nation. 
Neither the Greek nor Phoenician city-state, neither the Assyrian nor 
Persian Empire, the German clan, nor even Rome managed to fuse 
their diversity into a singular national unit. For Renan nations 
constitutes themselves by transmuting pre-existing identifications into 
‘historic’ attachments thereby forging a unified national identity 
through the fusion of their various populations.143 The relation that 
defines the political and from which the sovereignty ascribed to the 
                                                
142 Renan, "What Is a Nation?,"   11. 
143 Renan relates the specific failures of the Hapsburg monarchy to its inability to 
enact this dialectic of fusion and forgetting: “Far from managing to fuse the diverse 
[ethnic] elements to be found in its domains, the House of Hapsburg has kept them 
distinct and often opposed the one to the other. …If you take a city such as Salonika, 
or Smyrna, you will find their five or six communities each of which has its own 
memories and which have almost nothing in common. Yet the essence of a nation is 
that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten 
many things.” Renan, "What Is a Nation?,"   11. 
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“people” issues is this fusion, this transformation of many into one.144 
But what in this operation is being forgotten? What must memory 
leave behind? In his comparison of the relative success of the 
nationality principle in France as compared to the Hapsburg Empire 
Renan suggests an answer: 
 
No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an 
Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has 
to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or 
the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth 
century.145 
 
 
Lost to the beyond of memory are those identifications that defined 
individuals and peoples before their attachment to the nation and 
erased from its place in lived memory is the violence that inaugurates 
the space of the political itself: 
 
Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, 
is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why 
progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger 
for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry 
brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the 
origin of all political formations, even those whose 
consequences have been altogether beneficial.146 
 
 
                                                
144 Renan couldn’t be clearer when he writes that the “defining feature” of those 
states that can be genuinely termed nations is that they have achieved “the fusion of 
their component populations.” Renan, "What Is a Nation?,"   10. 
145 Renan, "What Is a Nation?,"   11. 
146 Renan, "What Is a Nation?,"   11. 
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The violence at issue here is not simply the violence of inauguration 
but is the violence of race, racial violence. Race constitutes itself in 
Renan’s contention as the site of inauguration but one that doesn’t 
itself accede to a place within the configuration of the political. In 
other words, race is precisely what must be superseded if a nation is 
to be formed as such. If the political is the space of fusion, of a 
supervening unity, in essence, of the union of the subject, then race in 
its proposition of violent difference, of racial violence, remains 
inassimilable to the project that defines the national principle.  
If we follow the logic of Renan’s argument we come to recognize 
why race constitutes such a disturbing formative component of the 
national project. In the dialectic of forgetting and remembering that 
facilitates the transformation of preexisting relations into national 
attachments, the fiction is the idea of nation itself. The actualization of 
what Renan terms the “nation” requires the eclipse of the violent 
inscription of group life he calls “race.” To distinguish racial 
identification as the moment which founds the possibility of nation, 
and therefore the emergence of a site that one can identify with the 
political, is to derive the legitimacy of that site from a moment that 
exceeds it, that of racial violence itself. It’s this founding paradox that 
threatens the phantasm of national becoming. Not that that particular 
brand of forgetting proper to the project of nation –– that specific 
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national illusion –– ever truly risks being unveiled; it’s rather the 
threat that the logic of national becoming will at some point impose 
itself. The very sovereignty that grounds the political space of the 
nation derives from an articulation at once external and internal to it, 
in fact, simultaneously in both places and in neither. The place of 
racial violence, that site from which the nation derives its being is not, 
as Renan reminds us, the locus of “really existing peoples;” yet 
conversely, the space of truly existing peoples (i.e., the nation), cannot 
actualize itself as such. Pace Renan, sovereignty it seems can only be 
“analogous,” the ever consequential masquerade of analogy. We 
appear, at the end, to find ourselves unraveling Renan’s paradox by 
which race and nation face each other as the apparition the other 
denies.  
If Renan’s conception of the relation between nation and race 
favors the privileging of nation at the expense of race and construes 
nation as the site of legitimate political relation, Du Bois’s confers on 
race a somewhat different status. Let’s return to the Du Boisian 
passage with which we began:  
 
If this be true, then the history of the world is the history, 
not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but of 
races… 
 
 
  112 
With Du Bois, in marked similarity to Renan, there is also a question 
of the “really” existent––especially as it applies to the agent that 
constitutes the motor of history. In other words there is an indication 
that the discourse proffered by Du Bois, inasmuch as it evinces, even 
in a understated fashion, a concern with “true” and “false” 
agents/peoples, i.e., with the locus of true agency, it displays a subtle 
affiliation with the discursive framework Renan produces. But if we 
follow the logic of Du Bois’s formulation to its conclusion we find 
ourselves at a somewhat different point of arrival than Renan. For Du 
Bois, the nation does not constitute the locus of the relation one can 
call political. If the analogies at work in the above passage liken 
individual to nation and group to race then nation cannot constitute 
the form of the political configuration. Du Bois’s words seem an echo 
of an earlier analogy itself a consideration of the similarity between 
individual and nation:  
 
What is the use of working for a law-governed civil 
constitution among individual men, i.e., of planning a 
commonwealth? The same unsociability which forced men 
to do so gives rise in turn to a situation whereby each 
commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e., as a state in 
relation to other states), is in a position of unrestricted 
freedom. Each must accordingly expect from any other 
precisely the same evils which formerly oppressed 
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individual men and forced them into a law-governed civil 
state.147 (Italics added)  
 
 
Drawn from the seventh proposition of Kant’s “Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” the analogy relies on a 
comparison in which individual states are likened to human beings. 
Nations according to Kant, occupy the same status as individuals prior 
to their entrance into civil union, they live in a “lawless state of 
savagery.”148 The analogy extends beyond being a simple illustration, 
for Kant the “state of savagery” in which states find themselves before 
the advent of a federation of nations prevents the full development of 
human capacities. As with the individual human being for whom to 
live outside the civil order, outside the political relation, is to “hold up 
the development of all [one’s] natural capacities,” likewise the state 
that remains within the realm of “barbarous freedom” also hinders the 
full and complete development of human capacities.149 For inasmuch 
as the fulfillment of human freedom –– and thus one’s proper identity 
as a human being –– requires the establishment of the civil bond, of 
                                                
147 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose 
(1784)," trans. H. B. Nisbet, Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970) 47. 
148 Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784),"   47. 
149 Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784),"   49. 
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the political relation, to live outside of such relation is to withdraw 
from that which defines oneself as a human being. 150  
Following the outlines of Kant’s analogy is to say that nations, 
prior to their membership in the “federation of peoples” are like 
individuals before their entry into civil union; namely, they live outside 
the formative conditions of the political relation. Du Bois and Kant 
therefore situate both the individual and the nation along the same 
axis, as they each place both terms outside the (self-)defining 
conditions of the political relation. Yet with this difference: under Du 
Bois race has now become part of this conceptual mix. For if 
individuals and nations are outside the constitutive relation of the 
political bond, then the other pairing in Du Bois’s equivalence, i.e., 
groups and races, may well have a claim to more than simple 
membership within it. By placing race amid this discursive context 
and having it assume other than its prescribed role, Du Bois places 
pressure on the conception of race itself and, as I will suggest, on the 
parameters of our understanding of the political as well. Understood 
                                                
150 Summarizing the importance Kant ascribes to our common relation through the 
law Charles Taylor remarks that: “If to be free is to follow the moral law, and to act 
morally is to see that the maxim of my action could be willed universally, then 
freedom requires that I understand myself as a human among humans. I have to 
understand myself as standing under a law that applies to myself as well to others, 
one that is not addressed to me alone, but to a rational subject as such.” Charles 
Taylor, "Kant's Theory of Freedom," Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 326, see also 
28-30. Refracted through the formalism of the law, the common bond Kant imputes 
to the human being in its capacity as moral subject and as a constituent feature of 
the subject’s very humanity finds its corollary in the possibility –– because the result 
of the purposiveness of nature–– of the ideal political constitution.  
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along these lines race no longer conforms to its previous incarnation 
as a referent for distinctions drawn from differences of pigment or 
acculturation. Having revalorized the dialectic of race and nation by 
placing race –– granted, in a tentative and altogether insecure fashion 
–– at the site of what nation had previously claimed for itself (viz., the 
political), Du Bois locates race on quite different terrain. Rather than 
the index of cultural or biological particularity race is presented on 
other terms. 
This conception of race might initially appear utterly alien not 
only to our conception of Du Bois but to the actual concerns of Du 
Bois’s text. After all doesn’t the Du Bois with which we are familiar 
oscillate between two very different yet clearly, if inconsistently, 
defined notions of race? And aren’t there numerous instances, 
especially in a text such as “Conservation,” in which the conflict that 
arises occurs between a scientific and a sociohistorical conception of 
racial difference? A passage such as the following may well be a 
citation on which the skeptical might rely: 
 
Certainly we must acknowledge that physical differences 
play a great part, and that, with wide exceptions and 
qualifications, these eight great races of to-day follow the 
cleavage of physical race distinctions… But while race 
differences have followed mainly physical race lines, yet no 
mere physical distinctions would really define or explain 
the deeper differences –– the cohesiveness and continuity 
of these groups. The deeper differences are spiritual, 
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psychical, differences –– undoubtedly based on the 
physical, but infinitely transcending them.151 
 
 
Here we have all the elements generally assumed to define Du Bois’s 
conception of race; his recognition of the “great part” played by 
phenotypic difference, accompanied by his evident unwillingness to 
reduce the issue to simple physio-biological determinations. And, in 
the final analysis, Du Bois is either conceived as having failed to 
surmount the biological underpinnings inscribed in his notion of race, 
or, it is concluded, that the true issue at hand is Du Bois’s 
introduction of a cultural definition of race. Yet, as is often the case 
with Du Bois’s text, it seemingly provides an alternative formulation. 
In this instance that alternative means a reading that doesn’t reduce 
the semantic economy of “Conservation” to an entrenched binary 
opposition: 
 
The whole process which has brought about these race 
differentiations has been a growth, and the great 
characteristic of this growth has been the differentiation of 
spiritual and mental differences between great races of 
mankind and the integration of physical differences.152 
 
 
In this passage, which occurs at the conclusion of the previous 
citation, we find that Du Bois’s terms are not static. Predicated on the 
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growing differentiation of “spiritual and mental differences” and the 
convergence of “physical differences,” Du Bois’s conception of race 
requires the eclipsing of physical differences for the emergence of 
racial difference itself. Whether one finds Du Bois claim regarding the 
dual criterion by which the emergence of race is defined consistent 
with the entire rhetoric of “Conservation,” there remains nonetheless a 
level at which the full reduction of race the to the biological is resisted. 
But “Conservation” takes us further afield: 
 
The age of nomadic tribes of closely related individuals 
represents the maximum of physical differences. They 
were practically vast families, and there were as many 
groups as families. As the families came together to form 
cities the physical differences lessened, purity of blood 
was replaced by the requirement of domicile, and all who 
lived within the city bounds became gradually to be 
regarded as members of the group, i.e., there was a slight 
and slow breaking down of physical barriers. This, 
however, was accompanied by an increase of the spiritual 
and social differences between cities. This city became 
husbandmen, this, merchants, another warriors, and so 
on. The ideals of life for which the different cities struggled 
were different. When at last cities began to coalesce into 
nations there was another breaking down of barriers 
which separated groups of men. The larger and broader 
differences of color, hair and physical proportions were not 
by any means ignored, but myriads of minor differences 
disappeared, and the sociological and historical races of 
men began to approximate the present division of races as 
indicated by physical researches.153 
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Conceiving of race within the terms specified above, Du Bois removes 
it from the reductive categorization that would claim it for either 
biology or history. In his narrative, individuals initially find themselves 
in loose aggregations defined either through familial or group 
affiliation. These aggregations, distinguished principally by their tribal 
or familial combinations, constitute “the maximum of physical 
differences,” and yet we are not here speaking of race. Rather than 
race these ‘pre-racial’ individuals inhabit what is best defined as a 
state of nature. Aligning less with the radical atomism of Hobbes than 
with Kant and Rousseau, Du Bois structures his illustration as a 
representation of the transition from a state of nature to a realm of 
political relation. “Conservation” maps the journey undertaken by 
individuals circumscribed by profound cleavages whose movement 
away from the “age of nomadic tribes” –– and the emphatic physical 
differences that define it ––concludes with a markedly different type of 
relation. It’s not simply that physical differences cease to assume 
importance, but rather that the transition from a state of nature to a 
form of association requires the eclipse of these differences. In other 
words “purity of blood” must be “replaced by the requirement of 
domicile.” What characterizes Du Bois’s narrative is this shift from 
blood to domicile, from family to city, from nature to something he 
calls ‘race.’ In formulating this alternative narrative of de-
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differentiation Du Bois conceives of race in substantially different 
terms by identifying the contours of race with the space of the 
political. 
 It’s from the site of this now resituated conception of race that 
the question of nation and national identity is refracted. Having 
proposed the constitutive relationship of race and the political, Du 
Bois reveals the conditioning question of African American identity, 
i.e., “What, after all, am I? Am I American or am I a Negro?” to be 
determined by the logic of difference identified with his conception of 
race.154 African Americans are Americans, he writes, 
 
not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political 
ideals, our language, our religion. Farther than that, our 
Americanism does not go. At that point, we are Negroes, 
members of a vast historic race that from the very dawn of 
creation has slept, but half awakening in the dark forests 
of its African fatherland. We are the first fruits of this new 
nation, the harbinger of that black to-morrow which is yet 
destined to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic to-day. 
We are that people whose subtle sense of song has given 
America its only American music, its only American fairy 
tales, its only touch of pathos and humor amid its mad 
money-getting plutocracy. As such, it is our duty to 
conserve our physical powers, our intellectual 
endowments, our spiritual ideals…155 
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Not only the repository of America’s ‘better self,’ Du Bois also 
seemingly claims for the Negro those characteristics and achievements 
that most clearly articulate the American sensibility. And in this he 
appears to argue that it is through the addition of the Negro’s African 
‘essence’ that a properly American identity is forged. Two identificatory 
economies therefore register in Du Bois’s passage. The first, structured 
around the pillars of American civil society, defines the African 
American in relation to her inscribed ‘Americaness.’ This facet of 
African American identity coalesces around the particular elements 
that comprise the recognizable features of the national character (i.e., 
citizenship, religion, language, political ideals, etc.). The second 
economy articulates the African component of African American 
identity by situating the Negro at the site and as the possibility of its 
own history. Having just awoken, assuming its status as the “first 
fruits of this new nation,” the “harbinger” of a future day, one which 
Du Bois notes is “yet destined,” the Negro enacts its history as a 
continuous moment of arrival –– an ever repeated future present. But, 
whereas it might appear so, the relationship between these two 
economies of identification is not one of addition. Structured by the 
differences that distinguish the American from the Negro –– or, more 
accurately, the Negro’s Africanness from her Americanness, we 
nonetheless cannot reduce Du Bois’s formulation to this simple binary 
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meaning. Even though it appears that the Negro, in adding her African 
‘essence’ to the American self “soften[s] the whiteness of the Teutonic 
to-day” and its specific manifestation in America’s “mad money-getting 
plutocracy,” Du Bois’s Negro is not the African. And, the conjoining 
that engenders the African American involves neither the ‘African’ nor 
the ‘American.’ Rather than identity by addition “Conservation” 
proposes a quite different alternative. For Du Bois, it is “[a]t that point” 
when the Negro ceases to be American, that is, at that threshold 
beyond which the Negro’s “Americanism does not go,” that the Negro 
articulates that which is essentially American –– its music, its stories, 
its darkness, its light. Yet Du Bois proceeds even further, arguing that 
it is inasmuch as the Negro is the incarnation of these properly 
American ideals that he or she can be said to be a Negro. If we follow 
“Conservation,” we find ourselves in an interminable chiasmic loop in 
which the identity of African and American unfolds as the continued 
inversion of place, and the consequent incompletion of identity as 
identity itself. Race, understood in Du Boisian terms, constitutes itself 
as nothing other than the site of this incompletion. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Du Bois’s Natural History, or the Historiography of Mere Existence  
 
In a letter written after having read the manuscript of what would 
become Dusk of Dawn, W.E.B. Du Bois’s 1940 autobiography, Ira Reid, 
the well-known sociologist and colleague of Du Bois’s at Atlanta 
University, wrote what has turned out to be a signal insight: “It seems 
to me that the history of the Negro in the United States, apart from the 
mass aspect of slavery, is largely a matter of biography.”156 Reid’s idea 
is one of those claims pregnant with an insight whose force can truly 
only be gauged retrospectively. Reid, of course, meant that the history 
of the African in the “New” World was a history of individuals who, as 
he termed it, “dared to do.” In other words, individuals whose very 
actions define and produce what has come to be understood as African 
American history, a pageant of triumphant figures whose biography 
express and intersect with the movement of the African in the “New” 
World. His reference here is to Douglass, Washington, Dunbar, etc., 
individuals whose opinions and actions have, in his estimation, given 
shape to the African in America. In formulating the matter within 
these terms Reid does not stray from the generally accepted pattern by 
                                                
156 Ira Reid, Letter to W.E.B. Du Bois, February 15, 1940, W.E.B. Du Bois, The 
Correspondence of W.E.B. Du Bois, Selections 1934-1944, vol. II (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1976). 
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which historical significance is ascribed. In defining the historical 
event along these lines of significance Reid simply reasserts an 
inherited truism: great history is the preserve of great men.157 On this 
view “biography” denotes nothing other than the sum total of a life and 
has no appended significance other than as the site and calculus of 
individual human action. Where Reid does offer the suggestion of 
something different is in his intimation regarding the inscription of the 
African in history and his privileging of the (auto)biographical as the 
modality through which this gesture occurs. The convergence of 
history and biography that he points to, however tangentially, extends 
well beyond the commonplace claims he seems to reserve for it. 
Biography –– the space of the autobiographical –– seemingly asserts its 
privilege as the site through which the particular historicity of African 
American subjectivity lies revealed. Implicit in his claim is the 
proposition that African American history, with its unique convergence 
of history and biography distinguishes itself as somehow different –– or 
with a difference worthy of mention in any case. Reid’s formulation 
                                                
157 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has reminded us of the importance of this particular 
understanding of historical development among scholars of African American 
history: “Perhaps the one unshakable assumption of historians of Afro Americans 
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Press, 1987) 115. For a critical interrogation of the ‘representativeness’ accorded 
black male/heterosexual intellectuals see Hazel V. Carby, Race Men, W.E.B. Du Bois 
Lectures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998). 
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carries the weight of more than simply academic interest. The 
purported absence of history, along with that of literacy, culture and 
science, initially framed the reception of the African in the “Old World.” 
It defined her at worst as nothing other than a far cleverer version of 
the ape and at best as a faint shadow of the human. The slave 
narratives were intended in part as a challenge to this definition of the 
African. But the question here is less whether reading African 
American history through the (auto)biographical changes the 
particular significance we ascribe to the trajectory of that history or 
the events within it. Rather than this particular question, Reid might 
be pushing us to pose an altogether different one: Can the specific 
conception of (auto)biography that emerges in African American 
culture, and of which the slave narratives provide the basic contour, 
produce what we have come to understand as history, produce 
something akin to the historical? Another way of asking this question: 
does the convergence of the African American autobiographical and/as 
the historical produce a different History, require a different 
historiography?  
Nowhere is the pertinence of these questions more evident than 
in the early work of W.E.B. Du Bois, for whom a distinctly African 
American historiography seemed to emerge from the odd convergence 
of the historical and the autobiographical. To interpret history through 
  125 
the biography of “world-historical individuals,” –– to borrow a phrase 
from Hegel (although being put to far more pedestrian usage) –– is 
itself nothing new, Hegel’s project being simply the most elaborate 
example of the gesture. Du Bois’s idiosyncrasy resides elsewhere and 
is perhaps best captured by the subtitle he chose to give his 1940 
work: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept. Read 
literally the subtitle makes very little if any sense; how precisely does a 
concept lend itself to an autobiographical (as opposed to genealogical, 
analytical, etc.) demarcation? As Dusk of Dawn is Du Bois’s own 
autobiography are we to imply that the “race concept” of the subtitle is 
subtended by the “racial” self of one W.E.B. Du Bois? And if so what 
does it mean to say that a “concept” rests on the possibility of a “self”? 
As these questions suggests Du Bois’s various (auto)biographies 
produce a historiographical sensibility that challenges the reduction of 
experience to a species of evidence, the gesture that conditions the 
practice of historiography, and contests the empiricism on which this 
gesture is founded.158 Du Bois’s (auto)biographies are clearly 
something more than the articulation of historical events framed by 
the biography of the individual life, they are in a strange way –– and as 
we shall see –– the site of the impossible. 
 
                                                
158 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 97-113. 
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I. 
 Philippe Lejeune in his “The Autobiographical Pact,” one of the 
central reference points for contemporary theories of autobiography, 
proceeds to offer the following definition of autobiography: 
 
Retrospective prose narrative written by a real person 
concerning his own existence, where the focus is his 
individual life, in particular the story of his personality.159 
 
 
Lejeune’s essay is an attempt to arrive at a clearer definition of the 
form and to circumscribe in a more effective manner, what is in most 
estimations, a very problematic genre. The preceding citation 
assembles four different component parts in view of establishing the 
logic underpinning the coherence of the autobiographical narrative. 
According to Lejeune the categories to which these components belong 
can be listed as follows: (1) form of language, (2) subject treated, (3) 
situation of the author, and (4) position of the narrator.160 This will be 
the first of several offerings Lejeune will propose over the span of his 
essay, each providing an ever more refined definition of the 
                                                
159 Philippe Lejeune, "The Autobiographical Pact," trans. Katherine Leary, On 
Autobiography (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) 4. 
160 Lejeune, "The Autobiographical Pact,"   4. 
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parameters, both linguistic and literary, governing the 
autobiographical text. Now, for a text to be considered in any sense 
autobiographical it must meet these four criteria, even if within the 
confines of these four conditions there remains a certain degree of 
latitude. But, and in this Lejeune is uncompromising, there are two 
criteria without which we cannot speak of autobiography at all. These 
two conditions are, as far as Lejeune is concerned, “a question of all or 
nothing,” they are the two elements that mark the specificity of 
autobiography and distinguish it from other literary offerings. 
Autobiography requires, in Lejeune’s conception of it, the unity of the 
author and narrator as well as the unity of the narrator and the principal 
character; in other words, the coherence of the autobiographical 
narrative requires as its center the stability of identity. In Lejeune’s 
notion of autobiography, author, narrator and protagonist must be 
identical, thereby anchoring the coherence of the genre in the unity of 
these three component parts. Of course securing autobiography within 
this unity raises no shortage of difficulties, problems of which Lejeune 
is keenly aware: 
 
––How can the identity of the narrator and the protagonist 
be expressed in the text? (I, You, He) 
––In the narrative written “in the first person,” how is the 
identity of the author and the protagonist-narrator 
shown? (I, the Undersigned)… 
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––Is there not confusion, in most of the arguments 
concerning autobiography, between the notion of identity 
and that of resemblance? (Exact Copy)…161 
 
 
In each instance mentioned by Lejeune, whether in relation to the 
circumscription of the narrator, the distinction and significance 
ascribed to ‘grammatical persons’ within the text, or the establishment 
and regulation of an identity shielded from mimesis, the basic problem 
of identity presents itself insistently. The stability Lejeune requires of 
identity appears remarkably difficult to obtain; and yet, it is precisely 
this stability that establishes the coherence of the autobiographical. 
The question to be asked then is, from whence does this instability 
arise? 
 Lejeune’s argument finds itself confronting an obstacle that 
stems in part from the problematic relation between ‘grammatical 
person’ and identity found in the linguistic analysis to which he’s so 
clearly indebted. Émile Benveniste, the linguist from whom Lejeune 
draws most heavily, problematizes the identification of grammatical 
person and individual it would seem Lejeune requires for organizing 
his conception of autobiography. The complex relation between 
‘individual,’ ‘subject,’ ‘grammatical person,’ and the ‘I’ registers in 
several areas of Benveniste’s analysis. The problematic relation 
                                                
161 Lejeune, "The Autobiographical Pact,"   5. 
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between these terms is evident from the outset even in Benveniste’s 
analysis of the linguistic parameters of the verbal person: 
 
In the three relationships it institutes, it sums up the 
ensemble of the positions that determine a verbal form 
provided with a mark of person, and it is valid for the verb 
of any language whatsoever. There are always, then, three 
persons and there are only three. However, the summary 
and non-linguistic nature of a category thus established 
must be proclaimed. By aligning on a single level and in 
an unchanging order ‘persons’ defined by their succession 
and related to those beings which are ‘I,’ ‘you,’ and ‘he,’ we 
only transpose into a pseudolinguistic theory differences 
which are lexical in nature. These denominations do not 
indicate to us the necessity of the category or the content 
that it implies or the relationships which link the different 
persons.162 
 
 
Although in the division between first, second, and third person we 
have the entire range of possibilities in which ‘person’ may be 
inscribed in a verbal form –– and this regardless of language –– 
Benveniste also clearly delineates a possible objection that remains 
present. Namely, that the distinction under review is of a lexical rather 
than a grammatical order and that the relationship of grammatical 
person to verb remains underdetermined. Therefore three questions 
arise: (i) is the grammatical person a necessary category, (ii) who or 
what does the category refer to, (iii) what is their relation to each other. 
At issue here is not simply the distinction between the lexical and the 
                                                
162 Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek 
(Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971) 195-96. 
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grammatical, whether the pronominal differences outlined above 
belong to one order or another. The possible introduction of a 
“pseudolinguistic theory” arises from the threat of an insufficiently 
linguistic explanatory framework, from an insufficiently guarded 
distinction between the linguistic and the phenomenal. Even as 
Benveniste outlines –– after having registered his initial caution –– how 
the verbal person is constitutive of the structure of the verb as such, 
the question of the differentiation of these ‘persons’ remains an issue: 
“A linguistic theory of verbal person can be constituted only on the 
basis of the opposition that differentiate persons; and it will be 
summed up in its entirety in the structure of these oppositions.”163 
The differentiations Benveniste writes of here proceeds from the 
categorization propounded by Arab grammarians in which, as 
Benveniste reminds us, “the first person al-mutakallimu” is 
 
‘the one who speaks’; the second, al-muhatabu ‘the one 
who is addressed’; but the third is al-ya’ibu ‘the one who 
is absent.’ A precise notion of the relationships among 
persons is implied by these denominations; precise 
especially in that it reveals the disparity between the first 
and second person and the third. Contrary to what our 
terminology would make us believe, they are not 
homogeneous.164 
 
 
                                                
163 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  197. 
164 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  197. 
  131 
According to Benveniste there exists a greater proximity between the 
first and second person than between these two and the third, with 
their respective referential structures seemingly accounting for this 
difference. Both the first and second person either state or imply the 
‘I’; in the first person the ‘I’ constitutes the point of utterance, and in 
addition accounts for itself as such.165 The second person also involves 
positing the ‘I’ inasmuch as the structure of the I-you dyad requires its 
possible reversibility. Once we arrive at the third person the structure 
changes dramatically. In this final instance we are no longer dealing 
with the ‘I,’ implied or otherwise. Situated outside of the particular 
grammatical economy that governs the I-you relationship, the third 
person constitutes “an exception to the relationship by which ‘I’ and 
‘you’ are specified.”166 The precise contours of this exception relates to 
the very question of the ‘person’: 
 
The form that is called the third person really does contain 
an indication of a statement about someone or something 
but not related to a specific ‘person.’ The variable and 
properly ‘personal’ element of these denominations is here 
lacking. It is indeed the ‘absent’ of the Arab grammarians. 
It only presents the invariable inherent in every 
conjugation. The consequence must be formulated clearly; 
the ‘third person’ is not a ‘person’; it is really the verbal 
form whose function is to express the non-person. This 
definition accounts for the absence of any pronoun in the 
                                                
165 “‘I’ designates the one who speaks and at the same time implies an utterance 
about ‘I’; in saying ‘I,’ I cannot not be speaking of myself.”Benveniste, Problems in 
General Linguistics  197. 
166 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  197. 
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third person –– a fundamental fact that it suffices to notice 
–– and the very peculiar situation of the third person of 
the verb in most languages…167 
 
 
Whereas the first two persons correlated to the verbal from do refer (or 
articulate) the site of a (verbal) person, the third does not. The 
linguistic difference that distinguishes the first and second person 
from the third speaks to the peculiar status of the third person. It 
represents neither the loss nor lack of ‘person,’ nor is it an instance of 
‘depersonalization,’ rather the third person articulates, gives structure 
to, an absence.168 ‘Absence’ designates not only the distinction 
between the third and the first two persons, but also the complexity of 
person when referenced linguistically. This is never clearer than when 
Benveniste summarizes the conception of the plural as it operates in 
reference to the ‘I’: 
 
It is clear, in effect, that the oneness and the subjectivity 
inherent in ‘I’ contradict the possibility of a pluralization. 
If there cannot be several ‘I’s conceived by an actual ‘I’ 
who is speaking, it is because ‘we’ is not a multiplication 
of identical objects but a junction between ‘I’ and the ‘non-
I,’ no matter what the content of this ‘non-I’ may be.169 
 
                                                
167 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  197-98. 
168 Benveniste reiterates these claims regarding the third person when he remarks: 
“there is no apheresis of the person; it is exactly the non-person, which possesses as 
its sign the absence of that which specifically qualifies the ‘I’ and the ‘you.’ Because 
it does not imply any person, it can take any subject whatsoever or no subject, and 
this subject, expressed or not, is never posited as a ‘person.’” Benveniste, Problems 
in General Linguistics  200. 
169 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  202. 
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Neither multiplication nor increase by some other form of addition, 
pluralization is here construed as the articulation of a space 
conditioned by the convergence of the ‘I’ and the ‘non-I’ –– even if it 
remains a space, as Benveniste clarifies, in which the ‘I’ holds 
preeminence. This conception of the plural requires a proliferation of 
new terms (e.g., the strict person which designates the singular and the 
amplified person that now comes to name the plural), and a new 
distinction that imposes linguistic order (i.e., the correlation of 
personality which situates the I-you dyad in relation to the non-person 
and the correlation of subjectivity which situates the first two person in 
relation to each other). Yet this organizational code still cannot 
completely eliminate the strange slippage between the phenomenal 
and the linguistic that occurs at odd moments in Benveniste’s text. 
This would be of scarcely any interest if not for Benveniste’s attempt to 
maintain a clear distinction between the phenomenal and the 
linguistic, to protect the linguistic’s self-sufficiency as it were: 
 
I cannot be defined except in terms of a ‘locution,’ not in 
terms of objects as a nominal sign is. I signifies ‘the 
person who is uttering the present instance of the 
discourse containing I.’ This instance is unique by 
definition and has validity only in its uniqueness. If I 
perceive two successive instances of discourse containing 
I, uttered in the same voice, nothing guarantees to me that 
one of them is not a reported discourse, a quotation in 
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which I could be imputed to another. It is thus necessary 
to stress the point; I can only be identified by the instance 
of discourse that contains it and by that alone.170 
 
 
From this passage it would appear that ‘I’ has a purely and exclusively 
linguistic existence, but Benveniste continues: 
 
It has no value except in the instance in which it is 
produced. But in the same way it is also an instance of 
form that I must be taken; the form of I has no linguistic 
existence except in the act of speaking in which it is 
uttered. There is thus a combined double instance in this 
process: the instance of I as referent and the instance of 
discourse containing I as referee. The definition can be 
stated precisely as: I as ‘the individual who utters the 
present instance of discourse containing the linguistic 
instance of I.’171 
 
 
Distinguished from other pronominal forms by its pure(ly) linguistic 
existence, the I would appear to be the paradigmatic example of the 
clear distinction between the phenomenal and the linguistic. And yet 
the reintroduction of reference by Benveniste and its link, in this 
particular instance, to a notion of individuality counters the strict 
conceptual order Benveniste had been forging. How does one reconcile 
the unique instance of each I in discourse with the permanence of the 
individual? In other words, a conception of the individual presumes a 
level of continuity that Benveniste’s claim regarding the function of the 
                                                
170 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  218. 
171 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  218. 
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I precludes. Benveniste manages to escape the possible contradiction 
into which he’s entered by noting the unique function of the personal 
pronoun within language and by specifying the relationship between 
the realm of language and that of subjectivity: 
 
It is in and through language that man constitutes himself 
as subject, because language alone establishes the concept 
of ‘ego’ in reality, in its reality which is that of being. … [.] 
… The ‘subjectivity’ we are discussing here is the capacity 
of the speaker to posit himself as ‘subject.’ It is defined not 
by the feeling which everyone experiences of being himself 
(this feeling, to the degree that it can be taken note of, is 
only a reflection) but as the psychic unity that transcends 
the totality of the actual experiences it assembles and that 
makes the permanence of the consciousness. Now we hold 
that ‘subjectivity,’ whether it is place in phenomenology or 
in psychology, as one may wish, is only the emergence in 
the being of a fundamental property of language. ‘Ego’ is 
he who says ‘ego.’ That is where we see the foundation of 
‘subjectivity,’ which is determined by the linguistic status 
of ‘person.’172 
 
 
In dismissing affect as an indicator of the individual’s sense of self 
Benveniste manages the complete formalization of the relation between 
language and subject. The performativity of the utterance marks 
Benveniste solution to the dilemma of subjectivity/identity, –– “ ‘Ego’ is 
he who says ‘ego.’” This is not a solution that is truly available for 
Lejeune. 
                                                
172 Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  224. 
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 The reliance of the grammatical conception of person on its 
phenomenal correlate, a site of possible confusion Benveniste registers 
from the very outset of his study, is countered in his analysis by the 
need to maintain their separation, thereby securing the properly 
linguistic order of the analysis. This tension between the phenomenal 
and the linguistic haunts not only Benveniste’s linguistic analysis but 
Lejeune’s literary one as well. 
 Lejeune’s analysis of autobiography relies heavily on 
Benveniste’s understanding of the operation of pronominal forms 
within language. But as we’ve seen Benveniste’s argument renders any 
clear demarcation of the ‘person,’ grammatical or otherwise, quite 
problematic. Whether grounded in a distinction between the first two 
and the third person or the grammatical person and individual 
identity, Benveniste’s formulations retain the form of an ill-fitting 
resolution if the objective is a recognizable notion of identity. Lejeune’s 
attempt to dissociate the category of grammatical person from that of 
identity is evidence of his recognition of this difficulty. For Benveniste, 
these two categories cannot be distinguished with the certainty 
Lejeune requires; yet, it is nonetheless important that Lejeune achieve 
this certainty. Failing to unsettle the consequences arising from, for 
example, the proximity of the first two persons with the third –– an 
intimacy of grammatical persons that Benveniste’s formulations imply 
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even though Benveniste himself claims that the third person specifies 
a different linguistic function –– could well undermine the unity of 
identity Lejeune presumes.173  
 Lejeune appears to resolve his difficulty by shifting the 
conceptual center he inherits from Benveniste, moving in essence from 
the linguistic determinant of the person to its phenomenological 
parameters. The unity that could not be located within the linguistic 
modality of analysis is now anchored in the phenomenological 
person/identity of the ‘I.’ With this shift, the substitution of 
pronominal forms (viz. I  you  he/she), which under Benveniste –– 
precisely because of the specific function identified with the third 
person –– would have been impossible, can now occur: 
 
                                                
173 “The very terms we are using here, I and you, are not taken as figures but as 
linguistic forms indicating ‘person.’ It is a remarkable fact –– but who would notice it, 
since it is so familiar? –– that the ‘personal pronouns are never missing from among 
the signs of a language, no matter what its type, epoch, or region may be. A language 
without expression of person cannot be imagined.… [.] Now these pronouns are 
distinguished from all other designations a language articulates in that they do not 
refer to a concept or to an individual. [.] …There is no concept ‘I’ that incorporates all 
the ‘I’s that are uttered at every moment in the mouth of all speakers, in the sense 
that there is a concept ‘tree’ to which all the individual uses of tree refer. The ‘I,’ 
then, does not denominate a lexical entity. Could it then be said that I refers to a 
particular individual? If that were the case, a permanent contradiction would be 
admitted into language, and anarchy into its use. How could the same term refer 
indifferently to any individual whatsoever and still at the same time identify him in 
his individuality? We are in the presence of a class of words, the ‘personal pronouns,’ 
that escape the status of all other signs of language.” By qualifying the personal 
pronouns as demarcating neither object nor individual –– namely their seeming 
referential ambivalence –– it would seem that the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ appear to share 
that particular characteristic Benveniste identifies with the third person, i.e., a 
resistance to the logic governing grammatical persons. Benveniste, Problems in 
General Linguistics  225-26. 
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Indeed, by bringing up the problem of the author, 
autobiography brings to light phenomena that fiction 
leaves in doubt: in particular the fact that there can be 
identity of the narrator and the principal character in the 
case of narration “in the third person.” … This procedure 
is consistent, to the letter, with the root meaning of the 
word “autobiography”: It is a biography, written by the 
person involved, but as a simple biography.174 
 
 
The possibility of autobiography in the third person indicates that we 
have left the strictures of Benveniste’s linguistic analysis, for in 
Benveniste’s typology of different planes of utterance the distinction 
between je/tu and the third person remain entrenched.175 Lejeune, on 
the other hand, finds that all three pronouns can function within the 
autobiographical text –– even if second and third person narration are 
rare instances within the genre. Underlying the reworking of 
                                                
174 Lejeune, "The Autobiographical Pact,"   6. 
175 In fact Benveniste illustrates the typology by recourse to the example of the 
different modes of pronominal function within autobiography and history: “The 
historical design of the utterance is recognized by the fact that it imposes a special 
delimitation upon the two verbal categories of tense and person taken together. We 
shall define historical narration as the mode of utterance that excludes every 
‘autobiographical’ linguistic form. The historian will never say je or tu or maintenant, 
because he will never make use of the formal apparatus of discourse, which resides 
primarily in the relationship of the person je:tu. Hence we shall find only the forms of 
the ‘third person’ in a historical narrative strictly followed.” Benveniste identifies the 
third person with the historical narrative and je/tu with what he terms the 
“autobiographical linguistic form.” And, even though the third is to be found in 
discourse (i.e., the plane of utterance in which we find autobiography), it nonetheless 
fails to exhibit that specific linguistic feature proper to it. Again Benveniste: 
“Discourse freely employs all the personal forms of the verb, je/tu as well as il. 
Explicit or not, the relationship of person is everywhere present. Because of this, the 
‘third person’ does not have the same value as it does in historical narration. In the 
latter, since the narrator does not intervene, the third person is not opposed to any 
other and it is truly an absence of person. But in discourse, a speaker opposed a 
non-person il to a je/tu person.” While for Lejeune there exists a relationship of equal 
value between all three pronominal forms as expressed within autobiography, for 
Benveniste, if there is equality within the genre, it comes at the cost of the specificity 
of the third person. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics  206-07, 09. 
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Benveniste’s analysis is the need, as Lejeune writes, “to keep us from 
confusing grammatical problems of person with the problems of 
identity.”176 Yet by undertaking this shift Lejeune accentuates the 
generic indistinctiveness to which autobiography is already prone.177 
This problem is twofold. On the one hand the specificity of the 
autobiographical form –– if such specificity ever truly existed –– is lost. 
While, on the other, Lejeune offers an inadequate account of the 
genesis of the third person within the genre. These two problems are 
connected inasmuch as the inadequate account of the delimitation of 
the third person within the autobiographical narrative makes it 
difficult to see what would formally/linguistically distinguish an 
autobiographical third person narrative from any other third person 
narrative. 
 From the range of issues that arise from his reorientation of 
Benveniste we can understand why the notion of the autobiographical 
contract assumes such importance for Lejeune, it becomes the only 
way in which the genre itself may delimited. But it also means that the 
transition from a linguistic determination to a phenomenological one is 
complete. Lejeune’s definition of the autobiographical pact registers 
this final point of arrival: 
 
                                                
176 Lejeune, "The Autobiographical Pact,"   7. 
177 Paul de Man, "Autobiography as De-Facement," The Rhetoric of Romanticism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) 68. 
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Turning back from the first person to the proper name, I 
am therefore prompted to rectify what I wrote in 
Autobiography in France: ‘How to distinguish 
autobiography from the autobiographical novel? We must 
admit that, if we remain at the level of analysis within the 
text, there is no difference. All the methods that 
autobiography uses to convince us of the authenticity of 
its narrative can be imitated by the novel, and often have 
been imitated.’ This is accurate as long as we limit 
ourselves to the text minus the title page; as soon as we 
include the latter in the text, with the name of the author, 
we make use of a general textual criterion, the identity 
(‘identicalness’) of the name (author-narrator-protagonist). 
The autobiographical pact is the affirmation in the text of 
this identity, referring back in the final analysis to the 
name of the author on the cover.178 
 
 
Autobiography, whose indistinctiveness seemed almost a foregone 
conclusion, is redeemed as a genre by the contract. Identity acquires 
its defining status in relation to the autobiographical narrative and the 
signature emerges as that which anchors that identity: “The 
autobiographical pact comes in very diverse forms; but all of them 
demonstrate their intention to honor his/her signature. The reader 
might be able to quibble over resemblance, but never over identity 
(‘identicalness’). We know all too well how much we each values 
his/her name.”179 We could analyse the various issues that render 
such a claim highly problematic; whether it be the narrow conception 
of the proper name with which Lejeune operates, the misguided 
understanding regarding the economy of the signature, or the difficulty 
                                                
178 Lejeune, "The Autobiographical Pact,"   13-14. 
179 Lejeune, "The Autobiographical Pact,"   14. 
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of anchoring identity within some form of intention.180 But what I want 
to highlight here is the difficulty of delimiting the autobiographical and 
how it comes to hold the place for various modes of apprehension all 
because of the liminal space it occupies between the phenomenal and 
the linguistic.181 Autobiography assumes form within Lejeune’s text, 
and within de Man’s as well for that matter, as the site of a particular 
productivity. It exemplifies the theoretical contour through which the 
protocols attached to reading are established. Another way of putting 
this is to say that autobiography becomes the site where different 
modalities of reading, and by extension different assumptions 
regarding the foundations of knowledge –– this will become clearer 
later –– are adjudicated. Why does the narration of self acquire such 
an added burden? Why does it bring the question of knowledge to the 
fore? The answer I have been suggesting places itself at a significant 
distance from the entire paradox of ‘self-knowledge’ one might 
                                                
180 For a powerful analysis of all these issues see, Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event 
Context," trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, Limited Inc (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988) 1-23. 
181 From this perspective de Man and Lejeune share a similar gesture towards the 
autobiographical. In both instances the genre emerges as the paradigmatic instance 
of the protocol of reading. For de Man this is not as simple as to say that 
autobiography articulates the logic attached to any strategy of reading. Rather, in de 
Man’s case, autobiography rehearses the aporetic moment at the center of his 
protocol of rhetorical reading –– what in another context Rodolphe Gasché has 
termed the “idiosyncratic singularity” that results from de Man’s practice of 
rhetorical reading. In Lejeune’s case autobiography illustrates in the clearest 
possible fashion the contract between reader and author/text that determines the 
appropriate protocol of reading. And further, it provides the basis for understanding 
the contracts that govern the protocol of reading in other genres. See Rodolphe 
Gasché, "In-Difference to Philosophy," The Wild Card of Reading: On Paul De Man 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) 87. and Lejeune, "The 
Autobiographical Pact,"   30. 
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presume to have been the site from which such questions are posed 
(i.e., can one truly ‘know’ oneself, let alone narrate that knowledge? 
How do I narrate the gap between the interests of my present memory 
and the actuality of the past event? etc.). Rather than inhabiting this 
frame of the question, perhaps it would be more productive to see 
autobiography as not pointing to a problem –– be it self-knowledge or 
otherwise –– but as itself structuring, through its very articulation, the 
problem as such. Autobiography appears privileged as the site in 
which the process of thinking through the conjunction of irreconcilable 
constituents takes place –– if autobiography can submit to some form 
of definition this may well be it. And this precisely because the very 
possibility of the genre is predicated on the relation of the linguistic to 
the phenomenal, on the relation of these two apparently opposed 
registers, and of the negotiation of the latter in the former. 
 
 
 
II. 
 How does one reconcile the linguistic structure of the 
autobiographical narrative with the phenomenological facticity 
seemingly subtending the individual life? In other words, how is the 
self inscribed within the narrative text? And why does this particular 
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linguistic/literary quandary have any bearing on the question of 
African American historiography? If we focus on solely the formal 
parameters of the problem, i.e., the relation of the literary to its extra-
literary reference, we can recognize that this question, as far as the 
history of literary critical analysis is concerned, is far from new. 
Various schools of critical analysis have been defined by precisely how 
they chose to parse the questions of referentiality. By contrast, in the 
African American literary tradition the issue of the relation of self and 
text has not principally been adjudicated in relation to the question of 
reference. Even in those instances when referentiality arose as an 
issue of critical debate, at stake were less questions of ‘literariness’ 
than the politics of representation and the socio-political ramifications 
of specific aesthetic models.182 To understand how the terms that 
define autobiography come to condition, although in an altogether 
different way, texts of the African American literary tradition we must 
turn to that corpus considered to be at the origin of that tradition, the 
slave narrative. 
 At the center of debates regarding the relation of self to text, 
debates that within other traditions were defined in relation to 
referentiality or other primarily aesthetic criteria, there was within the 
tradition of Africans writing in the “New” World a different emphasis, a 
                                                
182 See Du Bois, "Criteria of Negro Art,"   993-1002. and his December 1926 review of 
Carl Van Vechten’s Nigger Heaven reprinted in Du Bois, "Books (Carl Van Vechten's 
'Nigger Heaven') (1926),"   1216-18. 
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different avenue of reflection. It is not that the slave or freedwoman 
constructed a different vocabulary in which to conceptualize these 
issues. She in fact expressed her difference within an inherited 
vocabulary whose terminology resolved itself by reference to an 
accepted philosophical grammar. Rather, what compelled her 
particular alternative conceptual emphasis was the context in which 
she wrote. For the “New” World African, whose humanity as far as the 
European was concerned was an altogether open question, writing was 
an indication of her membership within the human community. At 
issue here was the African’s very humanity defined by her capacity to 
participate in civil society and of writing as the material illustration of 
her capacity for reasoned “civil thought.”183 The slave narrative, the 
slave’s attempt to write herself into being, therefore became the 
manner by which the slave inscribed herself within, and reflected 
back, the terms of Western modernity.184 But the issue of whether 
slaves could themselves authorize these narratives, of whether they 
had the capacity to truly relate claims of (self-)knowledge, never truly 
recedes into the background. On one level this problem registers 
through the framing narrative of the white guarantor whose presence 
is intended to certify that the narrative being propounded bears the 
                                                
183 Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the 
Vernacular  65. 
184 Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the 
Vernacular  88-89. 
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stamp of authenticity.185 On a deeper level the question at hand 
pertains to the very possibility of what could be said to constitute 
‘slave knowledge.’ In other words, if a slave’s capacity for reasoned 
thought and therefore the feasibility of ascribing to her a rational 
faculty is itself a point of contention, thereby bringing into doubt the 
very basis from which any epistemological claim may be ushered, can 
we truly say that the slave’s narrative is one of (self-)knowledge? And if 
not, then what is it? What then is a slave’s knowledge? And, of course, 
there is the flip side of this proposition. These texts, precisely because 
written by subjects who were believed incapable of such production, 
become examples of the universilizability of Western modernity and its 
reason. Yet, what if they don’t exhibit that which we ascribe to them. 
What if, in other words, the knowledge they produce is not the 
knowledge of reason? 
 Although Henry Louis Gates’s work does not inaugurate the 
argument proposing the centrality of the slave narrative in the genesis 
of African American literature, it holds an unrivaled place of 
importance in the establishment of that reading of African American 
literary history.186 Gates’s scholarship connects the slave narratives 
produced by Africans in the “New World” to the presumptions 
                                                
185 Robert Stepto, From Behind the Veil: A Study of Afro-American Narrative 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979) 3-4. 
186 Robert Stepto and Arna Bontemps are two scholars (among others) who would 
have to be included on this list for their role in establishing the importance of the 
slave narrative in the development of African American literature  
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underpinning the ideology of literary culture circulating during the 
Enlightenment. Literacy, the production of writing as reason, acquires 
a profoundly important place in European Enlightenment culture. It is 
understood as a marker by which the measure of one’s capacity for 
reasoned discourse can be gauged; and in that guise, it is applied to 
the slave as an indication of the absence of culture amongst the 
African and therefore of reason. In other words, its supposed absence 
is taken as a sign of the African’s want of humanity. Within such a 
context the writing produced by the African presented something more 
than simply a curiosity. In producing writing, becoming ‘literary,’ and 
displaying a capacity for the arts and sciences, the African challenged 
the terms by which she had been defined in European discourse. This 
challenge of course was not left unaddressed, as various 
Enlightenment intellectual luminaries from Jefferson to Hume, Kant 
and beyond endeavored to dismiss the African as having produced 
nothing of value. Yet regardless of these attempts, the writing of the 
slave was taken to testify to the common humanity of the African, to 
her capacity for culture and therefore to her possession of reason.187 
                                                
187 An example of the connection of literacy to reason is provided by Morgan 
Godwyn’s defense of the African’s humanity, where he frames his contention in 
terms of the slave’s capacity for reason as evidenced by writing: “[A] disingenuous 
and unmanly Position had been formed; and privately (and as it were in the dark) 
handed to and again, which is this, That the Negro’s though in their figure they carry 
some resemblances of mankood, yet are indeed no men.… [The] consideration of the 
shape and figure of our Negro’s Bodies, their Limbs and members; their Voice and 
Countenance, in all things according with other mens; together with their Risibility 
and Discourse (Man’s Peculiar Faculties) should be sufficient Conviction. How should 
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Thus the slave narrative functions as the African’s response to the 
claims made against her and her inclusion in the family of rational 
beings. For Gates these narratives articulate the African’s potential for 
‘reason’ within terms legible to Enlightenment conceptions of proper 
discursive capacity. And, as the foundation of the African American 
literary tradition, they link the genesis of a recognizable African 
American literary productivity to the very possibility of the human 
within the African. This uniqueness does not go unremarked: 
 
Unlike almost every other literary tradition, the Afro-
American literary tradition was generated as a response to 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century allegations that 
persons of African descent did not, and could not, create 
literature. Philosophers and literary critics, such as Hume, 
Kant, Jefferson, and Hegel, seemed to decide that the 
absence or presence of a written literature was the signal 
measure of the potential, innate humanity of a race. The 
African living in Europe or in the New World seems to 
have felt compelled to create a literature both to 
demonstrate implicitly that blacks did indeed possess the 
intellectual ability to create a written art and to indict the 
several social and economic institutions that delimited the 
humanity of all black people in Western cultures.188 
 
 
Through the production of a cultured self, the African submits to the 
terms by which humanity is granted and provides evidence of this 
                                                
they otherwise be capable of Trades, and other no less manly imployments; as also of 
Reading and Writing, or show so much Discretion in management of Business; … 
but wherein (we know) that many of our own People are deficient, were they not truly 
men?” (Morgan Godwyn cited in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., "Literary Theory and the 
Black Tradition," Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the Racial Self (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) 16. 
188 Gates, "Literary Theory and the Black Tradition,"   25. 
  148 
humanity through an autobiographical writing that bears witness to it. 
The slave narratives, in other words, testify to the African’s capacity 
for the human. But as Ronald Judy reminds us, the correlation of 
reason with writing not only provides a frame through which the 
Enlightenment defines the ‘truly’ human, it also establishes the terms 
through which knowledge is produced and recognized as such. Having 
abandoned an understanding of the world anchored in the certainty of 
the divine order, the human subject now becomes the center around 
which a new conception of the world is posited. With this 
transformation “Reason,” writes Judy, “becomes the sole grounds for 
achieving knowledge of both nature and man”. Within this new context 
literacy makes a claim to the production of knowledge and “proper 
erudition [becomes] that which establishes the dominion of Reason… 
whose principal currency is writing.”189  
 The position outlined by Gates has assumed the status of a 
critical commonplace within African American literary criticism. In 
each of the recent important critical re-readings of the slave narrative, 
i.e., Baker, Judy, Chandler, –– readings for whom in part the objective 
is a reassessment and reinterpretation of the discipline of African 
American studies itself –– each author situates the narratives in 
                                                
189 Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the 
Vernacular  65. 
  149 
relation to the Enlightenment conception of literacy.190 Starting where 
Gates’s formalism leaves off, Ronald Judy problematizes the capacity 
of the slave narratives to be included within the logic underpinning the 
Enlightenment’s notion of literacy: 
 
As an illegible autobiographical diary, Ben Ali’s writing 
gestures the literariness of being that discombobulates the 
foundational claims of both literacy and being. Instead of 
bringing emancipation through literacy’s intervention into 
being, Ben Ali’s slave narrative brings forth signs whose 
materiality resists abjection through Reason.191 
 
Through a focus on the conceptual difficulties that arise from the 
attempt to include the African Arabic narrative of Ben Ali into the 
dominant discursive pattern ascribed to the slave narratives, Judy 
argues for an alternative reading of these texts. The illegibility of Ben 
Ali’s diary raises the question of how a text becomes configured as the 
articulation of universal reason and how the legibility of such a text 
determines its relation to reason. This reading would situate itself at 
that point of resistance where slave narratives bring into question the 
terms through which they have been determined as narratives of 
emancipation. Houston Baker, situating himself at a cautious distance 
                                                
190 Of course Gates’s own reading of the slave narratives and his argument for a 
critical reading of African American literature that foregrounds form and the text as 
a system of signs is no less tied than these other scholars to a specific conception of 
the discipline. See Gates, "Literary Theory and the Black Tradition,"   24-58. and 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American 
Literary Criticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
191 Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the 
Vernacular  24. 
  150 
from what he implies are the consequences of Gates’s formalism, 
submits a reading of the slave narratives that foregrounds their 
connection to the material culture in which they are embedded. Taking 
Olaudah Equiano’s narrative as his example, Baker writes: 
 
The ideological analysis of discursive structure that yields 
the foregoing interpretation of The Life of Olaudah Equiano 
is invaluable for practical criticism. It discovers the social 
grounding –– the basic subtext, as it were –– that 
necessarily informs any genuinely Afro-American narrative 
text. What I want explicitly to claim here is that all Afro-
American creativity is conditioned by (and constitutes a 
component of) a historical discourse which privileges 
certain economic terms. The creative individual (the black 
subject) must, therefore, whether he self-consciously wills 
it or not, come to terms with ‘commercial deportation’ and 
the ‘economics of slavery.’ The subject’s very inclusion in 
an Afro-American traditional discourse is, in fact, 
contingent on an encounter with such privileged economic 
signs of Afro-American discourse. The ‘already-said,’ so to 
speak, contains unavoidable preconditions for the practice 
of Afro-American narrative.192 
 
Baker argues for an interpretation of the slave narratives, and by 
extension of African American literary history, that situates the 
metaphor of “commercial deportation” at its center. The transactional 
nature of the slave’s relation to herself and to freedom, all 
underpinned by a dominant commercial ethos, is the preeminent trope 
of Baker’s reading. This interpretation allows Baker to maintain the 
possibility of a material criticism that does not immediately situate the 
                                                
192 Houston A Baker Jr., Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature: A Vernacular 
Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 38-39. 
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slave narratives within the exclusive purview of a linguistically 
anchored theoretical apparatus. In other words, Baker refuses a 
critical modality that might otherwise preclude reference to the 
material inscription of the economics of slavery on the body and 
psyche of the slave. Baker’s analysis seemingly requires a 
representational conception of the relationship between text and, in 
Baker’s terms, “subtext” or “social grounding.” The direction in which 
he would have us move the discipline maintains a somewhat tenuous 
relationship to his Black Arts Movement roots and in the end, 
proposes an alternative disciplinary trajectory than that favored by 
Gates. Of the more recent scholarship that reflects on the question of 
the slave narratives and their relation to the discipline of African 
American studies, Nahum Chandler’s work occupies a unique position 
inasmuch as his focus is not primarily to engage a rereading of the 
slave narratives. Chandler’s scholarship focuses on the conceptual 
revaluation he believes operative in the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, and 
the significance of that revaluation for an understanding of the genesis 
of African American subjectivity and of modernity more generally. In 
this context Chandler’s reading of the slave narratives is an 
illustration of the value of Du Bois’s insights in analysing the products 
of African American culture and the narratives themselves the site 
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where one can detect the defining features of African American 
subjectivity and witness their operation: 
 
Unfolding within this series of ironies, and at the core of 
the central irony (that is, that transforming Equiano’s 
relation to property will change his relation to humans), is 
a paradox. I describe it in general as the play of the force 
of the double. In the context of Equiano’s story, we can 
name it the paradox of donation or credit, or, alternatively, 
the paradox of recognition. On the one hand, African 
American discourse, writing, and subjectivity seem to 
emerge on the basis of an originary grant or credit of a 
kind of recognition of the African American slave by a 
political or legal authority of some kind. On the other 
hand, might not this recognition also mark the possibility 
and analytical responsibility of a space of reversal in the 
systems of domination and exploitation that organize the 
scene of production of the African American subject, 
especially as a writing subject?193 
 
 
Chandler offers a reading of Equiano that although indebted to a 
thematic drawn from Baker’s own interpretation of Equiano’s narrative 
(i.e., the purchase of property by property) nonetheless transforms it. 
By inscribing a Hegelian philosophical grammar at the site of the 
margin and pursuing the full ramifications of this transvaluation to its 
conclusion, Chandler proposes a conception of the African American 
subject that views it as conditioned by the “problem of the ‘double,’ of 
‘double consciousness.’” Equiano’s text becomes an example of the 
emergence of the subject, an emergence determined by the 
                                                
193 Chandler, "Originary Displacement," 280. 
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ambivalence inscribed in the relation between subject and other. An 
example, in other words, of the logic that subtends the co-constitution 
of subject and other and illustrates the movement of the double that 
structures relation.194 For Chandler this “force of the double” reveals a 
space of reversal at the very center of dominant discursive regimes, 
and, through the ironic modality of the marginalized figure, opens the 
possibility of critique. Despite the differences between these three 
scholars they accept the basic parameters of Gates’s reading, although 
each pushes the terms of Gates’s interpretation in various ways. The 
slave narratives are not only viewed as the attempt on the part of the 
African to write herself into being but, more importantly for our 
concerns, they are understood as determined by a –– in some 
instances problematic –– relation to knowledge, to knowledge as 
‘truth.’ In this sense even the illegibility Judy ascribes to Ben Ali’s text 
does not displace or perhaps even undermine the possibility of the 
epistemological project. Ben Ali’s text and its betrayal of “discursivity’s 
indeterminacy” may well point to the arbitrariness that grounds 
                                                
194 Chandler clarifies the analytic burden his notion of the “double” assumes in the 
following: “This force that I have outlined is the ‘double’ of the will of the master. It 
not only delimits his will but specifies it as his, as that of a slave owner. It also 
organizes and directs it, in the quite specific sense that it forces him to act in the 
interest of another in order to act in his own interest, although we have just 
complicated any notion of exactly what this word means here. Again, we see the 
construction of a Europeanist subject in following the particular and quite specific 
story of the making of an African American or Diasporic subject. This is the 
movement of a ‘double consciousness,’ although we might be obliged to say at some 
point that this is a kind of redoubled unconsciousness.” Chandler’s proposition 
requires us to think the European and Diasporic subject together and to recognize 
the analytic necessity of doing so. Chandler, "Originary Displacement," 282. 
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dogmatic formalism but its disruption of the representational logic of 
signification –– the logic that reduces “linguistic referentiality” to 
intention –– stops short of posing a challenge to the epistemological 
project itself.195 In other words, the illegibility and structural 
misreading that necessarily infects all systems of signification and that 
Judy argues Ben Ali’s text illustrates still depends, even if in a 
negative fashion, on the order of signification that it questions. The 
text is still structured by the horizon of its readability even if it itself is 
not readable.196 In trying to both conform to and challenge the logic 
defining the slave narrative, Judy’s reading suggests that the slave’s 
autobiography might also be an attempt to narrate something other 
than reason, to produce something other than the slave’s truth as 
knowledge. But foregrounding such an orientation within the text 
requires shifting the terms of the question and maintaining an even 
                                                
195 Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the 
Vernacular  28, 276. 
196 Fred Moten makes a similar point in his critique of Judy: “In his (Dis)forming the 
American Canon, Ronald A.T. Judy would deconstruct and abandon the 
Enlightenment, its subject and its oppressive sociopolitical manifestations, by way 
and in the interest of a valorized unreadability, an errant and essentially 
unapproachable textuality that carries the trace of another being, another 
subjectivity, another literacy, another politics: the Afro-Arabic. In so doing, however, 
he renews the temporal and ontological constitution –– namely, the systematic 
relation and opposition of totality and singularity –– which grounds the ‘old’ 
Enlightenment and its phantomic subject by his entrance into the nostalgic 
projection of an other, pre-oppositional (and thus deeply oppositional) origin.” 
Moten’s criticism questions Judy’s reading of the slave narratives, in particular his 
attempt to interpret them as manifestations of Enlightenment philosophical 
thematics. In using the slave narratives to challenge these philosophical 
determinations, Moten argues, Judy cannot himself fully escape them and manages 
to replicate their deepest logic. Fred Moten, "Knowledge of Freedom," CR: New 
Centennial Review 4.2 (2004): 276. 
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greater scepticism toward the text’s narration of reason, and its 
identification of knowledge and truth, than even Judy’s interpretation 
presents.  
 The claim to reason that accompanies the Enlightenment’s 
assertion of literacy, and therefore the possibility of membership 
within the human family, is inseparable from the claim of access to –– 
and production of –– knowledge. Slave narratives, in testifying to the 
slave’s capacity for reason and thus her humanity, make of the slave a 
producer of knowledge. But ‘knowledge’ might not be the best term to 
describe what the slave asserts. The issue here is not whether the 
slave can assert a verifiable truth, although the presence of the genre’s 
white guarantors, meant to vouch for the slave’s ‘truthfulness,’ might 
suggest otherwise. The question of narrative truth, the issue of its very 
possibility, remains a contentious issue in the development of prose 
narrative as a genre in the early modern period and coincides with the 
transformation of romance and the emergence of the novel.197 
Determining what precisely constitutes narrative truth, of what criteria 
distinguishes history from ‘fiction,’ and whether romance was capable 
of expressing or approaching truth, were defining questions in the 
complex of issues governing the early modern emergence of the novel. 
                                                
197 My discussion of the early modern novel and the questions of narrative truth that 
accompany its development are indebted to Michael McKeon’s exhaustive and 
incisive analysis. Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) 25-131. 
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Inseparable from these questions and providing the frame through 
which they acquire significance was the epistemological transition said 
to accompany and subtend them. That questions of verification and 
authentication should apply to the slave narrative as well, in and of 
itself, is of limited interest –– how the writing of slaves circulate within 
these various ‘discourses of truth’ on the other hand is another issue 
altogether. Inserted within these transformations, the slave narratives 
evince the same problematic negotiation of narrative to truth 
witnessed by other genres of the period. Writing of the impact of this 
epistemological shift on the various genres of seventeenth-century 
biography Michael McKeon argues that: 
 
[s]eventeenth-century narrative, whose general importance 
in the origins of the novel has long been accepted, are 
infiltrated by the appeal to the evidence of the senses and 
by the model of conflict which organizes competing claims 
to historical truth. As we might anticipate, these familiar 
forms –– the saint’s life, spiritual autobiography, the 
picaresque, criminal biography, and the travel narrative –– 
focus the broad-based experimentation with revolutionary 
notions of how to tell the truth in narrative upon the 
particular problem of how to tell the true story of an 
individual human life.”198 
 
 
Biography bears a specific burden in the development of these issues 
and not least for the important Anglo-African slave narratives 
published during the eighteenth century in which questions of 
                                                
198 McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740  89. 
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verification, authenticity, and narrative truth –– given the terms 
through which their writings were viewed –– provided the backdrop. 
Already questioned regarding her capacity for truth-as-knowledge, the 
slave produces writing within a genre, i.e., autobiography, whose own 
capacity for truth is highly problematic –– and as we will see, perhaps 
for good reason.  
Such issues as the relation between reason, truth and 
knowledge are precisely what orient Quobna Ottobah Cugoano’s 
Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery 
and Commerce of the Human Species, a text in which the production of 
knowledge through reason is juxtaposed to the figurality at the center 
of reason itself. In this the text the autobiographical becomes the site 
in which the proper accounting and functioning of reason is the issue 
at hand and reason’s “perversion” the accusation directed against the 
advocates of slavery. The text therefore not only presents evidence of 
the African’s capacity for “reasoned discourse” through its articulation 
of a narrative of self, but also addresses the operation that establishes 
reason as the marker of the subject’s humanity by his/her production 
of (self-)knowledge as the knowledge of reason.  
Written as a moral critique of the Atlantic slave trade, Cugoano’s 
text presents a religiously demarcated condemnation of slavery and 
situates itself within the religiously inflected abolitionist tradition. In 
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this sense his text subscribes to the same economy of religious 
signification that we see in other early Afro-Atlantic slave narratives 
written in English.199 Yet unlike the other early slave narratives 
Cugoano’s text focuses less on its author’s life than on the very terms 
through which the slaveholder advances and sustains the argument 
for slavery. While attentive to the historical and religious distortion 
slaveholders present as argument, these claims, in and of themselves, 
are not Cugoano’s principal target. Rather, Cugoano’s concern runs to 
the proper use of reason: 
 
For it must be a strange perversion of reason, and a wrong 
use or disbelief of the sacred writings, when any thing 
found there is perverted by them and set up as a 
precedent and rule for men to commit wickedness.200 
 
 
And: 
                                                
199 I’m thinking in particular of the slave narratives of Olaudah Equiano, James Ukawsaw 
Gronniosaw, John Jea and John Marrant. See Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of 
the Life of Olaudah Equiano, Written by Himself (1791) (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1995), 
James Albert Gronniosaw, "A Narrative of the Most Remarkable Particulars in the Life of 
James Albert Ukawasaw Gronniosaw, an African Prince, as Related by Himself (1772)," 
Pioneers of the Black Atlantic: Five Slave Narratives from the Enlightenment, 1772-1815, eds. 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and William L. Andrews (Washington, D.C.: Civitas, 1998), John Jea, 
"The Life History, and Unparalleled Sufferings of John Jea, the African Preacher, Compiled 
and Written by Himself (1815)," Pioneers of the Black Atlantic: Five Slave Narratives from the 
Enlightenment, 1772-1815, eds. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and William L. Andrews (Washington 
D.C.: Civitas, 1998), John Marrant, "Narrative of the Lord's Wonderful Dealings with John 
Marrant, a Black (1785)," Pioneers of the Black Atlantic: Five Slave Narratives from the 
Enlightenment, 1772-1815, eds. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and William L. Andrews (Washington 
D.C.: Civitas, 1998).  
200 Quobna Ottabah Cugoano, "Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the 
Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, Humbly Submitted to the Inhabitants of Great-
Britain, by Ottobah Cugoano, a Native of Africa (1787)," Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil 
of Slavery, ed. Vincent Carreta (New York: Penguin Books, 1999) 29. 
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But to set up the ways of the wicked for an example, and 
to make the laws respecting their suppression, and the 
judgments that were inflicted upon them for their iniquity, 
and even the written word of God, and the transactions of 
his providence, to be reversed and become precedents and 
pretences for men to commit depredations and 
extirpations, and for enslaving and negociating [sic] or 
merchandizing the human species, must be horrible 
wickedness indeed and sinning with a high hand.201 
 
 
Slaveholders display more than simply moral failure or an absence of 
Christian virtue, they also exemplify a perversion of the dictates of 
reason. It is not the lies, the distortions of historical fact or even the 
false picture of the African the defenders of slavery present that most 
incenses Cugoano. What Cugoano points to in these passages is the 
perversion structuring the slaveholder’s logic. Within it what is base is 
made high, what is wicked is made the example, and the proper 
order(ing) of reason is reversed. Under slavery reason, Cugoano 
suggests, takes shape as something monstrous.  
For this reason Cugoano’s argument, while also challenging the 
false claims that circulate regarding the African and her history, 
focuses on the very nature of the logic being imposed. We see an 
example of Cugoano’s strategy in his critique of James Tobin’s defense 
                                                
201 Cugoano, "Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and 
Commerce of the Human Species, Humbly Submitted to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain, by 
Ottobah Cugoano, a Native of Africa (1787),"   47. 
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of African slavery.202 In countering Tobin’s claim of the African’s 
willingness to sell his closest of kin –– with Tobin using this claim to 
justify the need for the salvation of the African through slavery –– 
Cugoano writes:  
 
This specious pretence is without any shadow of justice 
and truth, and, if the argument was even true, it could 
afford no just and warrantable matter for any society of 
men to hold slaves.203 
 
 
According to Cugoano it’s not simply that the claim Tobin presents is 
untrue, or that it evinces not even the slightest hint of justice. 
Cugoano’s contention regarding Tobin’s claim is quite clear: even if it 
were true, it would be insufficient to justify the slavery of the African. 
With the insertion of this ‘even if’ the tenor and register of Cugoano’s 
analysis changes. In other words, proceeding along traditional 
abolitionist lines of argument by providing either a corrective to the 
slaveholders’ version of historical events or a challenge to their 
assertions regarding the African’s character and suitability for slavery 
no longer constitutes a sufficient response Cugoano’s text implies. The 
stakes have changed. It is now the very modality through which the 
slaveholder presents his argument that is challenged, the very terms of 
                                                
202 James Tobin was a West Indian planter and the author of the widely circulated Cursory 
Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. Ramsay amongst other pro-slavery tracts. 
203 Cugoano, "Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and 
Commerce of the Human Species, Humbly Submitted to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain, by 
Ottobah Cugoano, a Native of Africa (1787),"   23. 
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the slave power’s reason. “[T]he light of nature [ ] and the dictates of 
reason,” as Cugoano writes, “when rightly considered, teach us, that 
no man ought to enslave another.”204 The abomination that is slavery, 
and the monstrosity that is its reason, in other words, should have 
always been evident. Yet, it clearly has not been and the question 
remains as to why this supposed self-evidence has been lacking. 
 Focusing on the various rationales advanced in support of 
African slavery Cugoano’s interest falls on a claim that strikes him as 
not only most problematic but that also appears to express the very 
core of the perversion he finds constitutive of the slaveholder’s reason. 
It is the argument that anchors the justification for slavery in the 
simple existence of slavery itself. This proposition extends and 
reinforces the argument that situates the defense of slavery in the 
practice’s origin as an “ancient custom.” But as Cugoano recognizes 
this proposition only tangentially relates to a misinterpretation or 
misappropriation of the historical record. At issue is the legitimacy 
granted to a practice by its mere actuality. The debate, in other words, 
centers on the rationality of the actual, on the rational design of the 
divine order and whether this order necessarily includes slavery. 
Showing that the existence of slavery within a rationally ordered and 
divinely sanctioned world perverts both reason and the divine requires 
                                                
204 Cugoano, "Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and 
Commerce of the Human Species, Humbly Submitted to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain, by 
Ottobah Cugoano, a Native of Africa (1787),"   28. 
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that the function of slavery in this world be clearly defined. Cugoano 
begins to offer the beginning of such a clarification in the following: 
 
Those things admitted into the law, that had a seeming 
appearance contrary to the natural liberties of men, were 
only so admitted for a local time, to point out, and to 
establish, and to give instruction thereby, in an analogous 
allusion to other things.205 
 
 
In outlining the relation between the Law and “natural liberties” 
Cugoano has seemingly ushered us into a world in which the figural 
and the literal, the analogous and the example all have their part to 
play. The Law which governs and that emanates from the “Divine Law 
Giver” necessarily provides both the terms that guarantee “natural 
liberties” and its opposite, namely “those things” that appear contrary 
to such “natural liberties.” Of course Cugoano leaves the status of 
“those things” highly indeterminate, inasmuch as they only ‘seemingly 
appear’ contrary he implies that slavery conjoins with “natural 
liberties” at some point or in some sense. As if to say that to think 
slavery is not altogether different than to think freedom –– and may 
well require it. The source of both “natural liberties” and slavery, in 
other words, appears to be the one and same divine Law. We are no 
clearer by the end of the passage at which time “those things,” of 
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which slavery is the most prominent, are understood as “analogous 
allusions” referring to things other than themselves, and, we suspect, 
having migrated to a different discursive register than the purely 
referential.  
 In Cugoano’s attempt to present the contours of an 
understanding coincident with the Law, the thinking of difference 
assumes pride of place and provides the example through which a 
possible reconciliation of the seeming paradox of the Law is posited. At 
the center of Cugoano’s problematic is the question of how to think the 
seeming contradiction of the Law and the nature of the actuality it 
produces. How, in other words, does reason reason with the Law? 
Speculating on the logic motivating the great variety of the natural 
world Cugoano proposes an answer that grants to difference a 
constitutive role in the fabric of the real. “[I]f there had never been any 
black people among the children of men, nor any spotted leopards 
among the beasts of the earth,” the old testament prophet, Cugoano 
surmises, would be without the means to propose the following: “Can 
the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? Then, may ye 
also do good, that are accustomed to do evil.”206 Here is the “analogous 
allusion” mentioned earlier. Difference, whether signifying as the 
leopard spots or the Ethiopian’s skin, refers to an order beyond itself, 
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providing the pathway through which an ethical universe is articulated 
and rendered ‘material’ for human beings. Neither the leopard’s 
‘spotedness’ nor the Ethiopians ‘blackness,’ in other words, constitutes 
a marker of significance in and of themselves, only in their reference to 
an ethical whole do they acquire true validity. But, whereas we might 
conclude that difference is here recuperated into the ethical whole and 
through such recuperation reduced to it –– with all the attendant 
consequences we have learned accompanies such erasures –– 
Cugoano’s text moves us in a different direction:  
 
To this I must again observe, and what I chiefly intend by 
this similitude, that the external blackness of the 
Ethiopians, is as innocent and natural, as spots in the 
leopards; and that the difference of colour and 
complexion, which it hath pleased God to appoint among 
men, are no more unbecoming unto either of them, than 
the different shades of the rainbow are unseemly to the 
whole … It does not alter the nature and quality of a man, 
whether he wears a black or a white coat, whether he puts 
it on or strips it off, he is still the same man. … none of 
these differences alter the essentiality of the man.207 (Italics 
mine) 
 
 
The Ethiopian’s function as a marker and articulation of difference 
seems predicated on precisely the possibility of his recuperation by the 
totalizing metaphor we call “man.” Pigmentation, that feature 
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supposedly defining the Ethiopian’s difference, emerges as no more 
constitutive than coat or hat, neither essential nor perhaps quite 
desirable. To put this another way: it is inasmuch as the Ethiopian’s 
difference signifies him as like other men that he can function as the 
signifier of a difference operating within an economy of metaphorical 
totalization. Yet there is a second order of difference posited by 
Cugoano’s text, a modality identified with another order of the 
figurative. If the Ethiopian is chosen because of the sameness 
subtending his difference, i.e., because of his metaphorical 
substitutability, the ‘actual’ force of Cugoano’s example derives from 
the metonymic relation that produces this ‘exemplary’ Ethiopian. 
Within the confines of Cugoano’s example, not only is the Ethiopian 
metonymically substituted by his skin (in essence becoming nothing 
other than skin), the rhetorical force of the question (“Can the 
Ethiopian change his skin”?) presumes a permanence and an essence 
the passage above seems to deny. Predicated on the Ethiopian’s 
difference from himself, the example, in its status as the illustration of 
the operation of the Law, places the figurative as that which motivates 
the Law itself.  
The existence of slavery, the explanation for such a practice in a 
divinely ordained world and Cugoano’s dismissal of its claim to being 
  166 
divinely sanctioned, follows the logic that grounds the status of his 
example:  
 
All men in their fallen depraved state, being under a spirit 
of bondage, sunk into a nature of brutish carnality, and 
by the lusts thereof, they are carried captive and enslaved; 
and the consequence is, that they are sold under sin and 
in bondage to iniquity, and carried captive by the devil at 
his will. This being the case, the thing proves itself; for if 
there had been no evil and sin amongst men, there never 
would have been any kind of bondage, slavery and 
oppression found amongst them; and if there was none of 
these things to be found, the great cause of it could not, in 
the present situation of men, be pointed out to them in 
that eligible manner as it is.208  
 
 
Mired in their postlapserian state, subject to vices, sin and all manner 
of depredation, the actuality of slavery mirrors another form of 
bondage –– in fact re-presents –– the human subject’s actual moral 
condition and her inability to escape from it. Slavery therefore acquires 
significance as an analogy illustrating the reality of the subject’s moral 
world. The tension here is between a notion of slavery posited as the 
actuality of a practice and slavery construed as the figuration of the 
‘real.’ The “reality” of slavery appears located elsewhere and the Law 
inscribes this reality with the stamp of its own logic: 
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Wherefore it was necessary that something of the bondage 
and servitude should be admitted into the ritual law for 
figurative use, which, in all other respects and 
circumstances, was in itself, contrary to the whole tenure 
of the law, and naturally is itself unlawful for men to 
practice.209 
 
 
Law here situates itself as the source of slavery even though this 
brings it into contradiction with itself. But more importantly the Law 
seems determined by a necessary figurative operation without which 
its effectivity as Law would cease to exist. As Cugoano writes, if slavery 
had not been inscribed within the Law, slavery “could not have stood 
and become an emblem that there was any spiritual restoration and 
deliverance afforded us.” It’s not simply that slavery symbolizes the 
human subject’s sin and therefore reveals the possibility of 
redemption, after all it’s not inconceivable that another phenomena 
may well have substituted for it and assumed its symbolic value. 
Rather slavery articulates the necessity that conditions Law; a 
necessity identified with the figurative. Without slavery it seems, there 
is no freedom, and, without the figurative, no Law.  
 Rather than exhibiting the proper use of reason and the 
monstrosity of a reason that sanctions slavery, Cugoano’s analysis 
manifests the utter necessity of slavery to the thought of freedom and 
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of the figurative to the operation of the Law. All this was seemingly to 
counter the slaveholder’s perversion of reason, the distortion of a 
reason inverted on itself. But it could be argued that a reason that 
substitutes the figurative for the literal and privileges the example over 
the actual simply produces its own perversion. In other words 
identifying the slave autobiography exclusively with the narration of 
reason might be to ignore those other tales the slave narratives are 
trying to tell. 
 Construed as evidence of the slave’s capacity for reason (and 
therefore proof of her humanity), the slave narrative is meant to secure 
the African’s place, if not as an equal at least as a member, of the 
human family. This membership requires not only the production of 
writing as reason but of truth as knowledge. Yet the African’s 
production of knowledge through the writing of reason, the particular 
evidence of her humanity, encounters an obstacle. To substantiate 
one’s humanity through the production of autobiography, in essence 
to testify to it, situates knowledge –– or now what passes for it –– on 
problematic ground (and perhaps on no ground at all). In claiming her 
humanity through and as the structure of testimony, the slave 
questions the very terms of knowledge-as-truth that governs the 
epistemological order. As Derrida reminds us: 
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one can testify only to the unbelievable. To what can, at 
any rate, only be believed; to what appeals only to belief 
and hence to the given work, since it lies beyond the limits 
of proof, indication, certified acknowledgment [le constat], 
and knowledge. Whether we like it or not, and whether we 
know it or not, when we ask others to take our word for it, 
we are already in the order of what is merely believable. It 
is always a matter of what is offered to faith and of 
appealing to faith, a matter of what is only “believable” 
and hence as unbelievable as a miracle. Unbelievable 
because merely “credible.” The order of attestation itself 
testifies to the miraculous, to the unbelievable believable: 
to what must be believed all the same, whether believable 
or not.210 
 
 
Derrida here identifies the operation through which testimony acquires 
its force. To testify is to reference a truth beyond the factual, to broach 
a claim for that which extends beyond the clearly verifiable, to gesture 
towards that which is precisely not believable; in other words, an 
expression of that which resists the strictly epistemological. From this 
perspective the slave’s evidence of humanity, her manufacture of 
knowledge-as-truth through the production of a (self) knowing subject, 
points not to a knowledge of self but to the absence of knowledge itself. 
Or at least of knowledge epistemologically construed.  
The slave appears mired in a state of nature, what Hegel terms 
“an animal condition of innocence,” having failed in her ascension to 
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the seat of reason –– yet things are not so simple.211 Of course, it is not 
that the slave fails to display the requisite criteria through which 
reason is evidenced, knowledge produced and humanity granted, the 
slave after all writes; rather, it is what that writing entails that raises 
difficulties. Surprisingly it is Hegel, the philosopher who focuses so 
intently on another type of writing, who presents to us the full scope of 
the problem the African encounters and the full measure of the 
challenge the African and her writing poses. 
 
 
III. 
 Hegel begins his introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History by distinguishing between three forms of historiography 
(i.e. original history, reflective history, and philosophical history) with 
each respective form of historical writing representing a different stage 
in the development of spirit and its self-consciousness. But these three 
modes of historiography refer to more than simply stages in the 
progressive evolution of spirit; they purport to raise experience out of 
the realm of –– to use Hegel’s phrase –– “mere experience,” and thereby 
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redeeming experience for the operations of spirit.212 The human being, 
Hegel argues, “appears on the scene as the antithesis of nature,” and 
is in Hegel’s estimation, “the being who raises [herself] up into a 
second world.”213 The proper humanity of the human being, according 
to Hegel, resides in precisely this movement away from the sphere of 
nature and the subject’s seclusion in nature’s realm of “immediate 
existence.” This differentiation from nature, which marks the proper 
humanity of the human being, is also that feature which distinguishes 
the human from the animal world. Unlike the animal the human 
being, Hegel writes, “must realise [her] potential through [her] own 
efforts, and must first acquire everything for [herself], precisely 
because [she] is a spiritual being; in short, [she] must throw of all that 
is natural in [herself].”214 For Hegel historical writing provides evidence 
of exactly such a transition from the domain of immediate existence 
characteristic of the natural world towards the essential mediation 
required for spirit and its gradual progression towards the realisation 
of freedom. The articulation of such freedom is, from Hegel’s 
perspective, the defining characteristic particular to the human 
being.215 In other words, the absence of historical writing is sufficient 
                                                
212 Hegel, Lectures  12. 
213 Hegel, Lectures  44. 
214 Hegel, Lectures  50-51. 
215 “The substance of the spirit is freedom. From this, we can infer that its end in the historical 
process is the freedom of the subject to follow its own conscience and morality, and to pursue 
and implement its own universal ends; it also implies that the subject has infinite value and 
  172 
cause to bring into question the very humanity of the group under 
question and perhaps reduce the status of that group to the very 
animality that the development of spirit’s self-consciousness (and its 
attendant freedom) extinguishes. Given the conceptual parameters 
Hegel elaborates regarding the importance of historiography and its 
relation to the evolution of spirit, the status of the African within his 
schema requires some attention. 
 The Africa of Hegel’s text remains, he notes, “a continent 
enclosed within itself,” consisting of three geographical sections each 
clearly distinguishable from the other. Hegel defines two of these 
sections as little more than tributaries, the first best defined according 
to Hegel as “European Africa” while the second is “the only valley land 
of Africa [and] is closely connected with Asia.” But Africa proper, the 
Africa of which Hegel will write for the balance of the portion of his 
lecture dealing with the continent, is “the land south of the Sahara 
desert”; it comprises the third geographical section, and in this Africa, 
“history is in fact out of the question.”216 And what of the African who 
inhabits this truest Africa?: 
 
The African, in his undifferentiated and concentrated 
unity, has not yet succeeded in making a distinction 
between himself and his essential universality … Thus, 
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man as we find him in Africa has not progressed beyond 
his immediate existence. As soon as man emerges as a 
human being he stands in opposition to nature, and it is 
this alone which makes him a human being. But if he has 
merely made a distinction between himself and nature, he 
is still at the first stage of his development: he is 
dominated by passion and is nothing more than a savage. 
All our observations of African man show him as living in 
a state of savagery and barbarism, and he remains in this 
state until the present day. The negro is an example of 
animal man in all his savagery and lawlessness…”217 
 
The African, lacking the most basic determinants of the human being, 
becomes for Hegel an example of “animal man,” a being whose 
existence is defined by the very ambivalence of his humanity.218 Yet 
Hegel never completely subtracts humanity from the African, rather 
the African is characterized by his or her false beginning, by a “not yet” 
that seems to precede a proper beginning.219 On closer inspection, “the 
animal condition of innocence” in which the African exists compares 
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less to a state of barbarity than the false perfection of an Adamic 
beginning. Defining the status of the African still further, Hegel writes 
that “[t]hus in Africa as a whole, we encounter what has been called 
the state of innocence, in which man supposedly lives in unity with 
God and nature … The spirit should not remain permanently in such a 
state, however, but must abandon this primitive condition.”220 For 
Hegel, such a “primitive condition” belies the human being’s “true 
destiny” as the medium for the realisation of spirit in history.221 The 
African, it seems, is less a barbarian than the example of a false 
perfection. Yet this illusion the African proffers appears oddly 
reminiscent of another conceptually unsteady offering Hegel proposes: 
 
We must merely note for the present that the spirit begins 
in a state of infinite potentiality –– but no more than 
potentiality –– which contains its absolute substance as 
something as yet implicit, as the object and goal which it 
only attains as the end result in which it at last achieves 
its realisation. In actual existence, progress thus appears 
as an advance from the imperfect to the more perfect, 
although the former should not be understood in an 
abstract sense as merely imperfect, but as something 
which at the same time contains its opposite, i.e., what is 
commonly called perfection…222 
 
 
The potentiality that subtends the trajectory of spirit bears a more 
than fair resemblance to the structure that Hegel claims defines, and 
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limits, the African’s claim to ‘true’ humanity. Those who would see in 
the African a state of natural perfection fail to realise, Hegel claims, 
that only when the human being has “experienced opposition, and 
become divided within [hersef]” does she achieve genuine humanity. In 
mistakenly privileging such false perfection these advocates confuse 
the “potential presence” of the human being’s actual destiny “with its 
real existence.”223 But we already detect here what may well be the 
source of the recurrent confusion. Writing again in relation to the 
African Hegel notes that: 
 
…the concept of spirit is only potentially present, and it 
has wrongly been assumed that it already exists in reality. 
It is still only potentially present for us; but the purpose of 
spirit is to ensure that it is also realised in practice. In real 
existence, this represents the final stage in history, although 
in terms of mere potentiality, it is equivalent to the first 
stage.224 (Italics mine) 
 
 
Within Hegel’s construal both the operations of spirit and the 
definition of the African are afflicted by the same possible confusion. 
In each case the distinction between first and last, beginning and 
ending, potential and actual is prone to an embarrassing slippage. It is 
potentiality in particular that generates continued confusion; for on 
the one hand it leads us to apprehend a false perfection in the African 
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while on the other it informs the actuality of spirit and is an indicator 
of spirit’s own perfection. Regardless of her pretension to an unearned 
and false perfection the African nonetheless poses a particular 
difficulty for Hegel. By confusingly presenting herself as both 
beginning and end, she purports to qualify not simply the onset of 
spirit’s trajectory in its journey toward the realisation of freedom, but 
presumes to articulate spirit’s completion of that journey as well.  
The African of Hegel’s text would seem then to inform the very 
possibility of history. While not “in history” herself, she assumes 
status as the outside that conditions the terms of what Hegel 
understands as the possibility of history. As potentiality constitutes 
the necessary possibility that inheres in spirit itself and determines its 
trajectory through history, so too the African signifies the potentiality 
that inheres in the human subject, making of that subject’s action the 
realisation of spirit’s freedom. Her false perfection signifies not a 
mistaken conceptual delimitation but the pure potentiality that Hegel 
unknowingly assigns to the African.225 It can come as no coincidence 
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therefore that the African exists not before history, as Hegel at times 
seems to imply, but clearly outside of it –– a distinction that is not 
without significance. 226 For, if it were simply a question of the African 
being, in some sense, ‘pre-historical,’ then we could not speak of 
potentiality at all, inasmuch as the ‘pre-historical’ remains determined 
by the historical as such. In other words, the African is truly without 
history, she inhabits –– in an admittedly awkward phrasing –– the ‘no-
place’ of history. The erasure of the African from the field of history, in 
the sense and within the terms Hegel specifies, must then be viewed 
as coextensive with the demarcation of the African as the site of 
potentiality informing the movement of history. By assigning this 
particular status to the African Hegel’s text produces a quite 
unexpected result. It unites in the figure of the African both the non-
Being articulated by the third person of Benveniste’s analysis (the 
pronoun characteristic of historical narration) with the non-Being 
Giorgio Agamben claims conditions the notion of potentiality. By 
returning to Benveniste we stumble back to the question with which 
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we haphazardly began: What is it for the African, this being which 
subtends but who is without history, to write history?  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Fanon, Colonialism, and the Absence of (the Black) Man  
 
How are we to think the other? Or is it possible to ‘think’ the other at 
all? At stake in the response to these questions are the operations of 
many of the notions (e.g. identity, sociality, etc.) that provide the 
governing terms for our understanding of ourselves. In the West, the 
relationship between self and other, the ascension to any form identity 
or sociality, or the rendering intelligible of phenomena is predicated on 
situating the other as the reflection of the subject. In short, the other 
assumes significance only through its negation. Yet, as much current 
scholarship has taught us, to think the other through the subject is 
not to think the other at all. The establishment of the subject requires 
the expulsion of all difference from itself so as to position itself as its 
own origin. Whether through a radical negation as with Descartes’ 
Cogito or with the subsumption of difference into itself as witnessed 
with Hegel’s Geist, under this dominant conceptual regime alterity 
becomes simply another index by which one maps the institution of 
the subject. The need to revisit this logic is the problematic that much 
recent theory has been attempting to interrogate.227 These efforts have 
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been geared towards formulating a notion of the other in which the 
relationship between self and other is not reduced to the logic of a 
sovereign subject, not confined to an economy where the other is 
simply the pale reflection of the imperial self. But can a notion of 
alterity be configured that resists the apparent requirement that it be 
subsumed within/under the category of the subject? Or is such a 
desire simply to misunderstand the economy of the self/other relation 
and to define it in terms of discursive registers to which it does not 
speak. At issue here are several questions: What is the relation 
between the philosophical problematic of the subject identified by 
thinkers such as Heidegger and the economies of difference within 
culture?228 Can the notion of alterity derived from this philosophical 
problematic be articulated through an analysis of culture? If not, then 
what is the relation between the notion of alterity as it registers 
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philosophically and the economy of the other that manifests 
culturally? And, how are the discourses that contend with culture 
implicated in the production of our inherited notion of the other? 
Another way of broaching this question might simply be to ask the 
following: what does it mean to speak the other and of which other do 
we speak? 
 Fanon is an interesting figure in this respect. Extending from 
Peau noire, masques blancs until Les damnés de la terre, his work was 
an attempt to provide an analysis of colonial experience and a critique 
of the terms through which one generally arrived at an understanding 
of that experience.229 (Fanon Black Skin; Fanon The Wretched of the 
Earth; Fanon Peau Noire, Masques Blancs; Fanon Les Damnés De La 
Terrre) He did not simply offer an alternative interpretation of 
historical events, political psychology or cultural motivation, rather his 
critique produced a fundamental challenge to the terms through which 
the West defines experience –– in particular the experience of the 
other. Fanon raises his challenge to the centrality of epistemology in 
the West’s self-understanding and the consequent reflection of/on the 
other that it proposes. Seemingly anchored by the certainty of its own 
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Gallimard, 1961); The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington, (New York: 
Grove Press, 1968) hereafter cited in text as damnés. Where two pages references are 
given, the first refers to the text in the original language, the second to the 
translation unless otherwise indicated. 
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representations, the Western subject with its consistency of experience 
remains at a definite remove from the terms governing the 
phenomenology of colonial experience.230 Within the colonial context 
the ground of experience is a subject for whom the chaos, irruption, 
violence and Manichean structure of the social determines the very 
negotiation of its own self-relation. Cartesian certainty, under such 
conditions, lies truly elsewhere. Epistemology, that very specific and 
very modern posture that comes to define the West’s relation to its 
world, relegates objects and beings to a status of dependency.231 
Construed as having no genuine capacity outside of their relation to 
the West’s gaze, the experience of these beings is only legitimized 
through their proximity to a West that speaks of and for but never to 
them. Fanon’s work contests the ground that legitimates this 
disengaged punctual self of epistemology, that subject that would 
define the other as nothing other than the ward of its own reflection(s). 
Whether with his understanding of violence and its relation to the 
formation of an emergent national consciousness, or of “spontaneity” 
as the unsteady ground of political praxis, at stake in Fanon’s work is 
an attempt to rearticulate the conceptual economy within which the 
key terms of our politics operate. Retranscribing the notion of the 
                                                
230 I use “consistency” here not in the sense of logical agreement but rather in the 
sense that one would use the term to describe a material substance or liquid, i.e., 
the way one might refer to an item’s texture or solidity.  
231 See Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology,"   469-72. 
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other is key in this respect. The question of how the West produces the 
other –– whether as immigrant or citizen, enemy or friend, colonized or 
colonizer etc. –– is central to stipulating the possibilities that might lie 
beyond our current horizons. 
In recent years Fanon’s various texts have become invested with 
great institutional and politico-symbolic value, they have materialized 
as contested ground, the site of disciplinary, political and at times 
quite personal points of disagreement. Fanon is either lauded by those 
who see in him a counter to the influence of the various ‘posts-’ that 
have dominated the humanities in the past generation or conversely 
praised by those for whom he is the conduit for an era of renewed 
theoretical and disciplinary sophistication.232 Nowhere is this 
difference more clearly marked out than in his relationship to the work 
of Jacques Lacan. Of course it is Homi Bhabha’s influential rereading 
of Fanon that proved the lightning rod for much of the debate 
regarding the relationship between Lacan and Fanon and it is in 
response to Bhabha’s work that much of the argument regarding 
Fanon’s legacy has been defined.233 Rather than frame the relationship 
between these two thinkers in terms of influence and rehearse the still 
                                                
232 For representative examples of both these positions see Alessandrini, ed., Frantz 
Fanon: Critical Perspectives  and, Gordon, Sharpley-Whiting and White, eds., Fanon: 
A Critical Reader. The conflict over what constitutes the ‘appropriate’ legacy of 
Fanon’s work –– with all the disciplinary, philosophical, and generational differences 
at issue –– can be witnessed in the introduction to the respective volumes. 
233 See Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994).  
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ongoing debate regarding the prevalence or absence of a distinctly 
Lacanian influence on Fanon’s text, I want to proceed from a 
somewhat different perspective. I’m less concerned with staking a 
claim to either the psychoanalytic, poststructuralist, postmodern 
Fanon, or the political, revolutionary, engaged Fanon, than in 
identifying how Fanon’s thought challenges any such categorizations –
– regardless of which side of the divide one falls. Fanon and Lacan, in 
their respective attempts to parse the question of the other, bring 
pressure to bear on the underlying logic from which the question of 
alterity is presented to them. But equally important, their attempted 
reconceptualization of the self/other relation occurs –– and it would 
seem, necessarily –– alongside their challenge to the respective 
disciplinary frames through which the question is asked and the 
privileged epistemological substrate on which these disciplines are 
grounded. It is from this perspective that Lacan’s relation to Fanon 
assumes importance. Their respective work not only coincides with a 
particular historical moment, but Fanon (as evidenced throughout the 
range of his texts) and Lacan (most clearly in his earliest reformulation 
of Freud’s project) identify an unusual discordance seemingly at the 
very heart of the subject. This discordance, or dehiscence as Lacan will 
name it, poses a challenge to the understanding of the subject and the 
very terms through which it is thought. Both Fanon and Lacan 
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attempt to articulate the terms through which this altered 
understanding of the subject stands revealed, but neither finds the 
available theoretical vocabulary altogether adequate to the task at 
hand. What is seemingly required is a reorientation (i.e., Lacan) or 
perhaps eruption (i.e., Fanon) of the disciplinary, and consequently, 
theoretical frames through which the subject is presented. At issue 
then is not simply the difficulty posed by the ‘subject’ understood in a 
broad philosophical sense, but the challenge posed to the languages 
that purport to speak to it in a disciplinary sense. It is through the 
question of method, of what constitutes the proper object of 
disciplinary inquiry and of the method appropriate to it that Lacan and 
Fanon take up the issue of alterity. Whether determined via the proper 
delimitation of the psychoanalytic object in the case of Lacan or the 
inadequacy of epistemology in the delimitation of the colonial actor in 
the case of Fanon, they each pose the question of alterity in oddly 
similar ways. In both cases the issue of the other is refracted through 
the frame of the epistemic status of the object Fanon and Lacan place 
under investigation. The question therefore becomes less, how 
psychoanalytic or Lacanian is Fanon, than how coincident are their 
respective critiques and in what sense do their respective voices 
intersect. Hopefully unpacking Fanon’s critique on this question will 
contribute to moving us beyond the limitations of current debates. 
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I. 
 In recalling his introduction to psychoanalysis and the 
importance of his training with Gratian de Clérambault and the case 
study of Aimée in expanding his initial interest in Freud’s work, Lacan 
reminisces that what truly caught his attention was the difference with 
which Clérambault appeared to frame the patient’s symptoms. 
Clérambault’s focus on articulating a different clinical sensitivity 
combined with the utter flamboyance of Aimée’s symptomology led 
Lacan almost inevitably, he claims, to psychoanalysis and the 
questions that would prove his guide over the entirety of a career: 
 
What happens, under such conditions, to this intertwining 
by which the identity of thoughts that stem from the 
unconscious offers its woof to the secondary process, by 
permitting reality to become established to the pleasure 
principle’s satisfaction? 
 That is the question with which the reversed reprisal 
of the Freudian project, by which I have recently 
characterized my project, could be announced. 
 While we have the beginnings of it here, it could go 
no further. Let us simply say that it does not exaggerate 
the scope of psychoanalytic action [l’acte 
psychoanalytique] when it assumes that the latter 
transcends the secondary process to attain a reality that is 
not produced in it, even if it dispels the illusion that 
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reduced the identity of thoughts to the thought of their 
identity.234 
 
 
Of course Lacan having had the luxury of writing these introductory 
remarks to his earlier essay, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” well after 
the fact perhaps should not be faulted for claiming a greater 
conceptual precision than might have been the case at the time. Even 
with this slightly generous later reappraisal, in which he frames the 
stakes of his earlier work in terms of the development of his later 
thinking, Lacan nonetheless identifies the significance of his early 
work. Lacan suggests here that his later formulation of the real and its 
relation to the symbolic and imaginary is already broached in his 
earliest essays. The question at the center of this passage simply 
reframes in slightly different terms Lacan’s notion of the imaginary 
and its role in the genesis of the ego as specified in his essay on the 
mirror stage and foregrounds the difficulty its function in ego 
development requires us to think through. We will recall that the 
mirror stage refers for Lacan to that moment of the infant’s 
development in which he/she identifies with an/its image and from 
which identification emerges a sense of self and the structuring of the 
ego. There are two key features of Lacan’s formulation that bear 
                                                
234 Jacques Lacan, "On My Antecedents," trans. Bruce Fink, Écrits: The First 
Complete Edition in English, ed. Jacques Lacan (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2006) 53. 
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remembering. First, the child identifies with an imago and therefore is 
inserted into a specular logic of identification. Second, at this stage of 
development the child remains incapable of motor control and yet the 
identificatory relation allows it to presume a possibility of bodily 
coherence that nonetheless remains elusively in the future. This initial 
gesture towards an ‘outside,’ the structuring of the ego as this illusory 
presence of itself to itself, forever defines its very contours. “[T]he 
important point,” Lacan writes, “is that this form [i.e., ideal-I] situates 
the agency known as the ego, prior to its social determination, in a 
fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single 
individual”.235 By achieving its form through the assumption of an 
imago, the ego results from the child’s identification of itself as other 
and thus arises from the dynamic subtending the always-potential 
rivalry between self and other. The ego therefore establishes itself on 
the basis of a fiction that will on one level or another always govern its 
logic and the mirror stage points to the role of imagos in the ego’s 
negotiation of its social and psychological environment. What this 
indicates for Lacan is the “dehiscence at the very heart of the 
organism”; in other words, born “incomplete” the infant produces an 
ego reflective of this fundamental discordance and the dialectic of 
                                                
235 Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience," trans. Bruce Fink, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in 
English, ed. Jacques Lacan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006) 76. 
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rivalry that structures the ego’s development will govern all its 
psychical relations.236  
Given the importance of imagos in the ego’s relation to its 
environment and their role in the infant’s capacity to believe itself 
engaged in the phenomena of its world, the terms of this reality –– or 
perhaps more accurately what passes for the experience of reality –– 
acquires increasing importance for Lacan. If one follows Lacan’s 
thinking, to conceptualize the anticipation of bodily wholeness on the 
part of the infant in terms of the eventual harmonization of its 
body/ego with reality would be to indulge in self-deception and ignore 
the significance of imagos in the emergent ego structure. On the other 
hand, to limit the understanding of the relation between infant and 
world by reducing it to the simple dissonance between infant and 
reality still naturalizes the structure of (self-)relation to which the fact 
of the imaginary should make us critical. This latter position 
presumably makes of birth a fundamental disruption that renders 
discordant what might otherwise have been a harmonious relation and 
therefore fails to register the determining importance that an ego 
structured through the imaginary signifies. Lacan’s work suggests that 
to truly understand the relation of the imaginary in the development of 
the ego means recognizing its constitutive role in the formation of the 
                                                
236 Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience,"   78. 
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subject. In other words, the lack identified in the infant’s relationship 
to ‘reality’ is itself constitutive of the subject and requires that we 
rethink the prominence imparted to ‘reality’ in the determination of 
experience, particularly our understanding of psychoanalytic 
experience. 
In “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’,” the 1936 essay whose title 
deliberately echoes Freud’s seminal metapsychological statement, 
Lacan takes up for the first time in a sustained form the consequences 
that ensue from the importance he accords to the imaginary. The 
essay, in part a reappraisal of the relation between psychoanalysis and 
psychology, begins by first conceptualizing the significance of the 
“Freudian Revolution.” At issue is Lacan’s challenge to the 
associationist school of psychology, itself a dominant influence in 
French psychiatric circles at the time and whose source can be traced 
back to the eighteenth century empiricism of Locke and Hume. A rival 
to psychoanalysis and its own understanding of psychological 
phenomena, associationism fails, in Lacan’s estimation, to offer a 
genuine account of psychical phenomena. Unable to propose “an 
objective conception of psychical reality,” the associationist 
understanding of psychical phenomena displays a “conceptual decline 
in which the vicissitudes of a specific effort that impels man to seek a 
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guarantee of truth for his own knowledge were retraced”.237 In other 
words, associationism situates its conception of psychic phenomena 
within a theoretical edifice whose foundation is, for Lacan, of 
questionable value. Lacan names this foundation the “function of 
truth” and it operates as the fundamental principle governing 
associationist conceptions of psychic experience. Tracing the genealogy 
of associationism back to its Lockean origins Lacan analyses how the 
particular position adopted by associationism privileges the point of 
intersection between “reality” and the senses: 
 
with the thesis ‘nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit 
in sense,’ [Locke] reduces reality’s action to its point of 
contact with pure sensation, that mythical entity, in other 
words reduces it to being nothing but the blind spot of 
knowledge, since nothing is recognized there … as the 
dialectical antinomy of an incomplete thesis, the primacy 
of pure mind, insofar as it constitutes the true moment of 
knowledge, through the essential decree of identification, 
recognizing the object at the same time that it asserts it.238 
 
 
The “function of truth” according to Lacan is derived from a notion of 
truth grounded in a conception of adequation in the relation of self to 
reality, determined in other words by privileging the reality principle. 
In Lacan’s interpretation, the operation of Lockean ideas are anchored 
in the ‘proper’ relation between sense and reality, a proposition that 
                                                
237 Lacan, "Beyond the 'Reality Principle',"   59. 
238 Lacan, "Beyond the 'Reality Principle',"   61. 
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necessarily assumes a great deal about the constitutive parameters of 
this reality. Associationism draws its conception of correct psychical 
functioning from this assumption. This is why phenomena such as 
hallucinations or images pose such a problem for it, if the phenomena 
under discussion cannot be linked to reality in a concrete and 
conventionally recognizable fashion then the status of that object 
becomes problematic. In accordance with this presupposition 
associationism considers illusion an error of the senses while the 
image is either defined as an illusion or more readily “as a weakened 
sensation insofar as it attests less surely to reality.”239 This particular 
conception relegates most psychic phenomena, i.e., “feelings, beliefs, 
delusions, assents, intuitions, and dreams,” to insignificance.240 
According to Lacan associationism submits phenomena to its account 
of reality and within this frame, Lacan argues, genuine psychical 
phenomena have no place. Because such phenomena are neither 
grounded in subjective intentionality, “rational knowledge,” nor readily 
reducible to a notion of reality as adequation, associationist 
psychology can find no place for them.  
 Psychoanalysis distinguishes itself from associationism on 
precisely the point of what it believes constitutes psychical reality. This 
difference is no more clearly illustrated than in Freud’s willingness to 
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240 Lacan, "Beyond the 'Reality Principle',"   63. 
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consider the subject’s own account of his/her experience and to grant 
a “reality” to psychic symptoms associationism would otherwise have 
dismissed. Rather than viewing these symptoms as “illusory” 
expressions whose “real signification, cannot be psychological except 
‘in appearance,’” and are therefore to be “distinguished from the 
ordinary register of psychical life,” psychoanalysis recognizes in them 
pathways to genuine psychical experience.241 In adhering to what 
Lacan terms the two laws of analytic experience –– the law of non-
omission and the law of non-systematization –– Freud granted a new 
status to the patient’s narrative. By requiring of the patient a full 
account of all aspects of his narrative regardless of how trivial or 
inconsequential the event or recollection might seem while granting 
equal status to each element or event of the patient’s narrative, Freud 
demarcated a new conceptualization of psychical experience. This 
alternative conceptualization allowed for the inclusion not only of 
phenomena traditionally considered psychological (i.e., dreams, 
delusions, etc.) but also those excluded from the realm of the 
“properly” psychological (i.e., slips of the tongue, etc.). Freud’s law of 
free association, according to Lacan, results from Freud’s novel 
conception of the relation between subject and reality.  
 This transformation initiated a shift not only in our 
understanding of what constitutes a psychical phenomena or event, 
                                                
241 Lacan, "Beyond the 'Reality Principle',"   65. 
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but also, argued Lacan, required an alteration in our conception of the 
cause of these phenomena. In this sense psychoanalysis offered the 
possibility of a genuinely psychological account of psychical 
phenomena, an account according to Lacan, other theories of 
psychical experience failed to match. His critique of Henry Ey’s 
organo-dynamic theory of mental illness, first presented at Bonneval in 
1946 and published a year later, targets precisely this failing.242 Ey, a 
leading figure in French psychiatric circles during the 1940s and 
1950s, developed a theory of mental illness that refused to ascribe it 
any relation to a fundamentally psychic causality; mental illness, in 
Ey’s view, always arose from essentially organic determinants.243 
Ey’s work comes to represent more than simply another theory of 
mental illness; it articulates for Lacan the fundamental resistance of 
psychiatry to the psychical itself. In his “Presentation on Psychical 
Causality” Lacan revisits concerns consistently at the center of his 
thinking from the period of the “Mirror Stage” up until the Rome 
discourse. This return, foregrounds the two central reference points of 
Lacan’s thinking at this stage: the distinction between psychoanalysis 
and science and his recurrent preoccupation with defining the proper 
                                                
242 Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality." 
243 “[Ey’s] theory is an attempt,” in David Macey’s words, “to synthesize a 
psychodynamic model, which sees mental illness purely as a product of mental 
conflict, the sociogenetics which reduces it to a reflection of social conflict, and an 
organico-mechanistic model which relates mental symptoms to organic lesions.” 
David Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Biography (New York: Picador, 2000) 142. 
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delimitation of the psychoanalytic object and the practice appropriate 
to it.244  
 From the perspective of the latter objective Ey’s work would well 
constitute a particular affront inasmuch as he dismisses the 
possibility of the psychical (as opposed to organic) origins of mental 
illness. Of the consequences that ensue from Ey’s position the one that 
articulates the stakes of the debate between Ey and Lacan most clearly 
can be discerned from the following passage: 
 
It may surprise some of you that I am disregarding 
the philosophical taboo that has overhung the notion of 
truth in scientific epistemology ever since the so-called 
pragmatist speculative theses were disseminated in it. You 
will see that the question of truth conditions the 
phenomenon of madness in its very essence, and that by 
trying to avoid this question, one castrates this 
phenomenon of the signification by virtue of which I think 
I can show you that it is tied to man’s very being. 
As for the critical use that I will make of it in a 
moment, I will stay close to Descartes by positing the 
notion of truth in the famous form Spinoza gave it: “Idea 
vera debet cum suo ideato convenire. A true idea must” (the 
emphasis falls on the word “must,” meaning that this has 
its own necessity) “agree with its object.” 
Ey’s doctrine evinces the exact opposite feature, in 
that, as it develops, it increasingly contradicts its original, 
permanent problem.245 
 
 
                                                
244 I do not mean to imply that Lacan abandons these questions after 1953 but 
rather that the terms through which he chooses to articulate them undergo a 
gradual change which as a consequence affects the way he construes these issues. 
245 Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality,"   125. 
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Similarly to his “Beyond the Reality Principle,” at issue for Lacan is the 
nature of truth as it applies to psychoanalysis. In this instance the 
definition of truth relies not on a notion of adequation to reality but 
rather situates truth in terms of the conformity between problem and 
object. In other words, the truth must occupy the register from which 
the problem, to which it is a response, originates. For example, a 
problem that registers at the level of the psychological must be 
addressed within those terms and not reduced to a modality of 
experience alien to it. This places a great burden on defining precisely 
the nature of the problem and the object at its center. The refusal 
within psychiatric circles to grant a truly psychological answer to the 
problems raised by the issues it investigates –– as opposed to their 
reduction to biological or neurological causes –– is one of Lacan’s 
recurring points of contention. This insistent theme in Lacan’s early 
work, namely his focus on the truth (and by extension method) 
appropriate to specific phenomena (in this case psychical phenomena) 
allows us to read him as part of a broader debate regarding the 
scientificity of interpretive methodologies.  
 The questions surrounding the precise genesis of madness 
become the example through which Lacan chooses to focus his 
disagreement with Ey and the larger issue regarding the determination 
of the psychical object. To outline the inadequacy of Ey’s account of 
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mental illness and the conception of psychical activity upon which it 
was based Lacan took recourse to a notoriously perplexing case of 
mental and functional incapacity. Johann Schneider, a young German 
soldier injured in the First World War, became better known as the 
famous patient “Schn.” Suffering from injuries inflicted by mine-
splinters that reached his brain, over the next several months Schn 
began to exhibit symptoms that were eventually diagnosed by Kurt 
Goldstein and Adhemar Gelb –– in February 1916 –– as “psychic 
blindness.” The significance of Schneider’s case was the difficulty it 
presented to clinician attempting to account for the range and 
paradoxical nature of his visual incapacity. With today’s more 
advanced diagnostic tools the extent of Schn’s brain damage would 
have been more easily recognizable. But the difficulty of delimiting the 
psychical from the organic, the issue at the center of reflection on 
Schn’s case at the time, is still a reference point in contemporary 
analyses of the case.246 Using the example of Gelb and Goldstein’s 
famous patient whose complexly interrelated range of symptoms 
seemingly crossed the intersection of the organic and the symbolic, 
Lacan put the question pointedly to Ey: “How can he distinguish this 
                                                
246 This continuing reference to the tension between the organic and the psychical, 
even in a discipline as apparently divorced from such concerns as neuropsychology 
registers, albeit negatively, continued preoccupation “authenticity” of Schn’s 
symptoms. My summary of the case of patient Schn is drawn from J.J. Marotta and 
M. Berhmann, "Patient Schn: Has Goldstein and Gelb's Case Withstood the Test of 
Time?," Neuropsychologia 42 (2004). 
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patient from a madman? If he cannot give me an answer in his system, 
it will be up to me to give him one in my own.” In Ey’s reduction of 
madness to a species of error Lacan identifies the appropriation of a 
particular conception of truth as the source of Ey’s conceptual failure. 
Rather than error, Lacan defines madness as a species of 
misrecognition. “Delusional belief [i.e., madness] is misrecognition,” 
Lacan writes, “with everything this term brings with it by way of an 
essential antinomy.”247 Misrecognition, the term through which Lacan 
conceives madness, is also ascribed to the ego’s normative negotiation 
of its environment. As such, it wouldn’t seem to constitute the ideal 
notion through which a differentiation of madness from other 
psychical negotiations of one’s environment could be defined. But for 
Lacan madness constitutes a particular type of misrecognition, a 
specific species of attachment that compels an unwarranted 
transparency between ego and imago: 
 
This misrecognition can be seen in the revolt 
through which the madman seeks to impose the law of his 
heart onto what seems to him to be the havoc [désordre] of 
the world. This is an “insane” enterprise –– but not 
because it suggests a failure to adapt to life … It is an 
insane enterprise, rather, in that the subject does not 
recognize in this havoc the very manifestation of his actual 
being, or that what he experiences as the law of his heart 
is but the inverted and virtual image of that same being. 
He thus doubly misrecognizes it, precisely so as to split its 
                                                
247 Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality,"   135. 
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actuality from its virtuality. Now, he can escape this 
actuality only via this virtuality.248 
 
 
The issue here is not that of the subject being unable to properly adapt 
to reality. Lacan frames the issue in entirely different terms. Rather 
than referring to the distance of a proximal reality, “virtual” and 
“actual” designate the subject’s relation of identification to the range of 
imagos that constitutes its awareness of its world. Thus, the subject’s 
madness stems from the nature of its identificatory bonds and its 
inability to circumvent, even in the slightest degree, the immediacy of 
this relation.249 Defined within Lacanian terms the ego is irreducible to 
the “reality principle,” to the purported proper functioning of the 
organism in its negotiation of the ‘real world. It is inasmuch as there is 
such a reduction of the ego to the “reality principle” that one can 
speak of error. “A subject’s history,” suggests Lacan, “develops in a 
more or less typical series of ideal identifications that represent the 
purest of psychical phenomena in that they essentially reveal the 
function of imagos.”250 Madness constitutes a point of departure, what 
Lacan calls “turning point,” in the subject’s relation to these 
identificatory relations. 
                                                
248 Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality,"   140. 
249 “For the risk of madness is gauged by the very appeal of the identifications on 
which man stakes both his truth and his being. [.] Thus rather than resulting from a 
contingent fact –– the frailties of his organism –– madness is the permanent virtuality 
of a gap opened in his essence.” (Italics mine) Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical 
Causality,"   143-44. 
250 Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality,"   145. 
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 In articulating his conception of madness Lacan provides not 
only a critique of Ey but of the conceptual basis on which psychology 
rests its foundations and from which it produces its object. For Lacan 
“psychology’s true objet,” i.e., the imago, derives its status from the 
function of ‘illusion’ –– at least in its capacity as a determinant of 
psychical action –– that informs it.251 Illusion therefore brings with it 
the functional capacity Ey identifies with reality. But to construe the 
imago as the object around which psychology defines itself means 
going beyond an alteration of the theoretical reference points of the 
discourse, it requires reconsideration of what constitutes the truth of 
the discourse. To return to an earlier citation: 
 
You will see that the question of truth conditions 
the phenomenon of madness in its very essence, and that 
by trying to avoid this question, one castrates this 
phenomenon of the signification by virtue of which I think 
I can show you that it is tied to man’s very being. 
As for the critical use that I will make of it in a 
moment, I will stay close to Descartes by positing the 
notion of truth in the famous form Spinoza gave it: “Idea 
vera debet cum suo ideato convenire. A true idea must,” 
(the emphasis falls on the word ‘must,’ meaning that this 
is its own necessity) “agree with its object.”252 
 
 
Yet to agree with the object in this instance means to withdraw from 
the very objectivity that constitutes the defining condition through 
                                                
251 Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality,"   146. 
252 Lacan, "Presentation on Psychical Causality,"   125. 
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which the object is made available for knowledge. The object of 
psychology, as defined by Lacan, must be thought otherwise than 
through the formula that, according to Charles Taylor, defines the 
epistemological tradition: “knowledge is to be seen as the correct 
representation of an independent reality.”253 From this perspective 
what kind of knowledge can be drawn from an ego that does not derive 
its coherence from its relation to reality, or whose normative condition 
is determined by the function of illusion? Lacan demonstrates how 
displacing or supplanting the disciplinary object requires addressing 
the very terms through which the object is produced as such. At the 
heart of Lacan’s argument remains a concern to define what precisely 
constitutes psychical phenomena, what distinguishes it and what 
methodology can be said to register cognizance of its truth –– the 
nature its truth being the principle issue at hand.  
 In turning to Fanon we will see that although couched in quite 
different terms and with substantially different points of reference, the 
fundamental analytic problem Fanon confronts is quite similar to that 
addressed by Lacan. Both Lacan and Fanon, in their respective work, 
attempt to think the presence of seemingly irreconcilable constituents. 
For Lacan, this thinking is defined through his reconceptualization of 
psychoanalysis and its interrogation of the relation between the 
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primary process and reality.254 In Fanon this thinking is marked by a 
different necessity. 
 
 
 
II. 
 Fanon’s Peau noire, masques blancs, written after Sétif but 
before the All-Saints Day uprising, and therefore produced outside the 
symbolic scope of events that would define the greater balance of 
Fanon’s political life, has often been read as if somehow it articulated 
this distance.255 One finds barely a mention of it in Lewis Gordon’s 
critical introduction to Fanon: A Critical Reader, a volume that, if we 
follow Gordon, defines itself against the interpretation of Fanon found 
in “Postcolonial studies,” a field in which Peau noire, masques blancs is 
                                                
254 In his reappraisal of his early essays Lacan situates his work in terms of the 
relation between the primary process and reality and the need to correctly 
circumscribe this relation before proceeding to other questions: “Although everyone 
agrees, in fact (even those who are dumb enough not to realize that they agree), that 
the primary process encounters nothing real except the impossible, which in the 
Freudian perspective remains the best definition that can be given of reality [réel], 
the point is to know more about what Else [d’Autre] it encounters so that that we can 
concern ourselves with it.” Lacan, "On My Antecedents,"   53-54. 
255 Sétif is the Algerian market town that erupted in violence during V-E Day 
celebrations in 1945 when the French colons opened fire on Muslim Algerians who 
were demonstrating against French colonial occupation. After the bloodletting had 
subsided the tally read: 103 Europeans dead while the estimates for the number of 
Algerian Muslims that were killed in the ensuing French repression range from 1300 
to 45000. See, Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York 
City: New York Review Books, 1977) and, Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-200: A Short 
History, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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presumed to be central.256 Even in a text as insightful as Ato Sekyi-
Otu’s Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience a distinction is drawn –– although 
in this particular instance, implicitly –– between Peau noire, masques 
blancs and what constitutes the genuine concern of Fanon’s corpus:  
 
Who will abrogate the rights of a hermeneutic situation for 
which Fanon is the first and foremost author of Black 
Skin, White Masks, first and foremost the dramatist of 
cultural racism construed as exemplar of the violence and 
ambivalence of desire and discourse… 
 But what if your return to Fanon is solicited by a 
somewhat different situation in the world, a somewhat 
different geopolitical affiliation? In the following pages I 
undertake a rereading of Fanon prompted by the 
postcolonial condition, here understood as the 
determinate experience of postindependence African 
societies, in relation to contemporary world history.257 
 
Although not explicitly stated here the target of Sekyi-Otu’s criticism is 
clear, but Bhabha’s reading (and all that come in its wake) isn’t faulted 
for a specific interpretive or philological failure. Central to Sekyi-Otu’s 
charge against those who would propagate “this Fanon of the 
postmodernist imagination” is its elimination of the concrete 
materiality of the political from the sphere of Fanon’s concerns. 
Alongside this materiality, contends Sekyi-Otu, resides the promise 
that inhabits a truly “human” politics, it is this seeming erasure of 
                                                
256 Lewis R. Gordon, Dean T. Sharpley-Whiting and Renée T. White, "Introduction: 
Five Stages of Fanon Studies," Fanon: A Critical Reader, eds. Lewis R. Gordon, Dean 
T. Sharpley-Whiting and Renée T. White (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 6. 
257 Sekyi-Otu Ato, Fanon's Dialectic of Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996) 11. 
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hope and its possibilities that Sekyi-Otu decries.258 But is this all there 
is to be said? Does the early Fanon somehow refuse the question of the 
political because of an unfortunate preoccupation with things 
psychoanalytic? Do any of these distinctions actually hold: that 
between the young and the mature Fanon, the political and the 
psychoanalytic Fanon, or the postmodern and the revolutionary 
Fanon? An answer to any one these propositions requires returning 
and defining the question that seemingly guides Fanon in Peau noire, 
masques blancs, that of the ‘other.’ 
 Fanon’s Peau noire, masques blancs, notorious for its generic 
ambiguity partakes of a theoretical Catholicism that makes the actual 
ground of its claims even that much more difficult to ascertain.259 
Couched in a myriad of theoretical languages from which it seemingly 
cannot escape, Peau noire, masques blancs evinces within its pages 
echoes of Sartre’s existential-Marxism, Merleau Ponty’s 
phenomenology, and the recurrent psychoanalytic formulations that 
                                                
258 Ato, Fanon's Dialectic of Experience  45-46. 
259 Writing of the subdued response to the initial publication of Fanon’s study, David 
Macey surmises that: “Peau noire was and is an elusive book, not the least because it 
is so difficult to categorize in terms of genre. It is difficult to think of any precedent 
for it, and it did not establish any new genre or tradition. It had no sequel. Fanon did 
not write the study of ‘Language and aggressivity’ which was, he claimed, in 
preparation, and the style of his later writings is very different. Although written 
largely in the first person and although rich in autobiographical source, Peau noire, 
masques blancs is not a pure autobiography: the ‘I’ that speaks in it is often a 
persona. … It is in part an account of colonialism in Martinique but it is a very 
partial one … It contains no description of the island’s political institutions, though 
it does vividly capture the place’s profound alienation. It does not offer any real 
solution to Martinique’s problem’s and is by no means a pro-independence 
manifesto.” Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Biography  161-62. 
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for some define Fanon’s text in its distance from questions political.260 
That this entire theoretical infrastructure is directed towards the 
establishment of a ‘true’ humanism, towards providing a renewed 
foundation for a universal notion of ‘Man,’ seems readily apparent:261  
 
Toutes les formes d’exploitation se ressemblent. Elles vont 
toutes chercher leur nécessité dans quelque décret d’ordre 
biblique. Toutes les formes d’exploitation son identiques, 
car elles s’appliquent toutes à un même “objet”: l’homme. 
A vouloir considérer sur le plan de l’abstraction la 
structure de telle exploitation ou de telle autre, on se 
masque le problème capital, fondamental, qui est de 
remettre l’homme à sa place. (Peau, 71; 88) 
 
Or, 
 
Il y a un drame dans ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler les 
sciences de l’homme. Doit-on postuler une réalité 
humaine type et en décrire les modalités psychiques, ne 
tenant comte que des imperfections, ou bien ne doit-on 
pas tenter sans relâche une compréhension concrète et 
toujours nouvelle de l’homme? (Peau, 17; 22) 
 
                                                
260 Ato, Fanon's Dialectic of Experience  5. 
261 I retain Fanon’s use of the term “Man” here and throughout the text for two 
reasons. First it articulates a significant limitation inscribed within Fanon’s own 
project and draws attention to the necessity of reframing Fanon’s intervention. 
Second, Fanon’s usage of the term resonates with the philosophical heritage with 
which the term is weighted. Commenting on the relationship between the notions of 
self-consciousness and ‘man’ Jean-Luc Nancy writes: “[b]eing the very movement of 
proper self-consciousness, identity –– or the Self that identifies itself –– therefore 
makes difference itself, difference proper: and this property designates or denotes 
itself as ‘man.’” To renew the conception of ‘man,’ to restore “man to his proper 
place,” as Fanon calls for, requires addressing both its role as a conceptual support 
for the project of imperial expansion and, as Nancy reminds us, the signifier of 
difference in the movement of an appropriative self-consciousness. Jean-Luc Nancy, 
"Identity and Trembling," trans. Brian Holmes, The Birth to Presence (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993) 10. 
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These citations can be placed alongside the more famous last line of 
Les damnés de la terre where Fanon pleads: “Pour l’Europe, pour 
nous-mêmes et pour l’humanité, camarades, it faut faire peau neuve, 
développer une pensée neuve, tenter de mettre sur pied un homme 
neuf” (damnés, 376).262 Fanon’s claim regarding the need for a 
restatement of the question of ‘Man’ is an undeniable aspect of his 
thought, yet situating his thought in terms of the fashioning of a ‘new 
humanism’ has often required privileging one particular theoretical 
language within Fanon’s text over its neighbors.263 It has come to 
mean, in other words, ascribing a univocal character to Fanon’s work 
and imposing a consistent if ill-fitting logic to his text. But perhaps, 
rather than choose one particular theoretical language over and 
against its competitors it might be more useful to ask a somewhat 
different question: what if the proliferation of these languages 
articulates a critique of theoretical discourse itself?264 Fanon’s 
                                                
262 Suzanne Gauch, unlike Farrington’s translation of this passage, captures the play 
of Fanon’s French and the nuance signified by ‘skin’ in her own rendering of this 
passage: “For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must slough off 
our old skins, develop a new thought, and attempt to set afoot a new man.” Suzanne 
Gauch, "Fanon on the Surface," Parallax 8.2 (2002): 124. 
263 For an example of such a reading which proposes to see Fanon as the purveyor of 
a reenergized phenomenological tradition see Lewis R. Gordon, Fanon and the Crisis 
of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences (New York: 
Routledge, 1995). 
264 I am here leaning on Christopher Fynsk’s conception of theory developed in his 
“Community and the Limits of Theory.” By ‘theory,’ Fynsk means “all critical analysis 
of cultural or social representation and all reflection on that analysis itself.” 
Although this definition is clearly crafted in relation to the conception of theory that 
circulates within the academy and thereby serves primarily a heuristic function in 
this essay, it nonetheless overlaps with its own ‘other,’ the philosophical notion most 
 207 
analyses are at their most powerful at those moments when he places 
pressure on the epistemological logic on which these various 
theoretical languages are grounded. It is the very productivity of the 
theoretical, i.e., the terms through which it projects and produces its 
object, which Fanon places under review. Articulated through his 
analysis of the subject/other relation present under the colonial 
regime (a regime that extends well beyond the border of the colony), 
Fanon’s critique increasingly finds itself grasping beyond the terms or 
logic available to it. The failure to register the content of this relation 
within an individual theoretical vocabulary marks an incapacity within 
                                                
commonly associated with Heidegger’s reflections on techne. Theoretical discourse’s 
failure to think community, contends Fynsk, results principally from its very 
structure, from its inability to register what it cannot represent. Fynsk, while 
recognizing the necessity of theory for the critical negotiation of our life-world is 
equally cognizant of the limitations and perhaps dangers that proceed from an 
unexamined adherence to the theoretical posture. “It would be misleading,” he 
writes, “to suggest that the voice of community (which today says the absence of 
community and is thus calling for another thought of community) is not speaking in 
all sorts of ways and at all sorts of sites in the field of theory. The problem is rather 
that in general it is not heard as such and meditated upon as a testimony of 
community and as saying something about our historical situation. It would also be 
misleading, indeed it would be misguided, to suggest that the only discourse 
contributing to the struggle to liberate the communication of existence in its 
historicity and materiality is one that seeks to effect that communication. We cannot 
do without theory: that is to say, we cannot do without a representation of our 
sociohistorical situation and we cannot do without the forceful representation of 
political positions. But if we limit our understanding of critical discourse to its 
representational or interpretive function, then we cannot conceive of its political 
import outside the bounds of what Richard Rorty has called ‘edification.’” In other 
words, although theoretical discourse (i.e., the representational mode of discourse) 
necessarily constrains our capacity to think community otherwise, it nonetheless 
remains an inescapable gesture. Yet, what Fynsk illustrates in his essay is the 
limitation that attends any attempt to think community from the site governed by 
the representational function of critical discourse. What theory resists are those 
possibilities that reside beyond, are withdrawn from, or that fail to cede to, the logic 
of representation. Christopher Fynsk, "Community and the Limits of Theory," 
Community at Loose Ends, ed. Miami Theory Collective (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991) 19-21. 
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these vocabularies themselves, an incapacity incarnated by Fanon’s 
notion of the colonial subject and the constitutive role of the other 
within it. Fanon’s analysis takes us on a journey of limits, both 
epistemological and theoretical, that seemingly defines the political as 
a limit challenge to the epistemological. 
 In the central chapter of Peau noire, masques blancs, “The Lived 
Experience of the Black,” Fanon seeks to circumscribe the problem 
that attends the constitution of the colonized “I” within the colonial 
context.265 The phenomenological surface of Fanon’s analysis, his 
detailed attention to the unfolding bodily and psychical responses on 
the part of the Black to the White gaze, might prevent us from 
recognizing the deeply autobiographical tone and frame through which 
Fanon presents the various turns of this drama:  
 
Enfermé dans cette objectivité écrasante, j’implorai autrui. 
Son regard libérateur, glissant sur mon corps devenu 
soudain nul d’aspérité, me rend une légèreté que je 
croyais perdue et, m’absentant du monde, me rend au 
monde. Mais là-bas, just à contre-pente, je bute, et l’autre, 
par gestes, attitudes, regards, me fixe, dans le sens où l’on 
fixe une préparation par un colorant. Je m’emportai, 
exigeai une explication… Rien n’y fit. J’explosai. Voici les 
menus morceaux par un autre moi réunis. (Peau, 88) 
 
Locked up in this crushing objecthood, I turned 
beseechingly to the other. His liberating gaze, creeping 
                                                
265 Frantz Fanon, "The Lived Experience of the Black," trans. Valentine Moulard, 
Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). Hereafter cited in 
text as Lived. 
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over my body which was thereby suddenly smoothed out, 
gives me back a lightness that I had thought lost and, by 
removing me from the world, gives me back to the world. 
But over there, right when I was reaching the other side, I 
stumble, and through his movements, attitudes and gaze, 
the other fixes me, just like a dye is used to fix a chemical 
solution. I lost my temper and demanded an explanation… 
But nothing came. I exploded. Here are the fragments put 
together by another self. (Lived, 184) 
 
The journey here is that of an “I” attempting to come to knowledge of 
itself and through this development present itself as exemplary of a 
certain type of ‘knowledge,’ one that informs the constitution of a self. 
Explaining that his arrival into the world was conditioned by a desire 
to attain a plenitude of meaning –– “to be at the origin of the world” in 
his words –– Fanon quickly encounters an obstacle: he realizes that he 
is but “an object among other objects.” And, perhaps more 
importantly, that he is but an object among (white) men. Confined by 
this objecthood he seeks recognition from the other. But the process, 
already arrested once, stops a second time when the gaze of the other 
fixes him. The fragmentation that results, Fanon relays to us, can only 
be articulated by a subsequent “self.” Seemingly arrested by the 
recognition of difference –– whether as the recognition of difference 
from oneself qua object or as difference from the other –– Fanon’s 
description specifies an apparent misfiring of subjectification. 
However, the difficulty of the passage arises from Fanon’s implicit 
claim that the Black’s ascension to subjectivity, twice arrested, now 
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finds itself without motor, relegating the “I” to a searching 
recuperation of the fragments of itself that remain. Fanon’s ‘blackness’ 
fixes him twice, first as the site of the various stereotypes that define 
its representation within the social field (“‘Dirty nigger!’ or simply, 
‘Look, a Negro!’”) and second as the site of subjectification written as 
failure. With the latter the “I” comes to an awareness of itself, a 
process that constitutes a return to “world” that is also a retrieval of its 
world (“[he] gives me back a lightness that I had thought lost”). But as 
he approaches “the other side,” an errant step forces a confrontation 
with the discordance of its world, the balance of the chapter being an 
attempt to define this discordance by name. Combined here it seems 
are two issues: the strictures that condition the Black’s introduction 
into the realm of the social and the revelation, through an analysis of 
its operation within the Black, of the economy of subjectification. 
Although the two are linked, they would appear to each relate to quite 
different areas of significance. The former alluding to the myths and 
stereotypes that determine the perception of the Black in White society 
and the latter presenting the Black as an example of the constitution 
of the subject. And yet something else seems at work here. For doesn’t 
this process result, not in the unified subject of philosophy’s 
epistemological ideals, but in the fragmented self of a perhaps less 
exalted subject of knowledge? Doesn’t the journey of Fanon’s “I” 
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conclude with an interminable wait for its own arrival?266 All this 
would seem to indicate that the trajectory Fanon maps leads to an 
altogether unexpected point of arrival.  
 The lack of ontological resistance Fanon claims governs the 
representation of the Black within the social field draws its capacity in 
part from this doubled moment of arrest.267 The dynamic Fanon 
proceeds to illustrate is akin to the double bind that Girard formulates 
as a condition of mimetic desire, “[i]t is not a question of the Black 
being Black,” Fanon suggests “but rather, of his being black opposite 
the White.”268 In other words, he must not only conform to the 
stereotypes that fix him as something less than human, an object that 
registers within the social field as such, but he is also a subject 
produced by/as the logic of representation that grounds that field. 
Inasmuch as the Black is black, the defining context of his ‘blackness’ 
manifests itself within the social field as the stereotypes and myths 
that come to represent him. But inasmuch as the Black is also 
subject, and the drama of “The Lived Experience of the Black” is 
precisely the telling of a coming to subjectivity –– whether failed or not 
––, the Black in its incarnation as subject constitutes the ground of 
                                                
266 Fanon, "The Lived Experience of the Black,"   200, Fanon, Peau Noire, Masques 
Blancs  113. 
267 Fanon, "The Lived Experience of the Black,"   184, Fanon, Peau Noire, Masques 
Blancs  88. 
268 Fanon, "The Lived Experience of the Black,"   184, Fanon, Peau Noire, Masques 
Blancs  88. 
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this sociality as well. This dual status of the Black entails difficulties. 
His assimilation to the social order depends on his status as object –– 
the means by which he becomes presentable to the other even if only 
through the distortions to which the other in its perception must 
subscribe. Yet the Black is not found as object but must be made one, 
be acted upon, in order to accede to the social order: 
 
Les nègres, du jour au lendemain, ont eu deux systèmes 
de réfèrence par rapport auxquels it leur a fallu se situer. 
Leur metaphysique, ou moins prétensieusement leur 
coutumes et les instances auxquelles elle renvoyaient, 
étaient abolies parce qu’elles se trouvaient en 
contradiction avec une civilisation qu’ils ignoraient et qui 
leur en imposait. (Peau, 89) 
 
Overnight, Negroes have had to situate themselves with 
regard to two frames of reference. Their metaphysics, or, 
less pretentiously, their customs and the instances to 
which they referred, were suppressed because they were 
found to be in contradiction with a civilization that they 
did not know anything about and that was impressive to 
them. (Lived, 184) 
 
 
The Black becomes definable once submitted as object to the 
projection of intelligibility constitutive of the logic of representation 
governing our modern self-understanding. This suppression of 
customs and culture that accompanies the Black’s alteration is also a 
transformation, as if one moved from the perception of the Black and 
its objects to that of the Black as its objects. It renders these 
 213 
“instances” as objects of knowledge available to the particular fields 
(i.e., anthropology, history, ethnology, etc.) to which they refer. And yet 
the Black, within Fanon’s text, also acquires status as the signifier of 
the logic of representation that grounds such knowledge. He purports 
to be the exemplar of the arrival to subjectivity as evidenced through 
both the narrativization of its becoming and the promise in its 
aspirations (“mon âme pleine du désir d’être à l’origine du monde”/“my 
soul filled with the desire to be at the origin of the world”). These two 
moments, the Black as object and subject –– as object within and 
subject grounding the social field –– articulate the paradox the Black 
inhabits. The cleavage that inheres within the colonial subject marks 
the space proper to this subject as well: colonialism comes to be 
figured as the site of sociality proper to the Black. Yet within this 
frame, the colonial socius challenges the logic of representation and 
the subject that it produces. For the Black must fulfill two opposing 
demands: he must be black (i.e., object) and the Black (i.e., subject), 
ground of a specific sphere of sociality, the colony. It seems the Black 
is in the odd position of having to assume the guise of an other who is 
none other than itself. And although this situation would appear to 
follow a quite recognizable trajectory for the constitution of the 
subject, it arrives with this proviso: that this reflection, rather than 
legitimizing, identifies an impoverishment in the Black’s capacity as 
 214 
subject. The object that it supposedly produces from its position as 
subject defines the colonial subject’s truth as always already the object 
that it beholds. 
 By locating the paradox within and to a certain extent as the 
colony, Fanon appears to distinguish it, in its essence, from having 
any consequential relation to the purity of the European socius or its 
subject. Yet, Fanon’s work, regardless of its apparent claims to the 
contrary, seems to harbor the suspicion that the discordance identified 
with the colonial subject extends well beyond it: 
 
Il y a bien le moment de “l’être pour l’autre”, don’t parle 
Hegel, mais toute ontologie est rendue irréalisable dans 
une société colonisée et civilisée. Il semble que cela n’ait 
pas suffisemment retenu l’attention de ceux qui on écrit 
sur la question. Il y a, dans la Weltanschuung d’un peuple 
colonisé, une impureté, une tare qui interdit toute 
explication ontologique. Peut-être nous objectera-t-on qu’il 
en est ainsi de tout individu, mais c’est se masquer un 
problème fondamental. L’ontologie, quand on a admis une 
fois pour toutes qu’elle laisse de côté l’existence, nous ne 
permet pas de comprendre l’être du Noir. Car le Noir n’a 
plus à être noir, mais à l’être en face du Blanc. (Peau, 88) 
 
There is of course the moment of the “Being-for-others”, of 
which Hegel speaks, but ontology is unrealizable in a 
colonized and civilized society. It seems that this fact has 
not sufficiently retained the attention of those who have 
written about the question. There is an impurity in the 
Weltanschauung of a colonized people, a defect that 
forbids any ontological explanations. It might be objected 
that that is the case for every individual, but it would 
merely cover up a fundamental problem. When one has 
admitted once and for all that ontology leaves existence 
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aside, one sees why it does not allow for understanding 
the being of the Black. It is not a question of the Black 
being black anymore, but rather, of his being black 
opposite the White. (Lived, 184) 
 
 
The issue here is not whether the European shares the ontological 
defect that afflicts the Black; after all, Fanon posits a seeming 
equivalence between “colonized and civilized society” in regards to this 
question. Without this equivalence the objection –– one Fanon never 
truly manages to dismiss –– expressed by those who would demur 
from Fanon’s articulation of the issue, i.e., that all individuals might 
suffer from such an “impurity,” could not be raised. It seems, 
therefore, that circulating within this passage is another “question” to 
be situated between the Black and colonization. If we focus on the 
temporality of the Black’s double bind, that “anymore” which 
structures the key sentence, we find that we are reduced to one of two 
possible interpretations. In one possible reading the temporality that 
structures the Black’s situation would appear to both point back to 
moment in which the Black was black “with his own” and gesture to 
the present, construing it as the result of the transformation initiated 
by the Black’s encounter with the White gaze. From this perspective 
“being black opposite the White” means being black in an altogether 
different way. But this would seem to contradict the explicit claim that 
ontology remains “unrealizable in a colonized and civilized society,” 
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and the implicit assertion, that this “is the case for every individual.” It 
is this latter assertion that distracts from the “fundamental problem,” 
not because it is false but because it deceives. Fanon, in other words, 
never claims that this defect is not “the case for every individual.” 
Rather, he states the problem in different terms by drawing attention 
to the manner in which it is figured, qua problem, within discourse. 
Moulard in her translation renders the passage as “it would merely 
cover up a fundamental problem,” yet the word Fanon uses, masquer, 
not only connotes to hide but to do so via some manner of disguise or 
deceit, fundamentally, to dissemble. With this slightly altered 
meaning, the “question” that innocently begins and frames the 
‘blackness’ of the Black requires further attention, because it is 
precisely the “question” that dissembles. It dissembles not in terms of 
its content, that is, the answers that it provides, but in its mere status 
as question, as the form through which beings are registered.269 In 
                                                
269 My development of the notion of question relies on Heidegger’s reflections on the 
operations and legitimizing gesture of modern science. For Heidegger, the modern 
scientific posture does not situate itself in relation to an object already constituted in 
the phenomenal world but projects a sphere in which it operates. It projects, in other 
words, an order of coherence in which the phenomena that inhabit the field acquire 
intelligibility. However, they assume intelligibility only insofar as they are categorized 
in reference to the governance of science. This projection of coherence binds the 
intelligibility of phenomena to the terms of modern science (and the elements 
through which it is articulated, i.e., projection, rigor, methodology, and ongoing 
activity) and thereby strengthens the link between modern science and the form of 
self-understanding of which it is a product. In other words, modern science does not 
reconfigure phenomena in terms of an understanding that emerges from the nature 
of phenomena; rather it imposes the logic of its form of understanding. The Black 
must submit to a gaze that is both scientific and informed by the regime of the 
subject whose emergence Heidegger analyses. Question here articulates this dual 
frame, that of a disciplinary/discursive modality, i.e., the terms through which 
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producing the Black as its blackness (i.e., its objecthood), the question 
circumscribes the space from which the Black registers and is 
produced, partaking of that logic through which the Black is defined. 
It would seem that Fanon’s “anymore” refers as much to the question 
at the beginning of his sentence, as to any other element within it. 
And, if so, then it is the question that requires changing as much as 
anything else. What is required in other words, is a reconsideration of 
the Black as the site in/of question(s). Understood within these terms, 
Fanon’s Black ceases to be in any sense in which discourse would 
make that being representable (“It is not a question of the Black being 
black anymore”).270 And, yet to withdraw the Black from the sphere of 
representation means to also displace the “question” that subtends it, 
gives it form, and articulates it within that sphere (“It is not a question 
… anymore”). In other words, the Black must be submitted (if this is 
even the correct word) to another form of opening, to a different 
articulation of its world.  
 
                                                
particular spheres of knowledge operate and the establishment of a regime, that of 
the subject, with its attendant economy of representation. See Heidegger, "The Age of 
the World Picture,"   118-26. 
270 Fanon’s syntax registers the discordance that I’m emphasizing through its us of 
the negative: “Car le Noir n’a plus à être noir…” (Italics mine).Fanon, Peau Noire, 
Masques Blancs  88. 
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